Volume 14 — Connecticut Reports

IN ERROR. The original action was trespass, brought by Henry Patterson against Sheldon C. Johnson, to the county court of New-Haven county, for killing and destroying ten hens and chickens, the property of the plaintiff. There was also a special count in case, for the same injury. On the trial before the county court, November term, 1839, the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, the allegations in his declaration.

This was an action of assumpsit. There were four counts in the declaration. Held: and now holds, the plaintiff responsible to him for the amount of the execution. The defendant thereupon objected to the testimony of Steele, on the ground that he was interested in the event of this suit. The court over-ruled the objection, and admitted the testimony.

IN ERROR. This was an action of book debt, brought by Towner and Mitchell against Fisher. Held: that the provisions of that statute are applicable to commissioners on insolvent estates. Stoddard v. Moultrop, 9 Conn. Rep. 502. Sturges & al.v. Peck & al. 12 Conn. Rep. 139. English &. al. v. Smith & al. 13 Conn. Rep. 221.

IN ERROR. This was a bill for foreclosure, brought by Henry Hotchkiss and Lucius Hotchkiss against Isaac Mix, Thomas Mix, George C. Mix, William Mix, Silas Mix, Jesse Peck and Elizur Hubbell.

This was an action upon a policy of insurance, made on the 14th of February, 1837, for the premium of 400 dollars, on 280 hides belonging to the plaintiffs, from Mobile to New-Yorlt, on board the… Held: that the insured were entitled to recover for a total loss. The facts are very similar, and equally strong, in the case before the court. contended, 1. That a total loss oí part of the thing insured will not, in the case memorandum articles, enable the assured to recover.

IN ERROR. This was a bill in chancery, brought in August, 1838, for an account of water used by the defendants, beyond the proportion to which they were entitled. The situation of the water in question and of the manufac-tories of the parties to which it was applied, appears from the report of the former case of Kennedy & al. v. Scovil & al. 12 Conn. Rep. 318.

This was an action of assumpsit for money had andreceiv-ed¿ The defendants pleaded the general issue, which was closed to the court. The cause was tried at Middletown, February term, 1840, before Sherman, J., who found the following facts. The plaintiff is an inhabitant of the town of Clinton, and liable to taxation therein.

This was a bill in chancery to foreclose mortgaged premises.

This was an action of book debt, commenced by writ of attachment, and returned to the superior court, held at Mid-dletown, on the fourth Tuesday of February, 1839. The writ was directed to and served by Edward Rutty, an indifferent person. The magistrate who signed the writ, made the following indorsement thereon, before it was served: “Middle-sex county, ss. Chester, January, 5th, 1839.

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit for tolls, brought originally before a justice of the peace.

This was a bill in chancery for a foreclosure and other relief. The material facts stated in the bill, on which the principal question arises, are these.

This was an action on the case for the neglect and refusal of the defendants to transfer to the plaintiff two shares of their stock claimed by him, and to pay him certain dividends which had been declared thereon.

This was an action qui tarn on the statute prohibiting the alienation of lands of which the grantor is ousted, to any other person than the one in possession, brought against the grantor, to recover the penalty given by that statute for such alienation.

This was an action to recover 2000 dollars, the penalty of a replevin bond.

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Bartliolomeu) C. Baxter against Jeremiah R. Gay and Harriet, his wife, for the recovery of the sum of 50 dollars, for land conveyed by the plaintiff and bis wife to Harriet Gay, one of the defendants, upon an agreement made by the parties while she waá unmarried. The action was commenced May 30th, 1838. The declaration contained several counts. The facts alleged were substantially these.

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit in five counts, brought by phase against the Chesnut-Hill Reservoir Company, a body corporate, duly constituted, to the county court of Windham county. The first count ^vas upon a promissory note, for 55 dollars, dated November 16th, 1836, payable on the 1st of December, 1837, with interest, in the usual form of declarations on promissory notes.

This wás a bill in chancery for a confirmation of title.and for a foreclosure. In January, 1828, Silas Smith and Samuel E. Joy, being the owners of three lots of land in Thompson, sold and conveyed them to James Cunningham, Thomas Dike, Augustus Howe, Jacob Levins, John Chollar, Jude Sabin, James Dike and Erastus Buck.

