Volume 138 — Maryland Reports

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Dusty, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Construction of Will — Limitation on Marriage — Cross-Limitations.</p> <p>' A devise to one “to have and enjoy the same until she marries,” with a limitation over upon her marriage, creates an estate upon special limitation, and is valid, there being no condition in restraint of marriage. p. 19</p> <p>A devise to one “until she marries” gives only a life estate, subject to be defeated by her marriage. p. 21</p> <p>Where testatrix devised property to her niece until she married, with a limitation over to nephews upon the niece’s marriage, held that the limitation over should be read as to take effect on either death or marriage, so that no intestacy would arise upon the death of the niece unmarried. pp. 20-22</p> <p>Where a limitation over, upon the marriage of a niece, in favor of the niece and two nephews, provided that in ease of the death of any one of them, his or her share should revert to the other two, and in case of the death of two of them, the remaining one should take, and in case of. the death of all three, the property should go to their descendants, share and share alike, held that upon the death of the niece a life estate passed to the brother or brothers surviving her, with a limitation over, upon the death of the last surviving brother, to the descendants of the niece and nephews, share and share alike.</p> <p>p. 23</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Caroline County (Adkies, O. J., and Hoppbb, J.).</p>

<p>Sale of Motor Truck — Live Load Capacity — Construction of Contract.</p> <p>In a contract for the sale of a motor truck, a specification, “Saurer chassis with a maximum guaranteed live load capacity of ten thousand pounds with regular equipment in accordance with standard specifications,” held not to involve a guaranty merely that the truck should have a capacity of 11,500 pounds, inclusive of the body, by reason of the fact that the vendor’s catalogue, under the heading “Saurer five ton, General, Mechanical Specifications,” contained the clause, “Capacity. — Normal carrying capacity inclusive of body, 11,500 pounds.”</p>

<p>Injunction Refused — Issue as to Title.</p> <p>When an injunction is sought as a primary, and not a mere auxiliary, remedy, and the title relied on is contested on grounds apparently substantial, such relief will not be decreed until the title has been established at law. . p. 48</p> <p>Only an absolutely clear and urgent right could justify a court of equity in causing an interference with railway operations and the convenience of the public by the issue of a mandatory injunction compelling the removal of the tracks and buildings of a railway company from land claimed by plaintiff, p. 49</p> <p>Where, after an offer by the equity court to retain the bill for an injunction until the question of plaintiff’s title could be determined in a court of law, the plaintiff refused to resort to a court of law for that purpose, it was proper to dismiss the bill.</p> <p>p. 50</p>

<p>Removal of Executor — Neglect of Duty — Appealable Order.</p> <p>An executor’s neglect of duty in not promptly and regularly proceeding to secure the adjudication of tlie rights and interests of the estate with respect to certain funds in dispute, held not such as to require his removal. p. 53</p> <p>The authority of the Orphans’ Court to remove an executor for failure to render accounts in due time is not so far discretionary as to preclude an appeal from an order refusing to remove him for that cause. p. 54</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, In Equity (Duncan, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from tire Superior Court of Baltimore City ('Sopee, C. J.).</p> <p>The cause was argued before Boro, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Pattisow, Urher, Stookbridgb, Adkihs, ' and Oeetttt, LT.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Oo-urt of Baltimore Oity.</p>

<p>Wills — Attestation Clause — On Envelope Enclosing Will.</p> <p>The attestation clause, if not on the same sheet of paper as testator’s signature, must be on a paper physically connected therewith. p. 78</p> <p>A will is not sufficiently attested when the will, as signed by testator, is placed in a sealed envelope, and the attestation clause and the signatures of the witnesses are then written across the sealed portion of the envelope, and on the outside thereof. pp. 79, 80</p>

<p>Appeals from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Soper, C. J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City (Stump, J.).</p>

