Volume 14 — District of Columbia Reports

<p>Tee Case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>1 Gr. Ev., §§283, 300 ; 2 Pars. Cr., 566 ; Wright vs. Pond, 10 Conn., 255 ; Carter vs. Holman, 6 Mo., 498 ; 2 Pars. Cr. (5th ed.), 560, and cases cited in note g, eb seq.; Bradley vs. A., W. & G. Steam Packet Co., 13 Pet., 97; Phelps vs. Closen, 1 Wool., 204; Kock vs. Dnnckle, 90 Pa. St., 264 ; Steadman vs. Taylor, 77 N. C., 134; Jones vs. Dove, 6 Org., 188; S. Falls M. Co. vs. Goddard, 14 How., 446 ; Atkinson vs. Cummins, 9 How., 479 ; 2 Pars. Cr., 513, and note <?; Boyle vs. Colman, 13 Barb., 42 ; Hanley vs. Cole, 27 Me., 35 ; Under-hill vs. New York, &c., 21 Barb., 489 ; 1 Gr. Ev., §51a; McAllister's Case, 11 Skep., 139, and cases cited in the note to the last section; Carrol vs. Granite, &c., 11 Md., 399 ; Hatton vs. McElesh, 6 Md., 407 ; Hall vs. Patterson, 51 Pa., 289; Woodman vs. Dana, 52 Me., 9 ; Hopkins vs. Lee, 6 Wh., 109,114 ; Aspden vs. Nixon, 4 How., 467-497; Wash., A. & G. S. P. Co. vs. Sickles, 24 How., 333-342 ; Young vs. Black, 7 Cr., 565 ; Wood vs. Jackson, 8 Wend., 10; Lawrence vs. Hunt, 1.0 Wend., 80; Boynton vs. Morril, 111 Mass., 4; Hood us. Hood, 110 Mass., 463; Boloit vs. Morgan, 7 Wall, 619; City of Sacramento us. Eowle, 21 Wall., 120; Cromwell vs. County of Sac, 94 U. S., 351; Campbell vs. Bankin, 99 U. S., 261; Davis us. Brown, 94 U. S., 423; Castle us. Noyes, 14 N. Y., 329; Young us. Bonnell, 2 Hill, 478; Hampton us. McConnell, 3 Wh., 234; McElmory vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; Miles vs. Duryee, 7 C., 481; Conrad vs. Griffey, 16 How., 38; Many us. Jogger, 1 Blatch. C. C., 372; Angus rs. Smith, 1 M. and Malk, 473; Crowley us. Paige, 7 Car. & P. 789; 1 Wh. Cr. Law, § 762.</p> <p>Eussell vs. Place, 4 Otto, 606; Etheridge us. Osborne, 2 Wend., 399, 62 N. Y., 374; Gr. Ev., vol. 1, sec. 376. Commonwealth us. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 539-549; Beaver us. Taylor, 3 Otto, 46-55; Rogers vs. The Marshal, 1 Wall,, 644; R. R. Co. vs. Varrell, 8 Otto, 379-482; Newell vs. Doty, 33 N. Y., 83.</p>

<p>If an administrator pays a claim of a creditor of liis decedent’s estate, and returns it in his account, the Orphans’ Court may allow it or reject it; but if the administrator refuses to pay such a claim, the Orphans’ Court has no authority to adjudicate it; the creditor must seek its enforcement against the administrator in another tribunal.</p>

<p>Although the creditor’s name be innocently or accidentally (but not fraudulently) omitted from the schedule of creditors provided for by the Bankrupt act of March 2, 1867, the discharge and certificate is conclusive evidence in favor of the bankrupt, and a complete bar to a suit against him by the omitted creditor.</p>

<p>A payment by a stockholder of a building association, of his dues to one of its officers not having authority to receive them does not discharge the stockholder if the officer so receiving the money fails to payjt over; nor can the association charge the loss against its asserts in its account with the stockholders so as to diminish the value of their shares.</p>