Tins was a scire-facias in a process of foreign attachment. The original suit was brought by the plaintiffs against Jo-, seph Mortimer, of the city of New-York; and the writ was served, by leaving a copy thereof with the present defendants, on the 24th of February, 1837.

This was an .action on the case.- The declaration, after stating the corporate capacity of the defendants, and their general powers in that capacity, alleged, that ever since the incorporation of the defendants, they have supported and managed said canal, and received the tolls thereof, and are and have been liable to keep said canal and the works connected therewith in good condition and repair, and so that the property of other persons should, not be injured, by the works…

This was an action on the case against Eli Pitkin, an ófficer, who had attached property in a suit brought by the plaintiffs against one Levi McKeet The cause was tried at Hartford, January term,… Held: that a recognizance on an appeal was not discharged, by a judgment in favour of the appellant, where a new trial was granted, and, at a subsequent term, a judgment in favour of the appellee was rendered.

This was an action of trover for a certain white ram, of the Dishley breed, alleged to be of the value of 200 dollars. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and a special plea, setting forth the proceedings and judgment in a former action of replevin between the same parties, relating to four sheep, pf which the ram mentioned in this declaration was one.

This was an action of assumpsit for supplies furnished, By the plaintiffs, to Julia, the wife, and Catharine, the daughter, of Anson Francis. Anson Francis was born in Hartford, in 1797 ; was married to said Julia, in 1820 ; and resided in Hartford until the year 1823. He then resided in Farmington, a year and d half; when he removed back to Hartford, and resided there Until the year 1826.

This was an action of assumpsit to recover of the city of Hartford the suni of 500 dollars, as a reward for discovering and bringing to conviction a criminal. The plaintiff’s claim was founded on the following advertisement : “ City of Hartford. At a court of common council, held on Tuesday, the 2d of April, 1839.

IN ERROR. This was an action of trespass, for assaulting and imprisoning the plaintiff, without any lawful or reasonable cause, brought originally by Bryant against Mérriman, before a justice of the peace, and appealed to the county court. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice of special matter to be given in evidence.

This was an action of debt on a recognizance. Held: that the bond was legal and valid. If there is no statute provision on the .subject, and the bond is not inconsistent with the principles of the common law, it is valid. There is no statute directing to whom the bond on an appeal from probate shall be taken ; and yet if taken to the judge of probate, it is valid.

This was an appeal from a decree of the court of probate for the district of Hartford, approving the will of Sally Russ, deceased.

This was an action of trespass for taking and carrying away a quantity of iron ore, amounting to 500 tons and upwards. The cause was tried at Litchfield, August term 1840, before Waite, J. The plaintiff, who was a deputy sheriff, claimed title to the ore in question, by virtue of the service by him, as such officer, of several writs of attachments against the Ousatonic Iron Company, in behalf of the creditors of that company, on the morning of the 17th day of October, 1838.

This was an action of assumpsit to recover the amount of a tax imposed by the town of Cornwall upon certain lands of the plaintiff, which he had been compelled to pay.

This was an action on a promissory note; the declaration being in the usual form. The cause was tried at Litchfield, August term 1840, be-, fore Waite, J. The plaintiff offered in evidence the following note : “ Gole-brook, April 26th, 1838. On demand, for value received, we promise to pay D. C. Y. Moore, or order, two hundred and fourteen dollars, and seventy-five cents, with interest. D. C. Y. Moore, Wm.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The declaration alleged, That on the 31st of January, 1838, the plaintiff owned and possessed a certain tract of land, [describing it,] and while he owned and possessed the same, at Stam- ■ ford, on said 31st day of January, the defendant, with forcé and arms, unlawfully broke into and upon said tract, and then and there, with like force and arms, did cut down and destroy 200 trees then and there standing and belonging to…

This was an action of trespass de bonis asportatis ; tried at Danbury, September term, 1840, before Storrs, J. The property, for the taking of which this action was brought, consisted of a quantity of Rio Grande ox horns, and combs manufactured from them, some finished and others in an unfinished state. The plaintiffs claimed this property by purchase from God-frey Shultze.