<p>Murder — Evidence-—Confession—Other Crime — Previous Course of Life — Harmless Error.</p> <p>A confession or statement by one accused of murder, the making of which was not influenced by any promises, threats, or inducements of any kind, was admissible. „ p. 103</p> <p>Evidence of the movements of one accused of murder, shortly before and after the commission of the crime, were admissible as reflecting on her culpability. p. 106</p> <p>Testimony that the persons charged with a murder, after its commission, left the state in an automobile the use of which was procured by a second murder, was admissible against one of the accused, although the testimony involved such other crime, the case being tried before the court sitting as a jury, and it being shown that she had been acquitted of a charge of larceny in connection with the second murder, and that a nolle prosequi was entered as to her in a prosecution for such murder.</p> <p>p. 109</p> <p>Evidence which is relevant to the crime charged is admissible, although it tends to prove defendant guilty of another crime, but not because it so tends. p. 109</p> <p>On a trial before a court sitting as a jury, when evidence of another crime is admitted, it may be presumed that the judges understood that the accused could not be convicted of such other crime. p. 110</p> <p>On a prosecution for murder, committed in the course of an expedition in which defendant, her husband, and another man participated, and which was planned, as she knew, for the purpose of robbing a bank, and followed by the larceny of the automobile of the person murdered, held that it was proper to show, on defendant’s cross-examination, what was her course of life before the murder as regards soliciting men, not for the purpose of proving her character, but in order to find out, if possible, what part, if any, she had in the life of her husband and the other man while they were getting ready to rob the bank, and also as reflecting upon the question whether she acted under coercion by her husband. pp. 110-114</p> <p>Evidence that defendant had been convicted of the crime of kidnapping was admissible to affect her credibility. p. 114</p> <p>On a prosecution for murder, charged to have been committed while defendant, her husband, and another man were on an expedition in which it was sought to rob a bank, held that the admission of evidence as to her subsequent participation with her husband in a robbery committed in another state, while erroneous, was not cause for reversal, the trial being before judges sitting as jurors, and the evidence properly admitted clearly ‘showing depravity of character. p. 115</p>

<p>Bill of Lading — Federal Statute — Filing Claim for Loss— Waiver of Delay.</p> <p>In the case of a bill of lading issued pursuant to the authority of the Interstate Commerce Act and the amendments thereof, its force and the nature and extent of the obligations created by it are Federal questions, in passing on which the construction placed by the United States Supreme Court upon those laws and things done pursuant to the authority thereof is to be accepted as final. pp. 119,120</p> <p>A provision in a bill of lading, issued pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act and amendments thereof, limiting the time for filing a claim for loss, cannot be waived by the carrier, nor can it estop itself from taking advantage thereof. p. 120</p> <p>A letter from a shipper to the carrier, requesting the latter to locate certain goods not received, does not, together with the bill of lading and paid freight bill, constitute a written claim for the loss of such goods, within the provision of a bill of lading requiring such a claim to be made within a limited time.</p> <p>pp. 122,123</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Howard County (Forsythe, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal — Printing of Record — Removal of Executor.</p> <p>A motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant did not pay the cost of printing the record within the time required by the rules of the Court of Appeals, and because of “his failure to have the appeal ready for argument,” will be overruled, if the record is printed before the appeal is called for argument. p. 129</p> <p>That an executor failed to state an account within the time prescribed by law, held not ground for his removal, there being no evidence that he intended to wrong anyone, and no person having been prejudiced by the delay, and he declaring his willingness to apply the funds in his hands in payment of the funeral expenses and costs of the administration, for which purpose they were barely sufficient, and to state an account.</p> <p>pp. 134-136</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Confession—Harmless Error — Evidence.</p> <p>A statement by the defendant as to his movements on the day of the murder, which, if true, excluded him from any participation in the crime, was not inadmissible because there was no preliminary proof that it was voluntary, as it was subsequently proved to have been. p. 140</p> <p>In so far as a statement by defendant amounted to a confession of guilt, the refusal to allow him, before the admission of the statement in evidence, to testify as to its involuntary character, was error. p. 140</p> <p>Error in refusing to allow defendant to testify and offer evidence as to the involuntary character of an alleged statement by him constituting a confession, before its admission in evidence, held harmless in view of his subsequent denial that he had made any of the statements relied on by the prosecution.</p> <p>pp. 140,, 141</p> <p>In view of defendant’s denial that he had made any of the statements relied on by the prosecution, it was proper to refuse to permit him subsequently to be asked whether, if any statement had been made by him, it was made voluntarily. p. 141</p>

<p>Construction of Will — Repugnant Glauses — Intention.</p> <p>A will in terms giving testator’s personal estate to his wife . for life or during her widowhood, and at her death or marriage all his estate both real and personal to his niece, and finally giving to his wife all his real estate, held to give to the wife the real estate for life only, the final clause being evidently intended merely to correct his previous omission to give it to his wife for life. p. 144</p> <p>The rule that as between two repugnant clauses in a will, the latter one will be preferred, is subject to the paramount rule that the intention of the testator as gathered from the whole will is to prevail. pp. 144,145</p>