<p>1. Whether the act of Congress of June 18,1874, providing for the registration of labels, is unconstitutional, And, therefore, void, queers.</p> <p>2. A government official cannot call in question the constitutionality' of a law directing him- to perform a purely ministerial duty.</p> <p>3. The duty of the Commissioner of Patents, on the application, to him to register a label, is a purely ministerial one, as much so as the act of a recorder of deeds in placing upon a public record a muniment of title. The statute has not defined what shall be considered a label, whether it shall be descriptive of the article to which it is affixed, or Whether it may bo a mere arbitrary design. If the applicant presents it as a label, and appeals to the Commissioner to give it the protection which the law provides for It as a label, the duty of the Commissioner is to register it, and in doing so he gives It only the protection which the statute provides. It is not protected as a trade-mark nor as a copyright. The public at large may use and enjoy it, but qua label it is restricted to the use’ of the party who has registered it for that purpose and no other. With the character of the device the Commissioner is not at all concerned. His function is as purely ministerial as it is capable of being.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>1. One cannot have a right of way over his own land as something separate from the fee simple ownership ; all such rights are considered merged in ' the ownership of the soil. Consequently where the owner of a lot which extended from the street in front to an alley in the rear, sells, “ with the appurtenances theieto belonging,” a portion of the lot, which portion fronts upon the street but does not quite extend to the alley, the term “appurtenances” does not carry with it a right of way to the alley over the part not sold. Such a right can only be conveyed by express grant.</p> <p>2. The owner of an easement in land can abandon or extinguish it if he chooses, and if he does so, and afterwards sells the land, the easement is no longer incident to it.</p> <p>3. Where a house is sold “ with the lot attached,” the question as to the extent and boundaries of the latter is one of fact for the jury.</p>

<p>1. In a case involving a question of law of great public interest and of great difficulty this court has sometimes directed a rehearing before the full court, but it has never been its practice so to refer questions of fact which have been once fully discussed.</p> <p>2. In a case which was heard before more than a legal quorum of the court and which involved merely the application of well-settled and undisputed principles of law to the facts, the court announced its judgment without rendering an opinion ; Held, That the fact that no opinion was rendered afforded no ground to grant a motion for a rehearing before a full court.</p> <p>3. A justice having no previous connection with a case, except to grant, at Special Term, a preliminary injunction on ex parte affidavits is not thereby disqualified to sit upon the final hearing of the case in General Term.</p> <p>4. A decree may be amended so as to allow costs to the party entitled.</p>

Dr. George N. Hopkins, a member of a Masonic lodge in Washington city, in good standing, in April, 1876, made application to tbe Masonic Mutual Relief Association for membership. In his application was the following: “Fifth.

Motion for a new trial' on exceptions. The action was brought to recover damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the alleged negligence of the defendant in not preventing or removing an accumulation of ice and snow on the footway and crossing at the intersection of Seventh street with Pennsylvania avenue northwest, in the city of Washington, where passengers are compelled to pass for the purpose of getting into and alighting from the street cars.

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit to recover tbe sum of $1,000, alleged to be due under a contract entered into between plaintiff and defendant.

<p>1. Whether the general superintending power granted by section 4986, R. S. U. S., to the Circuit Court of the United States over questions arising in the District Court,' when sitting as a court of bankruptcy, is possessed also by this court sitting in General Term over the Special Term when holding a court of bankruptcy, quaere.</p> <p>2. But even though this court possesses such power, it cannot interfere, except on appeal, to review an order passed by the Special Term holding a court of bankruptcy, when such order is appealable.</p> <p>3. By section 772, R. S. D. 0., any order passed in a cause by any special term of this c'ourt, is appealable to the General Term without regard to the amount involved, if it aHect the merits of the controversy; hence, the provision of the Bankrupt Act providing for appeals from the district courts to the circuit courts, where the matter involved is over five hundred dollars, does not apply to this court, for a general act does not apply to a case which is governed by a special act.</p>