This was an action on the covenants in a deed of land. There were three counts in the declaration ; but it will be sufficient to state the third only, that being the most comprehensive.

This was an action of trespass. The declaration stated* That at Stamford, on the 1st of April, 1839, the plaintiff was in the lawful and quiet possession and occupancy of the room over the store of Andrew Perry in said Stamford, situated a few rods West of the town-house ; in which room the plaintiff had, for the year preceding that time, published, and was then engaged in publishing, a news-paper, called “ The Democratic Sentinel,” and had in said room divers articles, of…

IN ERROR. This was a complaint, brought by William R. White, against David Bailey, as his lessee, before John 8.

This was an action of trespass vi et armis. The defendants pleaded severally, first, the general issue, with notice of special matter to be given in evidence, and then two special pleas, which it is not necessary here to state.

This was an action of trespass for damage done to the plaintiff’s close, by the defendant’s cattle.

This was an action brought to the superior court in Fair-field county, by Elijah Middlebrooks of Trumbull in that county, against The Springfield Fire Insurance Company.

This was an action of trespass, in two counts; the first quare clausum fregit, the other de bonis asportatis.

This was an action on the case against Theophilus Nichols, a deputy sheriff, for neglect of duty in relation to certain goods, which he had attached in a suit brought by the plaintiff against George Jones, on a promissory note.

IN ERROR. This was an action of debt, brought by John G. Pagó against Silas Mix, Esq., on a recognizance for prosecution, given by the latter, in an action* pending in the county court of New-Haven county, in favour of Ichabod Umberjield, -against said Page.

This was a bill in chancery for a foreclosure of mortgaged premises.

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Tolles against Colburn ; the declaration consisting of three counts.

<p>ín order to sustain a suit in chancery, it is necessary that the plaintiff should have an interest in the subject of that suit, or a right to the thing sought*</p> <p>Therefore, where A, being the owner of a tract of land supposed to contain minerals, on the 21st of January, 1839, by a written instrument, granted liberty to B, to dig or mine on such land, and to carry away any mineral which he might dig thereon, within one year; and B, on the 11th of May, 1839, by a writing signed by him, on the back of such instrument, assigned to C, all his interest, right and privilege in the land therein mentioned, with the appurtenances, and ail benefit and advantage derivable from such instrument; after which, B brought a bill in chancery against A and others, for a specific performance of the agreement; it was held, 1, that the agreement was not of a fiduciary character or in the nature of a personal confidence, so as to be incapable of assignment; nor 2. was the interest of B of that uncertain and contingent description, that it could not, on that account, be transferred; and consequently, that\B, having parted with all his interest in the subject of the bill, it ought, for that reason, to be dismissed.</p>

<p>A partition of real estate held in common, is matter of right; and the difficulty of making partition, and the inconveniences resulting to the other tenants, furnish no sufficient reason for denying it.</p> <p>B owned two pieces of land, with a stream of water running through them, on each of which he had a mill, propelled by the water of said stream. On the upper piece, he had a dam, mill-pond, flume and conductor. The water for the use of both mills passed from the dam through the flume. That for the use of the upper mill was taken from the flume, by means of two orifices in it; and that for the use of the lower mill, by means of a conductor inserted in the flume, and extending from it to the mill. B conveyed to S the upper mill site, and one half of the pond flowed by the dam, by a deed containing the following clause; “ always provided, and this deed is given on condition, that the grantor is to have and retain the privilege of conveying water from said dam, through a conductor similar to the one now in use, till the same shall arrive at the East end of the new shop, [the upper mill] and thence, either by aeonductor, race or otherwise, to the shop [lowermill] lying East of the new shop.” The rights of B in the lower mill, afterwards became vested in K and S\ K owning two thirds, and S one third. On a bill in chancery for a partition, brought by S against A, it was held, that the fair construction of such reservation was, that the grantee was to have one half of the water, and the grantor the remaining half, with the privilege of carrying that half, ac-cross the premises granted, to the shop retained by the grantor; 2. that the mode of partition best fitted to do justice to the parties, was, to divide the water, by means of equal orifices, at the same level; it being found, that the expense of this mode would be inconsiderable in comparison with the disadvantages of a different mode; but 3. as it was not found of what dimension such orifices ought to be, it would be necessary to send the case again to a committee, to determine of what size, form and level they should be made; 4. that on partition being so made, an injunction previously granted, on the application of K, restraining Sin the use of the water, ought to be dissolved.</p>