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stanton, L).</p>

<p>Judicial Sale — Jurisdictional Averments — Disposition of Proceeds.</p> <p>Tile test of the jurisdiction to decree a sale is whether the bill by which it is invoked can be maintained against a demurrer.</p> <p>p. 172</p> <p>In a bill by a life tenaiit of land for the sale of a part thereof under Code, Art. 16, sec. 228, the effect of the jurisdictional allegation that a sale would be advantageous to the remainder-men, plaintiff’s children, as well as to plaintiff herself, was not destroyed by the further averments that the purpose of the proposed sale was to realize a sum sufficient to discharge the taxes upon the balance of the land, and so prevent the loss to the remaindermen, by reason of the sale of plaintiff’s life estate for taxes, of the continued occupation of such balance as their home. pp. 172,173</p> <p>The provision of the statute that the court shall direct the investment of the proceeds is secondary to that authorizing a decree of sale, and does not require such decree to contain a direction for investment. p. 174</p> <p>An error in regard to the disposition of the proceeds of sale, while subject to correction on appeal or bill of review, does not impair the rights of the purchaser under a decree of sale passed in a case in which the jurisdiction of the court has been effectually invoked. p. 174</p> <p>A purchaser at a judicial sale, who has fully paid the purchase money, is not required to concern himself with its subsequent application. p. 175</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wicomico- County, In Equity (Bailey, J.).</p> <p>The cause was argued, tog'ether with that next preceding*, before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Brner, Adkins, and Oeeutt, JJ.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stanton, J.).</p>

<p>Assignment of Leasehold, — Irresponsible Assignee.</p> <p>The lessee of a sub-ground rent is not required to retain the ownership thereof for the protection of his landlord, or to alien it only to solvent and responsible persons.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stanton, J\).</p> <p>The causes were argued before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Pattison, Urner, Stockbridge, Adkins, and Oeeutt, JJ.</p>

<p>Sale of Decedent’s Land — Direction to Executor.</p> <p>If executors, directed by the will to sell testator’s land, fail to comply with such direction, any party in interest may proceed, under Code, Art. 16, sec. 94, to bring about a sale. p. 215</p> <p>if the necessary parties are before the court, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, mere irregularities in the proceeding are not sufficient grounds for setting aside the sale.</p> <p>p. 215</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Soper, C. J.).</p>

<p>Construction of Will — “Children" Not Inclusive of Grandchild..</p> <p>Where property was given in trust for the children of a niece of testatrix “until the youngest of said children reach the age of eighteen years, when said trust shall cease,” and said property “shall be equally divided, share and share alike, between said children or those surviving,” and a child .of the niece died after testatrix and before the youngest child arrived at eighteen, held that a child of such deceased child did not share.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Pete® and Worthington, LL).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City (Dawkins, J.).</p> <p>The cause was jargued before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Pattison, Urner, Stockbridge, Adkins, and Offutt, JJ.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Non-Payment of Rent.</p> <p>In an ejectment suit, a paper filed by tbe defendants’ attorney, stating that an amount therein named is brought into court “to be paid to the plaintiff” as “accrued rent on the property” mentioned in the declaration, sufficiently discloses the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant to justify the passing of an order directing the discontinuance of the action upon the payment of the amount named. p. 250</p> <p>In cases of ejectment by a landlord, under Code, Art. 75, sec. 73, modifying St. 4 Geo. 2, ch. 28, for the non-payment of rent, one in actual possession of leased premises, who is the only child and next of kin of the recognized assignee of the tenant-under the lease of plaintiff landlord, is within the class of persons named in the latter statute as entitled to pay or tender the rent and costs to the landlord, and thereby secure the discontinuance of the ejectment proceeding. p. 251</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Hendebsow, J.).</p>

<p>Authority of Agent — Sale of hand — Power in Mortgage — Beal Estate Broleer — Contract of Sale.</p> <p>The mere relation of attorney and client does not authorize the attorney to sell property belonging to the client. p. 259</p> <p>A contract for the sale of land, executed by one as “attorney” for the owner, held not to have been entered into by virtue of a power of attorney contained in a mortgage previously given to' him by the owner. pp. 260, 261</p> <p>The fact that, in a transaction between an attorney and his client, by which the former is authorized to sell the latter’s property, there is no express authority to make a contract of sale binding on the principal, is evidence tending to show a lack of such authority. p. 264</p> <p>A verbal authority to make a contract does not authorize an agent to make one under seal. p. 263</p> <p>One authorized to make a contract for the sale of another’s land must make a contract binding on the other party thereto, and if the contract purports io be executed by an agent in behalf of such other party under the latter’s seal, authority under seal should be shown. p. 265</p> <p>One employed to find a purchaser for land, or “to sell” land^ has, in the absence of express authority to that effect, no power to sign a contract of sale. pp. 266-269</p>

<p>City Ordinance — Removal of Ashes — Improper Discrimination.</p> <p>A city ordinance which limits to fifteen bushels per week the amount of ashes to be removed by the city from any dwelling house, apartment house, or tenement house, is not so capricious, oppressive, unreasonable, or discriminative as to invite or permit judicial interference.</p>

