Koster v. Matson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 57 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A person soliciting permission or accepting an invitation to ride as 'guest’ may assume the host will drive with due care. Suppose the host gives such attention to the speed at which he is driving that he is guilty of slight negligence. Instead of driving with more care, he increases speed until he becomes guilty of ordinary negligence. He then increases speed until he is guilty of gross negligence. As the rate of speed increases, danger increases, and need of the guest to take measures for his own safety becomes more and more imperative. If he does nothing, his negligence is of the same grade as that of the driver’s negligence, and he cannot recover.” (p. 130.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Donelan v. Wright

2. ““He certainly is required to do whatever is reasonably necessary to avoid injury to himself. If he had time and opportunity to do so he could have warned the driver, could have protested against the excessive speed or have asked the driver to stop and allow him to leave the automobile. Whether a warning protest or request would have been heeded by the defendant is questioned, but whatever the effect would have been, as the danger was obvious, it was the duty of Sharp at least to remonstrate against the dangerous speed or insist that he be allowed to leave the car if there was time to do so after the danger became apparent.” (p. 739.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Donelan v. Wright

3. ““In. this state, and apparently in Nebraska, reckless or wanton conduct differs not in degree but in kind from negligent conduct, and such a thing as wanton ‘negligence’ cannot exist. If the conduct be wanton it is not negligent. If it be negligent it is not wanton. Reckless or wanton conduct also differs from intentional conduct, because intent to injure is not present. However, in this state, for the practical purpose of an action for damages, recklessness or wantonness puts the wrongdoer in the same class with a willful wrongdoer. [Citing;] . . . Railway Co. v. Lacy, 78 Kan. 622, 629 , 97 Pac. 1025 .” (p. 128.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cohee v. Hutson