<p>1. A corporate seal is not necessary to the validity oí the contract of a municipal corporation.</p> <p>2. By an act of Congress (May 15, 1820), the corporation of Washington was given express power to “erect, repair and regulate public wharves, * * « and to regulate the manner of erecting, and the rates of wharf-age at private wharves.” Under this power, instead of appropriating money to be expended in the construction of a wharf, the corporation contracted with the defendants, that if the latter would erect a wharf at their own expense, and deliver it up at the end of ten years, the corporation would allow them the use of the wharf for ten years, upon the further consideration of the annual payment of a thousand dollars, reserving the right on the part of the corporation to take possession of the wharf upon paying the cost, or a proportional part of the cost, with reference to the time of occupancy by the defendants.</p> <p>Held, A legitimate exercise of the power to erect wharves.</p> <p>3. The chief engineer of the army has no power to issue a license to erect wharves m the District of Columbia; whatever power the commissioners of the Federal city, to some of whose powers he succeeded, may have had in that respect, expired when Congress assumed legislative jurisdiction over the District.</p> <p>4. In an action to recover rent of a wharf, plaintiff, the District of Columbia, offered, without objection or subsequent contradiction on the part of the defendants, evidence showing that defendants had admitted holding the premises in question under a lease from the District, and had paid the District rent therefor under said lease.</p> <p>Held, That the court was warranted in assuming that the defendants held the property under this lease.</p> <p>5. Where a party enters into possession under a lease, he is estopped from questioning the right of his lessor.</p> <p>6. It is error to leave to the jury the question whether anything of valué was given to or conferred upon defendants by plaintiffs for payment of which suit is brought, as that leaves to the jury a question of law, i. e., value in its legal sense.</p> <p>7. Limitations may be pleaded to a parol contract to pay rent, when the contract consists of an ordinance of a municipal corporation, for leasing, assented to by the proposed lessee.</p>

<p>1. Inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the police court to convict an accused of an offence against the criminal laws of the United States, without a trial toy jury, has been acquiesced in for nearly fourteen years, this court declines, at this, the first time that the jurisdiction has been formally assailed, to enter upon the examination of the question, but passes the prisoner on to the Supreme Court of the United States, if he should think proper to appeal to that tribunal. At the same time, it is intimated that, if the police court were just entering on its existence, this court would feel bound to consider the question, and would do so, perhaps, with some prepossession against the jurisdiction.</p> <p>S. Under the act creating the police court, the punishment is the criterion by which the ofEense is to be considered infamous. Offences which are punishable only by imprisonment in the District jail are, by this act, non-infamous offences, as petit larceny and the receiving of stolen goods amounting to less than $35 in value, are such offences, and they may be prosecuted in the police court by information, without being, on that account, obnoxious to the provision of Article Y of the Constitution of the United •States, which declares that “no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.</p> <p>3. If distinct offences, although of a similar character, are set forth in several counts in the same indictment, and a fortiori if set forth in different indictments or informations, it is in the power of the court to impose cumulative sentences — that is, periods of confinement, each one of which is independent of the other.</p> <p>4. The prisoner was sentenced upon six separate informations, each one of which set forth the offence of receiving stolen goods. On habeas coipus, the petition did not aver more than that the record would show on inspection that there was only one crime committed. It was — •</p> <p>Held, that the record did not show anything of that sort, and that the court had no right to assume that the goods set forth in the several informations were feloniously received at one time as stolen goods.</p> <p>5. A cumulative sentence of imprisonment is sufficiently certain where the imprisonment is made to commence at the expiration of an imprisonment under a previous sentence, the number and date of which is given.</p>

This was a petition for the writ of mandamus against the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, based upon the following facts: Lot E, square 25, fronting 231 feet on M street, N. W., between 24th and 25th streets, in the city of Washington, the property of Mrs. Mary C. Henderson, was assessed according to frontage for special improvements made on M street in the year 1872, $1,452.92; and the same lot for special improvements made on 24th street in 1876, was assessed in…

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On June 4, 18¡T9, the defendant caused the plaintiff to be arrested on a charge of embezzling certain building plans, drawings and specifications, which had been prepared, wholly or in part, by the plaintiff while in defendant’s employ as an architect. The plaintiff, after trial, was discharged, and the action in this case was brought by him to recover damages from the defendant for malicious prosecution.