<p>Givil Action for Conspiracy — Refusal to Sell.</p> <p>A civil action on the case for conspiracy lies only when some right of plaintiff is knowingly violated and damage results as the direct and proximate consequence of such violation. p. 282</p> <p>In the absence of any breach of contract or showing of fraud, no action will lie by reason of defendant’s refusal to do business with plaintiff, defendant having the right to select its own customers. p. 283</p>

<p>Baltimore City — Opening of Street — Injunction—Preliminary Advertisement — Parkway as Street — Tender of Compensation.</p> <p>If Baltimore City undertakes to condemn land for a street under an ordinance which is void,, that a property owner fails to appeal from the decision of the Commissioners for Opening-Streets does not prevent him from asking the aid of equity.</p> <p>p. 288</p> <p>The title of the Baltimore City ordinance of April 25, 1911, providing for the opening of Gwynn’s Falls Parkway, held correctly and sufficiently to describe the subject-matter. p. 288</p> <p>In the absence of any showing to the contrary, a notice preliminary to the passage of an ordinance for the opening of a street, published in accordance with the requirements of the Baltimore City Charter, sec. 828, may be presumed to have been published by an “official, officer, employee, agent or agency” of the city, within the meaning of Act 1908, eh. 142, authorizing a notice to be published by such person or agency, under certáin circumstances, in a German newspaper. p. 289</p> <p>Though Baltimore City Charter, see. 828, requires a preliminary notice of a street opening ordinance to be given by advertisements published as therein directed, and “also” by filing a map on or before the first day of publication, the map may be referred to in the advertisement, and made a part thereof, in order to make the description more easily understood. p. 291</p> <p>A “parkway” or “boulevard” is a street for the purpose of ■condemnation proceedings under the Baltimore City Charter, and the city is not prevented, by subsection 4 of section six, in reference to the purchase or condemnation of land for parks, ■squares, boulevards and parkways, from proceeding, under sec-¡i<m 825, to condemn a parkway or boulevard, which is a street and a highway. p. 292</p> <p>That a proceeding to condemn land for a long street and parkway, under a city ordinance passed for the purpose, is still pending, and the street and parkway is not yet actually opened, does not preclude the passage of another ordinance closing and relocating parts of the proposed street and parkway as described in the prior ordinance. pp. 293-29C</p> <p>In affirming a decree sustaining a demurrer to a hill filed by property owners to restrain proceedings to condemn land for a street on 1ho ground that the ordinances under which such proceedings were instituted were invalid, held that the affirmation should he without prejudice to the plaintiff filing a hill for an injunction, if necessary to prevent the city authorities from raking possession of the property before they were entitled to do so. " p. 297</p> <p>The provision in section 827 of the Baltimore City Charter, authorizing the city to pay into court the money awarded in condemnation proceedings, in case, by' reason of conflicting claims, refusal to accept, or any other cause, such money cannot be safely and reasonably paid to any person or persons, does not require the money so paid into court to be legal tender, even though it may he a better practice to make a legal tender when that can conveniently be done. pp. 297, 298</p> <p>A refusal by the property owner to accept such money on the ground that it was not legal tender was utterly inconsistent with allegations by him that the ordinances under which the eondonmanon proceedings were instituted wore void. p. 298</p>

<p>Construction of Instrument — Meaning of “Legal Age."</p> <p>A father conveyed property in trust for his children, the income to he applied, so far as necessary, for their support and education “during their minority,” and each son’s share of the principal to he paid over to him on his arrival at the age of twenty-one years, while as to the share of the daughter the entire net income was to he paid to her after her arrival at “legal age.” Exactly similar language was used hy the father in creating a trust hy will executed on the same day. Held, that “legal age” meant eighteen years, this being the age at which a female can give a valid receipt or release to a guardian or trustee.</p>

). The plaintiff’s second prayer was as follows: At the request of the plaintiff the court rules that if the court, sitting as a jury shall find from the evidence the following facts: 1. That the plaintiff has been appointed by the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, trustee, to succeed John Glenn and Robert Purviance, Jr., trustees appointed under a certain deed of trust offered in evidence in this case as recorded in Liber T. K. 318, folio 330, etc. 2.