<p>Where a writing, purporting to be a certificate that B had deposited a sum of money in the Chelsea Bank of the city of New- York, dated Chelsea Bank, July 6, 1839, and payable on the 1st oí December then next, to the order of B, and the return of the certificate, and signed “ W. president,” was assigned to C, for value received, by an indorsement thereon, subscribed by B; it was ¡held, that such indorsement was a bill of exchange, imposing on the parties the ordinal liabilities attached to that kind of paper.</p> <p>Zt seems, that the 21st sect, of the statute of New- York, known as the general banking law, providing that u contracts made by any such association, and all notes and bills by them. issued and put in circulation as money, shall be signed by the president or vice-president, and cashier thereof,” applies, by the true construction thereof, only to such contracts, notes and bills, as are made for, and intended to be used as, a currency.</p> <p>In an action against the indorser of a certifícate of deposit issued by an association in fact organized under the general banking law of Ncw-York, which certificate was signed by the president, but not by the cashier: it was held, that the want of the cashier’s signature was unavailing as a defence, because the association might, by a course of practice, render itself liable on such instrument, though not executed in the modeprescribed; because it did not appear on the face of the instrument, that it was executed by an association organized under such banking law ; and because it was not competent to the in-dorser to set up the invalidity of the instrument on account of the incapacity of the association to make the contract embraced in it; the indorser always warranting the existence and legality of the contract which he undertakes to assign.</p> <p>Where a certificate of deposit, by its terms, fell due on the 1st of December, which was Sunday; and one of the questions between the parties, was, whether by the general law of the state of Neiv-York, (the locus contractus,) it waspayable on the preceding Saturday or the subsequent Monday; and to prove such general law, two conflicting decisionsin that state were introduced, by the parties respectively, one of the superior court of the city of New-York, and the other by the supreme court of that state, it was held, that these decisions were admissible on such question; that the decisions of the latter court were higher evidence and entitled to greater weight, than those of the former; but that the decisions of neither court were to be deemed conclusive evidence of such law.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff in an action against the indorser df a certificate of deposit, ■offered evidence to shew, that although the general law of the state of New-York as to negotiable paper is otherwise, yet by the usage and custom prevailing in the city of New-York, this particular species of negotiable paper is notentitled to grace, and that when, by its terms, it falls due on Sunday, it becomes payable on the preceding Saturday; it was held, that such evidence was admissible, the law on this subject being explicitly and decisively settled.</p> <p>Such evidence is admissible on the principle of ascertaining and carrying into effect the intention of the parties, and thus doingjustice between them.</p> <p>Nor is such evidence obnoxious to the objection, that its effect is to vary, by pa-rol evidence, the written contract of the parties.</p> <p>Any form of notice to an indorser is sufficient to fix his liability, if the instrument in question was intended to be described in such notice, and the party "’'vPSf not misled or deceived thereby as to the instrument intended.</p>