This was an action on a promissory note, the property of the Bank of Washington.

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action of ejectment for tbe recovery of part of lot numbered 5 in square numbered 453.

<p>Ay?, fa. cannot issue on a judgment of this court after twelve years have elapsed since the last proceeding taken to enforce the judgment.</p>

<p>1. Words which do not disparage the character of the plaintiff are not actionable, although special damage flow from the uttering of them.</p> <p>2. Where A tells B that C, a Government clerk, had spoken disrespectfully of his chief, D, and this coming to the ears of D, he discharges C from office, it seems that the damages are too remote to enable G to maintain an action of slander against A.</p>

<p>1. An agreement to pay usury is a mere nullity, and cannot be set up as the consideration of an agreement.</p> <p>2. Defendant had given a note drawing ten per cent, interest per annum. After the note became due, there was endorsed upon it the flowing: “It is agreed and understood between the parties to the within note, that it is to run at the rate of five per cent, a month.” It was contended that the plaintiff, by agreeing to take usury, had forfeited his right to recover anything but the principal of the note.</p> <p>Held, That the new agreement to pay usurious interest, though void, did mot affect the original contract to pay legal interest, and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover the principal, with accrued interest, at the rate of ten per cent.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Ti-ie Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in tbe opinion.</p>

STATEMENT 0E THE CASE. The plaintiff brought this action to recover of the defendant $3,856.43, under the following declaration and bill of particulars: “ The plaintiff sues the defendant for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, and for work done and material provided by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, and for money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant ; and for money paid by the…

This was an action of assumpsit to recover damages for breach of contract, tbe plaintiff alleging that defendant, for a consideration paid to one A. Langdon, agreed to sell to plaintiff 800 acres of Florida lands, and deliver patents for same.

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>1. It is in the discretion of the court to refuse all instructions prayed for by either party, and to state the law in its own language.</p> <p>2. On exceptions for error in a part of the charge to the jury, the court will look at the whole charge, and if it see that in the very next paragraph an apparent error is corrected, the exception will not be sustained.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

STATEMENT 0E THE CASE. This was a creditor’s suit commenced by a bill in equity against the administrator of the heirs-at-law of Florian E. Hitz, deceased, having for its object to compel the distribution of personal estate among creditors pro rata, and to procure a sale of the real estate in order to supply the deficiency of personal assets.

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The Case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The District authorities had covered a well located on the public highway and in which was placed a pump for the use of the public, with a wooden platform, and upon this was .laid a brick pavement even with the level of the sidewalk. Plaintiff had frequently used the pump, and there was nothing to lead one to suspect any danger or defect about it. On the day in question, while in the act of using the pump, the pavement over the platform suddenly gave way, precipitating plaintiff to the bottom of the well. It was in evidence that the District authorities had not for nine years made any examination or repair of the platform. By the court below it was held that express notice must be brought home to the District of the defect in the covering of the well; but it was—</p> <p>Held, on appeal, that the District was bound to know that the platform was of perishable material, and to watch over it and keep it in repair; that having left it without examination for nine years, until it became a man trap, with the assurance to the public of security, there was such delinquency as rendered the District liable in damages.</p>

<p>1. A contract by a married woman for the loan of money to carry on the business of a boarding house in which she is engaged, is not a contract relating to her sole and separate property; but if she has equitably charged her separate estate with the payment of the debt, the creditor’s remedy is in equity.</p> <p>2. Under the Married Woman’s Act in force in the District, whatever the character of the separate estate of a married woman, whether legal or equitable, she may make a contract having relation to it.</p> <p>3. Where a married woman resides in Virginia and owns property to which under the laws of that State her right is sole and separate, she has, when she comes into this jurisdiction, the same capacity, although a non-resident, to sue in respect of such sole and separate right that a married woman in this District has.</p> <p>4. S., a married woman, conveyed to C., in satisfaction of an indebtedness, a piece of property which largely exceeded in value that indebtedness. S. was, at the time of the conveyance, indebted to another for a loan of money which she had equitably charged upon the property. C. knew, at the time of the conveyance, of the existence of this debt, but it is not shown that she knew of its having been made an equitable charge upon the property. Held, that so much of the property conveyed which exceeded ' in value the indebtedness satisfied thereby, should be subjected to the satisfaction of this equitable charge, and that whether G. knew of the existence of the charge or not was immaterial.</p>