<p>Three appeals in one record from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stantoe, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Soper, C. L).</p> <p>The cause was argued before Both, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Pattisoh, TJrwer, Stookbridge, Adkins, and Offutt, JJ.</p>

<p>Aavigable Waters — Patent for Accretions — Act of 1862.</p> <p>The Act of 1862, ch. 129 (Code, Art. 54, sec. 47), giving to the proprietor of land bounding upon any navigable stream all accretions to said land, applies regardless of whether the accretions start at the shore and extend outward to the channel, or start at the channel and extend inward to the shore. p. 343</p> <p>The provision of the Act of 1862, ch. 129 (Code, Art. 54, sec. 49), that no patent thereafter issued shall impair or affect the rights of riparian proprietors on a navigable stream, held to preclude the issue to one person of a patent for accretions which lay between the channel of the stream and shore land belonging to another person, since this would not only exclude the latter from the use of the navigable stream, but would also prevent him from exercising his statutory right to make improvements into the waters in front of his land. pp. 333-343</p> <p>Whether the rights of riparian proprietors would be impaired or affected by the issuance of a patent, so as to fall within the prohibition of the statute, is largely to be determined upon 1 lie facts and circumstances of each particular case. p.343</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll Comity, In Equity (TiroarAS, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stanton, J".).</p>

<p>Appeal front the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, In Equity (Peale, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ( jVEoss, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Sopee, O. L).</p>

<p>Special Act .of Incorporation — Validity—Adverse Possession.</p> <p>Since the general incorporation act then in force limited the duration of corporations formed thereunder to forty years, a special act of incorporation passed in 1884, which gave the corporation so created the power to perpetuate its existence, was within the exception to Const. 1867, Art. 3, sec. 48, which declares that private corporations shall not be created by special act “except in cases where no general laws exist, providing for the creation of corporations of the same general character as the corporation proposed to be created.” pp. 406, 407</p> <p>A charitable corporation having been in exclusive, continuous, and adverse possession of certain property for thirty-six years prior to the filing of a bill by it for the specific performance of a contract to purchase such property, and having throughout that time used and enjoyed the property for the purposes for which it was incorporated, held that it could convey a good and marketable title and was entitled to a decree. pp. 408-410</p>

<p>Judicial Notice — Foreign Law — Evidence—Equitable Lien — Defective Chattel Mortgage — Seizure of Chattels by Creditor — Equity Jurisdiction.</p> <p>In the absence of statutory requirement, the courts of one state do not take judicial notice of the unwritten or “judge made” law prevailing in a sister state, but proof thereof must be furnished by experts. p. 417</p> <p>Statutes of other states can only be proved as a fact by an authenticated copy of the law in question, or by reading it from an authorized publication containing such law. p. 417</p> <p>In the absence of proof as to the law of another state, the rights of the parties are to be determined by the law of this State. p.437</p> <p>A chattel mortgage, though lacking the affidavit as to the bona fides of the consideration, required by statute, and not recorded, is in effect an equitable lien upon the property therein named. pp. 418, 419</p> <p>A creditor who takes possession of chattels belonging to his debtor, with notice at the time of an equitable lien thereon in favor of another creditor, does not thereby acquire priority over the latter. p. 421</p> <p>One having an equitable lien on chattels of his debtor is entitled to appeal to a court of equity to enforce and protect his lien as against another taking possession of the chattels for a pre-eyisting claim against the same debtor, and threatening to dispose of them by sale and to appropriate the proceeds, p. 421</p>

<p>Support of Child — Duty of Father — Deprivation of Custody— Agreement Pending Divorce — Action by Mother— Cost of Necessaries.</p> <p>' The primary liability of the father for the support of the children is not affected by the fact that a decree of divorce gave the custody of the children to the mother, without making any provision for their support. ' pp. 428-435</p> <p>The mother of an infant child is not, by' a decree granting her a divorce, estopped from maintaining an action against the father for necessaries subsequently supplied by her for the support and education of the child; and that the court which rendered the decree was by statute' authorized to provide therein for the support of the child is immaterial, if it did not so provide. pp. 431, 439</p> <p>While agreements made pending suits for divorce between ‘the parties thereto are not in all cases and under all circumstances necessarily void, yet they are usually regarded with suspicion, and while the court may, in making its decree, take them into consideration, it is not bound to do so, nor will any such agreement be permitted to release or relieve either party of any natural or legal obligation, owed to the children of the marriage, when it would not be to the interest of or for the welfare of the children to permit that to 'be done. p. 438</p> <p>An agreement between husband and wife during the pend-ency of a suit by her for divorce on the ground of adultery, relieving the husband from liability for the subsequent support of a child of the marriage, in consideration of the immediate payment by him of a named sum, inadequate for the reasonable support and education of the child, held invalid as opposed to the welfare of the child, and consequently no defense to an action by the wife for the cost of necessaries subsequently purchased by her for the child. pp. 438, 439</p> <p>A judgment for the defendant in a suit for the cost of necessaries alleged to have been purchased by the plaintiff for defendant’s child before a certain date is not res adjudícala in a suit by the same plaintiff against the same defendant for the cost of necessaries alleged to have been purchased after that date for the child. p. 439</p> <p>A judge is not disqualified to sit in a suit to recover for necessaries furnished after a certain date to defendant’s child because he has previously sat in a suit by the same plaintiff against the same defendant to recover for necessaries furnished the child before such date. p. 440</p> <p>An exception based on the refusal of a prayer offered at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, seeking to take the case from the jury, cannot be considered if defendant elected to go on with his case and offered testimony in support thereof. p. 440</p> <p>The refusal to permit counsel for defendant to refer to the record of another suit between the two same parties held proper, this being a collateral matter not relevant to any issue in the case. p. 440</p> <p>Certain typewriting on the cover of an agreement, forming no part thereof, held immaterial and inadmissible. p. 441</p> <p>In an action by a woman against her divorced husband for the cost of necessaries purchased by her for their infant son after a named date, held that there was no prejudicial error in admitting evidence as to payments made by her for the son’s support prior to that date, it complementing other testimony in the case, and showing the application of money received by her from defendant, under an agreement made at the time of the divorce. p. 441</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, In Equity (Peter, J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Heuisler, J.).</p>