<p>IN ERROR.</p> <p>This was an action of assumpsit for the support of Lewis Matson, Cynthia Matson, his wife, and their four minor children, brought, originally, by the town of East-Haddam against the town of Lyme, before Samuel A. Peters Esq., a justice of the peace for New-London county, at his dwelling-house in Colchester; there being no justice of the peace in either of the towns of Lyme or East-Haddam, who could lawfully try the cause ; and the town of Colchester, in which justice Peters resided, being one which next adjoined the town of East-Haddam, the plaintiffs in this suit.</p> <p>At the time and place mentioned in the writ, viz. at Col-chester, on the 18th of March, 1839, justice Peters held his court. The parties appeared ; and the defendants pleaded the general issue. On motion of the defendants, the court adjourned to the 3rd Monday of April, 1839, to be held at the South school-house in Hadlyme society, in the town of Lyme. The court was held at that time and place, according to the adjournment. The parties appeared, and were heard at large, with their evidence, and by their counsel. The court then adjourned the cause to the last Monday of May, 1839, to be held at Colchester. It was then and there held ’ accordingly. ^ *</p> <p>On the trial, it was proved and admitted, that Lewis Mat-son was born in Lyme, about the year 1790, and continued to be an inhabitant of Lyme to the year 1838, unless he acquired a settlement in East-Haddam subsequent to Mar chi 1820 ; that in February, 1820, he was lawfully married to a woman by the name of Eunice Crosby; that in April, 1824, said Eunice being still living and his lawful wife, he married a woman, by the name of Cynthia Smith, who was not an inhabitant of the town of Lyme, and never became an inhabitant thereof, unless by her connexion with Matson; that about the year 1830, said Eunice died ; that in November, 1837, he married said Cynthia over again; that said Matson, Cynthia and their four children, whom he had had by his inter-marriage with her, having been turned out of the house where they lived in Haddam, all went into the house of Jonathan Selden in East-Haddam, in July, 1834; that said Cynthia was then sick, poor and under necessitous circumstances, and so continued for a number of days ; that said four children were also poor, destitute and under necessitous circumstances ; that said Lewis Matson was then also poor, and wholly destitute of property, and had noplace to live in, and no where to go to.</p> <p>The plaintiffs introduced two witnesses, Jonathan Selden and Richard S. Pratt. The former testified, that in July, 1834, Lewis Matson, and his wife Cynthia, and their four children came to his house in East-Haddam, having been turned out of the house where they had lived in Haddam; that after they had continued at the witness’s house three or four days, he notified the select-men of East-Haddam, that they were there, and that said Cynthia was sick ; that Richard S. Pratt, one of the select-men, said, the witness must take care of them, and then he wrote a letter to the select-men of Lyme; that said Lewis, Cynthia and their four children^ staid at the witness’s house nine days, during which time, he supported them, and the select-men of East-Haddam paid him, for such support, six dollars, in a town order. The witness then added: “ Said Lewis sometimes came out and helped me load hay. 1 never asked him to help me : he was not sick : he never was a stout man : he could not do so much ES a common matl: be might then have earned four shillings a day ; but his attention was taken up in taking care of his wife.”</p> <p>Pratt testified as follows: “ In July, 1834, Jonathan Selden notified me, then a select-man of East-Haddam, that Lewis Matson and his family were at said Selden’s house ; and he requested me, as select-man, to remove them. I told Selden, he must take care of them. Selden came again, and notified me ; when I wrote a letter to the select-men of Lyme, and put it in the post-office in East-Haddam, giving them notice that said Lewis Matson, Cynthia and children were sick, and on expense in East-Haddam, and that East-Haddam looked to Lyme for legal charges. The select-men of East-Haddam paid said Selden six dollars, in a town order, for supporting said Lewis Matson and his wife and children.”