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139 Ariz. 406

678 P.2d 987

Docket No. 2 CA-CR 3429.

State v. Cook

The STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Linda Nayda COOK, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

Decided March 13, 1984.

Court of Appeals of Arizona · decided 1984-03-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“to lead on; to move by persuasion or influence”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Dansereau v. Ulmer

Relies on State v. Darby · 10 Ariz. App. 399 - Klensin v. City of Tucson · State v. Carruth

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-03-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently July 2009

19 state decisions

120198419902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*407 Frederick S. Dean, Tucson City Atty. by Frank W. Kern, III, Tucson, for appellant.

¶2Kelly C. Knop, Tucson, for appellee.

¶3OPINION

¶4BIRDSALL, Chief Judge.

¶5This appeal is from the judgment of the superior court in Pima County affirming the dismissal of the criminal charge against Linda Nayda Cook. The dismissal was based on a finding that Tucson City Code § 11-28(3) was void for vagueness and therefore unconstitutional. We hold the statute is not void for vagueness and is constitutional and reverse.

¶6*408 The statute in question declared it to be a misdemeanor to be "in or near any thoroughfare or any public place for the purpose of inducing, enticing, or procuring another to commit an act of lewdness, fornication or unlawful sexual intercourse."

¶7We begin by recognizing the presumption in favor of constitutionality. Klensin v. City of Tucson,10 Ariz. App. 399, 459 P.2d 316 (1969); State ex rel. DeConcini v. Gatewood,10 Ariz. App. 274, 458 P.2d 368 (1969). We next note that a statute is not vague if it is sufficiently clear to give a citizen notice of the conduct which is prohibited. State v. Darby,123 Ariz. 368, 599 P.2d 821 (App. 1979); State v. Carruth,132 Ariz. 368, 645 P.2d 1282 (App. 1982).

¶8The instant statute proscribes the act of being in or near a thoroughfare or public place combined with the purpose of inducing, enticing or procuring another to commit a certain act or acts. This court's decision in State ex rel. Williams v. City Court of Tucson,21 Ariz. App. 489, 520 P.2d 1166 (1974) is in point. In Williams the statute said a person is guilty of loitering when he loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging. The act, "loitering", was combined with the specific intent to beg.

¶9There is nothing vague in the language of the statute. All of the words have generally accepted meanings.

¶10To induce is to lead on; to move by persuasion or influence.

¶11To entice is to draw on by arousing hope or desire; tempt; lure.

¶12To procure is to get possession of; to get and make available for promiscuous sexual intercourse.

¶13Lewdness is the state of being sexual unchaste or licentious.

¶14Fornication is sexual intercourse other than between married persons.

¶15All of these definitions come from Webster, Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1965).

¶16The ordinance clearly prohibits solicitation in a public place for prostitution. It is not vague. It is not void. It is not unconstitutional.

¶17Reversed and remanded to the Tucson City Court.

¶18HATHAWAY and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

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