Buchanan v. Rose’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 115 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 127 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “There are many instances in which it may be said, as a matter of law, that there is a duty to do something, and in others it may be said, as a matter of law, that there is no such duty. Using familiar illustrations, it may be said generally, on the one hand, that if a party negligently creates a dangerous situation it then becomes his duty to do something about it to prevent injury to others if it reasonably appears or should appear to him that others in the exercise of their lawful rights may be injured thereby. On the other hand, it may be said generally, as a matter of law, that a mere bystander who did not create the dangerous situation is not required to become the good Samaritan and prevent injury to others.”

   19 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman · SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe

2. ““(1) Appellants allege that the four special findings (63, 64, 65 and 66) upon which the Trial Court based its judgment are subject to attack upon the following grounds: (a) Jimmie Lofton had no duty to warn at the time and on the occasion in question; (b) Jimmie Lofton had no duty to anticipate negligent conduct on the part of the Defendant (Harwell) ; (c) The two groups of special issue findings (63-64 and 65-66) are shades and phases of one general issue of failure to warn; (d) There is no factual proof that Lofton’s failure to warn caused his injuries, and such findings are speculative; (e) There is no proof, factually, of what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, for the purpose of establishing negligence; and (f)There are no pleadings to support the findings of contributory negligence on the part of the Defendant, Raymond Norman, and the pleadings of the Defendant, Harwell, are insufficient to support said findings. (2) Findings of contributory negligence cannot bar a recovery under the Wrongful Death Statute. (3) The Trial Court erred in failing to award attorney fees to the attorney ad litem.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lofton v. Norman