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138 Wash. 174

246 P 27

Esteb v. Esteb

Washington Supreme Court

Decided March 25, 1926

Washington Supreme Court · decided 1926-03-25

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““I am ready to somewhat reluctantly yield to the amount of the award viewing the needs of the child apart from her claimed educational necessities.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Jackman v. Short

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1926-03-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 59 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2012 · most notably Yarborough v. Yarborough (1933), 550 So. 2d 986 - Ex Parte Bayliss (1989)

54 state decisions — followed in 22 states

1101926193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1 On Petition eoe Rehearing.

¶2 lEn Banc. May 24, 1926.]

Per Curiam.

¶3 By reference to the Departmental opinion it will be noted that the father of a minor child appealed from the decision of the trial court providing maintenance for the minor, and that, during the pendency of the appeal, he died and his executrix was substituted as appellant in his stead. These facts are stated in the opinion. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

¶4 Appellant urges, upon petition for rehearing, that the trial court may construe the decision as requiring the executrix to continue the payments after the decedent’s demise, and asks us to change the wording of the opinion to remove any doubt as to whether we intended to hold that the order providing for the maintenance should, in spite of the father’s death, be effective until the minor becomes of age, thereby requiring the executrix to continue the monthly payments specified. We think the opinion not open to such construction. In order, however, to remove any doubt, we hold that the monthly amounts provided for in the decree are payable only until decedent’s death. The order was a personal one, requiring the father to pay, and could not be effective as to his estate in any manner after his death, except as to payments theretofore due and unpaid.

Parker, J.

¶5 (dissenting) — I dissent from the view that a father is under legal obligation to furnish means for this child to acquire more than a high school education, situated as this father was prior to his decease; *186 though I am ready to somewhat reluctantly yield to the amount of the award, viewing the needs of the child apart from her claimed educational necessities.

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