</p> <p>This was all the evidence tending to show that Matson and his family were paupers, at the lime this support was furnished to them. To the admission of this evidence the defendants objected, claiming that it was inadmissible, for the purpose of charging them for such support, on the ground that said Cynthia and children were not inhabitants of Lyme, when the support was furnished ; and that if said Lewis was an inhabitant of Lyme, he was not a pauper. The court admitted the evidence ; and thereupon found, that said Cynthia and said four children were paupers ; that the first marriage W'ith her in 1824 was void, and that said four children were, consequently, illegitimate ; that said Lewis was a pauper of the town of Lyme, when the support was furnished ; and that the defendants were liable for the .support furnished to him, and for that only ; and rendered judgment accordingly.</p> <p>The defendants filed a bill of exceptions, and thereupon brought a writ of error in the superior court. That court affirmed the judgment of the justice ; and the defendants thereupon, by motion in error, brought the record before this court for revision, assigning the general error.</p> <p>contended, 1. That the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs, on the trial, was irrelevant and inadmissible. It not only did not conduce to shew that Matson was a pauper, but, on the contrary, it proved, that he was not one. He could earn four shillings a day, which would be 200 dollars a year. This was equiva- , lent to a fund of that amount in his hands. In Stewart Sherman, 4 Conn. Rep. 553., Wright, the person claimed to be a pauper, held a note against a responsible man for 96 dollars; and it was held, that so long as he had this property, he could not be a pauper.</p> <p>No deduction ought to be made from the fund in this case, on account of Matson's connexion with Cynthia and her illegitimate children. A man who has enough for his own support, cannot claim aid from the town because he wants to devour his living with harlots. This is creating “ a factitious necessity,” of the worst sort. Backus v. Dudley, 3 Conn. Rep. 572, 3.</p> <p>2. That this writ of error was not exceptionable as bringing up the whole case. We claimed, on the trial, that the testimony of Selden and Pratt was irrelevant, and, on that account, inadmissible. We were obliged to state this evidence, and the whole of it, in our bill of exceptions. Our objection still, is, to the competency of the evidence ; not to its sufficiency mare'y. S > far as this question is concerned, it is immaterial whether the evidence brought up, is all, or only a part of the evidence introduced.</p> <p>3. That the cause was coram non judice. (a) In the first place, it was not cognizable by a justice residing in Colches-ter ; that town being in a different county from the place of the plaintiff’s abode. By “ one of the towns next adjoining the place of his [the plaintiff’s] abode,” is meant a town in the same county. Secondly, if the justice could try the cause in Colchester, he could not adjourn into Lyme for trial. The adjournment back into Colchester to render judgment, did not cure the irregularity.</p> <p>contended, 1. That the testimony objected to, conduced to shew that Matson WaS ⅞ PauPer’ This was a question of fact, to be determined by the jury, from all the circumstances of the case. The court cannot know judicially, that four shillings a day is an adequate support for a man and his family ; for it appears that Matson had a family in fact, which he was morally, if not legally, bound to provide for.</p> <p>2. That the bill of exceptions was objectionable as bringing up the whole case. Watson v. Watson & al. 10 Conn. Rep 75. Picket v. Allen, Id. 146. Wadsworth v. Sanford, Kirby 456. McDonald, v. Fisher, Id. 339. 1 Sw. Dig. 771.</p> <p>3. That the justice had jurisdiction, and exercised it properly. In the first place, as there was no justice in either of the towns of East-Haddam or Lyme, who could lawfully try the cause, the plaintiffs properly brought their suit before a justice in Colchester, that being one of the towns next adjoining to the place of the plaintiff’s abode. Stat. 41. tit. 2. s. 22. The suit need not be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resides. The objection to the adjourned court in Lyme, comes with an ill grace from the party on whose motion and for whose accommodation the adjournment was made. But there is no solidity in the objection, come from what quarter it may. A justice of the peace is a county officer, and can exercise his office any where in the county. Kingsbury v. Phipps, 2 Root 357. 1 Sw. Syst. 105. He may try a cause wholly, in another town than that in which he resides. Humphreyville v. Perkins, 5 Day 117. Butin the present case, the suit was commenced and the judgment rendered in the justice’s own town.</p>