J., Bailey and Due®, JT.). The parties submitted the following prayers.

<p>Discharge of Surety■ — ■Alteration of Contract — Consent .of Receivers — Authority of Court.</p> <p>Where a contract for dredging a channel to a named depth and width was four years later modified by a contract which extended the limits of the channel to be dredged and expressly contemplated an increase in the amount of material to be removed, held that this involved such an alteration of the original contract as to discharge the surety on the earlier contract, although this latter in terms recognized the x>ossibility of its subsequent modification. ' pp. 476-480</p> <p>Where the surety on a government contract was in the hands of receivers when a supplemental contract, calling for additional work, was entered into, the court could authorize the receivers to consent to the new contract, or could decline to permit them to do so, in which latter event the government could either require other security, or could decline to give the new contract to that contractor. p. 479</p>

<p>Insolvent Corporation — Interest on Claim — Foreign Judgment — Full Faith and Credit Clause.</p> <p>That the lower court of another state, to which a cause had been remanded by the appellate court on affirming the judgment of the lower court, in passing an order which in terms affirmed its former judgment, in accordance with the local practice, stated the amount of interest thereon to the time of affirmance by the appellate court, did not entitle the judgment creditor to the amount of such interest, accruing after the appointment of receivers ft>r the debtor, as against the latter’s other creditors receiving no interest on their claims. pp. 485, 486</p> <p>A judgment of another state, when filed against assets in the hands of receivers in the courts of Maryland, has no priority over unsecured Maryland claims. p. 486</p> <p>The “full faith and credit” clause of the United States Constitution, while it protects judgments of other states from being inquired into as to the merits of claims merged in them, gives them no preference in the distribution of assets, it having reference to the fact and validity only of judgments and not to the effect or manner of their enforcement. p. 486</p> <p>The courts may, in distributing the assets of insolvents, disregard interest. ' p. 487</p> <p>The allowance of interest on foreign judgments is determined by the lex fori. p. 487</p>

<p>Death by Wrongful Act — Death of Wrongdoer — Survival of Liability.</p> <p>The rule of the common law, that an action for an injury to person or property, for which unliquidated damages only can be-recovered, dies with the person to whom or by whom the wrong-was done, is in force in Maryland except in so far as it has been modified by statute. p. 490</p> <p>An action on account of death caused by another’s wrongful act is an action “for injuries to the person” within the meaning-of Code, Art. 75, sec. 25, excepting such actions from the statutory provision against the abatement of actions by death, p. 490-</p> <p>An action on account of death caused by another’s wrongful act is an action for “injuries to the person” within the meaning-of Code, Art. 93, sec. 104, excepting such actions from the statutory provision that executors and administrators may be sued in any action which might have been maintained against the deceased. p. 491</p> <p>Code, Art. 67, secs. 1, 2, giving a right of action for wrongful death against “the person who would have been liable if' death had not ensued,” being in derogation of the common law and hence to be strictly construed, does not, directly or by implication, create a cause of action against the personal representatives of the estate of such person, in the event of his death prior to the recovery of a judgment against him on account of his tort. p. 493;</p>

