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← 139 F.3d 865 - Arrington v. Cobb County

Arrington v. Cobb County’s Empirical Analysis

139 F.3d 865 · 1998

Citation profile

124
cited by 124 later decisions
1
states following
April 2021
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 124 later decisions — most recently April 2021 · most notably Burton v. City of Belle Glade (1999), Walker v. Mortham (1998)

27 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

6601998200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Equal Pay Act of 1963) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Corning Glass Works v. Brennan · Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 124 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, an employee must show that “an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’ ” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 , 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); Waters v. Turner, Wood & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 874 F.2d 797, 799 (11th Cir.1989). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the jobs at issue are substantially similar; a plaintiff does not have to show that the skills or qualifications of the actual male and female employees holding the positions are also substantially equivalent. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1533 (11th Cir.1992) (“[0]nly the skills and qualifications actually needed to perform the jobs are considered.”). Moreover, “[t]he prima facie case ... focuses solely on the primary duties of each job, not duties that are incidental or insubstantial,” and, although formal job titles or descriptions may be considered, the controlling factor in the court’s assessment of whether two jobs are substantially equal must be actual job content. See id. Finally, a plaintiff does not have to prove that two jobs are identical but rather must show that the “skill, effort and responsibility required in the performance of the jobs are substantially equal.” Id. (emphasis ad”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[P]roof that a defendant’s articulated reasons are false is not proof of intentional discrimination; it is merely evidence of intentional discrimination. However, evidence of intentional discrimination is all a plaintiff needs to defeat a motion for summary judgment. That evidence must be sufficient to create a genuine factual issue with respect to the truthfulness of the defendant’s proffered explanation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.