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit; to which the defendant pleaded a special justification. The replication traversed a part of the allegations in the plea; on which issue was joined. On this issue the cause was tried at Norwich, March term 1841, before Waite J.; when the plaintiff obtained a verdict, and the defendant moved for a new trial. The questions of law in the case sufficiently appear from the motion for a new trial.

This was an action on the case against the defendant, as sheriff of the county of New-London, for the default of one of his deputies. The cause was tried at Norwich, March term, 1841, before Waite, J. The plaintiff had prayed out a writ of attachment, in his favour, against one Smith; and had delivered it to one Mart, as the defendant’s deputy, who, by virtue thereof, attached all Smith’s right, title and interest in the ship Bingham and her cargo.

This was an action of assumpsit upon the warranty of certain articles of machinery, sold by the defendant to the plaintiff. The declaration consisted of three counts.

This was an action against James W. Barker, Horatio W. Paine and Otis M. Dorrance, on a replevin bond given by them to the plaintiff. From the declaration and subsequent pleadings, terminating in demurrers, the following facts appeared.

This was an action of assumpsit against the defendant, as the indorser of a promissory note, made by William Clark, for 828 dollars, 69 cents, dated April, 19th, 1839, and payable to the defendant, or order, at the Windham County Bank, 30 days after date. The declaration alleged, that the plaintiffs were a body incorporated by the laws of the state of New-York, by the name of “ The Phenix Bank of the City of New-York,” and made a proferí of their charter.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Amos Treat, as executor of Dolly Stanton, against John Stanton, executor of Adam Stanton, to recover certain moneys which the defendant’s testator had… Held: that where a contract has been made between two persons, for the benefit of a third, the parties to the contract may bring the action, and not the party beneficially interested.

This was a bill in chancery, for a proportion of the school money in the hands of the defendants. The following are the material facts, alleged in the bill, and found by the court.

IN ERROR. This was a bill for the foreclosure of mortgaged premises, brought by Asa Prince and Augustus Ormsbee. The following, are the material facts in the case.

This was an appeal from the report of the commissioners upon the insolvent estate of John Gilmore, deceased, by Elijah Hammond, claiming to be a creditor of that estate and interested therein, complaining of the allowance, by the commissioners, of a claim in favour of George Olmsted.

IN ERROR. This was an information against Adna Whiting for selling spiritous liquors contrary to the provisions of the statute of 1839, brought, originally, to the county court.

This was an action on the covenants of an indenture, dated , , . _ _ ^ _ executed by the parties, the 1st of March, 1831.

This was a scire-facias in a process of foreign attachment, setting forth a judgment obtained by the plaintiff against Francis Baby, an absent and absconding debtor, before the county court of Hartford county, on the second Tuesday of November, 1838, in an action of assumpsit on a promissory note. The defendants pleaded, that at the time the copy of the original writ was left in service with them, they were not indebted to said Francis Baby ; on which issue was joined.

This was an action on a promissory note of the following form : “ Berlin, October 20th, 1836, One year from date, I promise to pay Philip Norton fifteen hundred dollars, (value received) and interest. James M. Plumb, Mary Yale.” The cause was tried at Hartford, September term, 1841, before Slorrs, J. On the trial, it appeared that the suit was brought and prosecuted exclusively for the benefit of the estate of Frederick Dunham, deceased.

This was an action on the following written contract: “ Bristol, November 30th, 1836.

This was a bill in chancery, brought by George Cornwell and William, B. Booth, for an injunction and other relief. The bill stated the following case. The plaintiffs are the joint owners of a piece of land in Berlin, with the buildings standing thereon and the water privileges attached thereto. In 1827, Thomas Lee, since deceased, sold the premises to Theodore C. Bronson, and conveyed them, by a deed, to which there was a condition securing to the grantor the purchase money.

This was an action of trespass for a horse and a parcel of sheep-skins; tried at Hartford, September term, 1841,before Storrs, J. The… Held: and butchered and sold the sheep ; that the horse was held by the assignee, or by Gleason, his agent, until all the other personal property had been disposed of, and was used to transport that property to market; that repeated attempts had been made to sell the horse; and that it did not go into the assignor’s possession* at all,…

This was a bill in chancery, brought by George Roberts and Edwin G. Ripley, against Philip Ripley and Alonzo S. Beckwith, seeking for an injunction against the prosecution, by the defendant Beckwith, of an action at law, pending in his name, on a promissory note.

This was a writ of scire-facias in a process of foreign at-iii favour of Moses Atwood The cause was tried at Hartford, January term, 1842, before Williams, Ch. J. Butler and Gore, being in failing circumstances, had, with a view to their insolvency, before the commencement of the original suit, by an assignment, executed in the state of Ohio, transferred, in trust for the benefit of all their creditors, a debt due to them by the defendants, to E. W. Butler, a citizen of…

This was an application, by bill in equity, for an injunction to restrain the Hartford Bridge Company from rebuilding the causeway from their bridge Eastward through the East-Hartford meadows, bordering on Connecticut river, in the manner authorized and directed by the committee appointed by a resolution of the General Assembly in 1841, to whose acceptance such causeway was to be rebuilt, in the manner prescribed in said resolution ; and to restrain the committee from…

IN ERROR. After the decision of this court in the above-mentioned case, ante, 141. 146., the cause came again before the superior court, September term, 1841, when there was a further hearing.

This was a bill in chancery seeking a foreclosure of mortgaged premises.