<p>Real Estate Broker — Action for Commissions — Averment as to License — Evidence.</p> <p>That the declaration, in an action by a real estate broker for commissions, failed to aver that plaintiff had a broker’s license, held not to render the overruling of a demurrer thereto reversible error, although Acts 1918, ch. 493, see. 699A, makes a contract for the payment of commissions to a real estate broker unenforcible and void if he has not first obtained a license as such. pp. 499-501</p> <p>Where a defendant, relying upon a supposed technical defect in the allegations or proof of the plaintiff, withholds an absolutely conclusive defense, known to him at the time of trial, and then immediately available to him without inconvenience or expense, the principle that any doubt that may exist as to the validity or force of objections presented on appeal is to be resolved in favor of sustaining the judgment appealed from, should be applied with more than ordinary emphasis. p. 500</p> <p>In a suit by a real estate broker for commissions, the action of the lower court in allowing the plaintiff to testify that he had a broker’s license, and in refusing to require record evidence of that fact, held not to constitute reversible error, it being presumed that, if there had not been a license, defendant would have proved that fact by records known to him to be readily accessible, and that he would not have stood on a mere technicality. p. 501</p>

<p>Promise to Marry — Justificaiion for Breach.</p> <p>When no time is fixed for the wedding, the marriage is to be performed within a reasonable time according to the circumstances of each particular case; and where no place is fixed, the-home of the bride is prima facie, by the custom of society, the-place for the marriage. p. 509</p> <p>That a young girl, after agreeing, at the instance of her lover, when they were away from her home, to marry where they were, on further reflection determined not to do so, in the absence of her parents and without their consent, not however refusing to marry him later, did not justify her lover in breaking the engagement. p. 510</p>

<p>Appeal from the1 Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Hiiursleb, J.L</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Heuisler, J.).</p>

<p>City Bridge — Extinguishment of JAghts — Evidence as to Other Accidents — Husband Driving Wife’s Automobile — A gency.</p> <p>In an action on account of negligence in failing promptly to repair the electric lights upon a bridge, after they had been extinguished by a storm, as a result of which plaintiff’s automobile was injured, it was proper to exclude evidence as to the number of accidents which had occurred at this same place, there being no evidence that the weather conditions were similar. p. 525</p> <p>In an action for injury caused by plaintiff’s automobile running into the wall of defendant’s bridge as a result of the extinguishment of the lights by a storm, held that the exclusion of evidence offered by plaintiff as to the occurrence of an accident at the other end of the bridge on the same night was, if erroneous, harmless, there being no actionable negligence shown on the part of defendant. p. 526</p> <p>The agency of the husband for the wife cannot be inferred merely from the relationship of husband and wife. p. 527</p> <p>That a husband uses his wife’s automobile, not for her business blit in connection with his own occupation, does not constitute him her agent in so doing, so as to charge her with his negligence. p. 527</p> <p>A short circuit of the electric current supplying lights on a bridge, resulting from unusual weather conditions, and causing their extinguishment, is not a latent delect. p. 527</p> <p>A city which undertook to repair the lighting system of a bridge, impaired by unusual weather conditions, within thirty to forty minutes after that condition was made known, cannot be charged with any laxity in this respect. p. 528</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (StawToy J.).</p>

<p>Prosecution for Larceny — -Evidence—Other Grimes — Joint Defendants — Separate Trials.</p> <p>Oil a prosecution for larceny of a brooch from a jewelry store, which defendant first entered under the pretext of bringing a ring to be repaired, it having been proved that defendant gave the brooch to a friend to bo pawned for him, evidence that he-stole other articles from the same store between the time of leaving the ring for repair and the larceny of the brooch, and that he gave them to the same friend to be pawned, was admissible as tending to prove that the larceny of the brooch was one of a connected series of crimes .committed in the execution of a continuous scheme of theft. p. 535-</p> <p>While ordinarily proof of another larceny by the accused is. not received to establish his guilt as to the larceny for which he is indicted, yet such evidence is admissible where it bears on the issues in the case on trial, as where it shows or tends to show intent, motive, guilty knowledge, or a common scheme, plan, or system. • p. 536'</p> <p>On a prosecution for the larceny of jewelry, which the evidence tended to show was delivered by defendant to a friend for the purpose of pawning it under a- fictitious name, held that, under the special circumstances, the admission of evidence that this friend frequently received from defendant other jewelry for the purpose of pawning it in the same manner, without any showing as to whence this jewelry was obtained, was not reversible error. p. 537</p> <p>When of two persons jointly indicted, one submits his case for trial by the court and the other for trial by a jury, the court cannot properly, during the trial of the latter before the jury, hear testimony which is inadmissible against the latter, although it is admissible against the former. p. 538-</p> <p>When, on a trial before a jury, the court heard evidence which was not admissible as against the defendant then on trial, though it was admissible as against one jointly indicted with him, who had elected to be tried by the court, held that, although the court ruled that this testimony could not he considered as against the defendant then on trial and told the jury to disregard it, its admission was ground for reversal. ' p. 539</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Hetjist,ek. J.).</p>