<p>In a conveyance between parties holding a confidential relation to each other, the grantee, althong not guilty of actual fraud, can take nothing from the deed which it would be inequitable for him, under the circumstances, and in view of that relation, to retain. On the other hand whatever he should equitably retain the court will not disturb. Such a case being distinguishable from one where the deed must be set aside entirely on the ground of fraud.</p>

<p>1. In legal effect tbe action of an applicant or Ms attorney is the same.</p> <p>2. Where one of the claims in an original application was rejected upon reference to certain patents, and the applicant, by his attorney, orders the same to be erased, and thus obtains and accepts a patent for the residue of his claims, there has been no inadvertence, accident or mistake within the meaning of the patent law, and the patentee is not entitled to a reissue covering the claim before erased.</p>

STATEMENT 0E THE CASE. The original bill in this cause was filed January 19,1882, and the defendant Ulyich was summoned to answer the following day. Held: by an almost invariable uniformity in the decisions upon the subject, that the rule of Us pendens does not apply to proceedings for alimony, for the reason that such a suit is in personam, and does not apply to any specific part of the personal or real estate of the husband.

<p>1. A court of equity will not allow a debtor who has conveyed his property with intent to defraud his creditors, to impugn his deed, or aid him to extricate himself from the embarrassment created by his own wrong-.</p> <p>2. An executor, being a party to a suit, is an incompetent witness to invalidate a contract made by him personally with his decedent, and which is the subject of the suit.</p> <p>3. A claim which has been suffered to sleep for nearly twenty years, with no effort to enforce it, will not be sustained by a court of equity when, in addition to suspicious circumstances surrounding it, there is no evidence going to satisfactorily explain the delay.</p>

<p>The scrutiny with which courts of equity regard a deed between parties holding a confidential relationship to each other, proceeds upon the principle that before and at the time of the conveyance, the grantor holds such a relation to the grantees as to place him in contemplation of law mentally under his control and domination ; and it is important in mating out this confidential relation, that it should be shown to have preceded the whole transaction. Proof that it was contemporaneous with and grew out of the transaction itself is not sufficient. .</p>

<p>1. A decree may be amended or corrected on motion where the amendment or correction desired is merely to conform the decree to the decision of the court, as where there has been a mistake in computation, or a mistake of the clerk in entering the decree or the like; but where the decree is attacked in its terms and substance or where any of its material provisions are sought to be varied, a rehearing of the case is the proper practice, and though this court has countenanced the practice of altering a decree even in its material provisions, upon motion, it is in substance really a motion for a rehearing.</p> <p>2. A party who moves the court by petition to alter one of the provisions of the decree cannot appeal from the decree until his motion is disposed of; such an appeal will be dismissed on motion.</p>

<p>1: Sections 1418 and 1419 of the Revised Statutes of the United States do not apply to enlistments in the marine corps.</p> <p>2. A person under twenty-one years of age cannot be enlisted in the marine corps without the consent of his parent, where such parent retains his right of control.</p>

<p>The terms of a building association contract with its borrower or advancee, discussed and held not to be usurious.</p>

Motion to direct the marshal to suspend execution. The verdict in this case was rendered June 5, 1884, and judgment was entered thereon on the same day. On June 7, 1884, a motion for a new trial was filed. On July 9, 1884, a writ of execution was issued. On July 14, 1884, the defendant moved to quash the writ of execution and to vacate the judgment. Both motions were argued and overruled on the 19th day of July, 1884.

This case was commenced in the Police Court of the District of Columbia, by information filed by the attorney for the District, and charging the defendant with violating an ordinance of the Board of Health against nuisances. Upon application to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia a certiorari was issued, and the case coming up in that court was certified to the General Term to be heard in the first instance.