<p>Appeals from the Circuit Court for Talbot County, In Equity (Amarra, C. J.).</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit. Court, of Wicomico County (Doer and Bailey, JJ.).</p>

<p>Defect in Street — Contributory Negligence — Directing Verdict.</p> <p>Unless there is some prominent and decisive act in regard to which there is no room for ordinary minds to differ, a case should not he withdrawn from the jury on the issue of contributory negligence. p. 584</p> <p>In an action for injuries caused by a defect in a sidewalk, which had existed for three months or more, and of which plaintiff had full knowledge, held that it was proper to direct a verdict for defendant on the ground of contributory negligence.</p> <p>p. 585</p>

<p>Appeal .from the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City (Hbuisler, J.).</p> <p>The cause was. argued before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Patttsox, Henee., S'tockbridge, Adkws, and Offutt, J,T.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stanton, J.).</p> <p>The cause was argued before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Thomas, Pattison, Urner, iStocicbridge, Adkins, and Okfittt, JJ.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City ¡'Duffy, J.).</p>

<p>Specific Performance — Sale of Land — Pime as Essence— Authority of Attorney — Evidence.</p> <p>In respect to tlie character of proof required to establish a contract sought to be specifically enforced, it is plaintiff’s duty to make out the case set up in the bill with such distinctness, certainty and legality in all its parts that the court may have no difficulty in deciding exactly what the contract was. The proof nmsi be clear and explicit, leaving no room for reasonable doubt, and must in every essential particular correspond with the terms of the contract set up in the bill. p. 625</p> <p>Time is not to be deemed to be of the essence of a contract unless it is expressly stipulated in it, or is to be inferred from its nature or the circumstances of the case. p. 626</p> <p>A written memorandum of a contract for the sale of land, acknowledging the receipt of a deposit, and reciting that the sale is- “to be concluded within thirty days of deposit, otherwise the deposit to be forfeited,” shows that time was of the essence of the contract, especially when taken in connection with undisputed evidence that at the time of delivering the contract the vendor’s daughter told the purchaser that unless it was settled in thirty days he would not get the property, and that the vendor had reasons for restricting the time for settlement, p. 627</p> <p>An attorney at law, employed in that capacity to examine a contract of sale and to protect the vendor’s interests therein, has no authority, by virtue of his employment and his profession, to vary the contract by extending the time for its performance. p. 628</p> <p>In a proceeding for specific.performance of a contract of sale of which time was of the essence, held that plaintiff purchaser’s delay in performance was not the result of statements made by the vendor’s attorney and her daughter, so as to estop the vendor from asserting such delay. p. 629</p>

<p>Appeal from the Commissioner of the Land Office.</p>

<p>Auction Sale of Land — Misrepresentation by Auctioneer — ' Rescission in Equity.</p> <p>A bill by a purchaser to set aside an auction sale on the ground of misrepresentation by the auctioneer is not insufficient as failing to allege any specific damage, when it recites facts which make it apparent that unless such purchaser completes the purchase of this property, he will lose the amount deposited by him at the time of the sale. p. 648</p> <p>Equity has jurisdiction to set aside a sale of property at auction on the ground of misrepresentation by the auctioneer of a material fact. p. 648</p> <p>A bill by the purchaser at an auction sale to set aside the sale upon the grounds of misrepresentation by the auctioneer as to the duration of outstanding tenancies on the property, held not demurrable. p. 650</p> <p>That the owners of the property, at the time of the auction sale of the property, did not know the duration of the tenancies, is immaterial if they, while thus in ignorance of the true facts, acquiesced in a misstatement in this regard, made by the auctioneer in their presence, by which the purchaser was misled.</p> <p>pp. 650, 651</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Duffy, J.).</p> <p>Action by the Realty and Insurance Exchange', a body corporate, against Charléis .Sahm. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Worcester County, In Equity (Bailey, J.).</p> <p>Bill by Annie Adams against the Peninsula Produce Exchange of Maryland for an injunction. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Market Stalls — Powers of Mayor and City Council.</p> <p>The Mayor and City Council oí Baltimore lias'the power, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to regulate and control markets and stalls, to grant a permit to enclose a stall to the existing curb line, in conformity with other enclosures in the same market.</p>

T.). Petition by the County Commissioners of Baltimore County by way of appeal from an order of the State Tax Commission. Prom an order dismissing a motion in behalf of the Commission to dismiss! such appeal, and reversing the order of the Commission, the Commission appeals.