STATEMENT 0E THE CASE. . Tbis action is brought upon a promissory note against the makers, (a partnership), Booth, Wemple & Smith, and also.. against one of the endorsers, Henry P. Gilbert, the appellant in this case.

<p>An agreement of the parties by their attorneys to refer a pending cause to a special referee, “whose award, when approved by the court, is to be its judgment,” is not within the Maryland act, and if the court disapprove the award, and make an order setting it aside, such order is not appealable.</p>

These cases were consolidated by the order of the court. Held: that in equity the substituted policy belonged to the children, and that they and not the creditors of the husband were entitled to the insurance money. Chapin and others vs. Eellowes, Administrator, 36 Conn., 132.

This was .an action against the sureties upon the official bond of one James A. Beau, lately one of the constables of this District. Bean was appointed July 3, 1878; his bond was approved July 5, 1878.

<p>1. The courts of the United States are invested with power to determine conclusively in the trial of a criminal cause; when the interests of public justice require that the jury shall be discharged, and such a discharge is not in any sense equivalent to a verdict of acquittal, or a defence against a further trial upon the same or a new indictment.</p> <p>2. But this discretionary power to discharge the jury during the course of a criminal trial is not to be understood as containing the slightest element of arbitrary choice. The discretion is one which the trial justice must use under a 'solemn obligation to satisfy his judgment that such a course is required by the interests of justice</p> <p>3. Fourteen indictments were found against the defendant for embezzlement, to each of which he pleaded not guilty. Afterwards, at his instance, they were all consolidated and directed to be tried as' one case. A jury was then impanelled and sworn, and the district attorney opened the case to the jury, stating what he expected' to prove in relation to each and all of the indictments. After he had closed, and before any evidence was taken, the presiding justice, on his own motion, and against the protest of the defendant, rescinded the order consolidating the indictments, discharged the jury and directed the district attorney to select one of the indictments for trial, which was done, and the same jury resworn. Whereupon the defendant pleaded autrefois ucqn.it which was overruled on demurrer and the trial proceeded with, and a verdict of guilty found. On appeal to the General Term it was held that this discharge of the jury was not equivalent to an acquittal,' and was no defence to the second trial.</p>

John B. Boone died July 17, 1859, testate, seized of two lots of ground in the city of Washington, both improved, and worth about $10,000. Held: upon a bill by the executor to compel the purchaser to take, “that whether there were or were not debts unpaid, and whether it was or was not uncertain whether any debts remained unpaid, the plaintiff had a power to sell and convey the house in fee-simple.” Forbes vs. Peacock, 11 Meeson & Wellsby, 630.

In this, case the complainant filed a bill in equity setting forth in substance: 1. Held: and that said defendant, whilst he did not deny his liability to pay the same, yet neglected so to do, and now refuses to pay the same. 6.

STATEMENT 0E THE CASE. This was a bill in the nature of a bill of peace. The bill set forth that complainant was the owner of lots 1 to 12, inclusive, in square 156, in the city of Washington, in fee simple and derived his title from Thomas Young and wife, through deeds from Young to Kilbourn, Kilbourn to Latta, Latta to Sunderland, and Sunderland to Alley.

STATEMENT 0E TEE CASE. Wm. M. Bryant sued out .a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition he alleged that he was a resident of the District, and was confined in the Government Hospital for the Insane, being there unjustly and unlawfully restrained of his liberty by Dr. Wm, W. Godding, the superintendent of said hospital.

Appeal from a decree in Special Term dismissing a bill in equity and dissolving an interlocutory injunction. The court at the same time heard argument upon a motion filed in General Term September 8, 1884, to vacate for alleged irregularity a judgment entered at a previous term, the motion involving a consideration of the same subject matter.

This case having been heard below was appealed to the General Term where, upon a full hearing, Mr. Chief Justice Cartter, after commenting on the facts, announced that the court had concluded to affirm the decree for the reasons stated in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Cox in the court below, which opinion was as follows:

Bill ín Equity for an account. The Case is stated in tbe opinion. First. In this case there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. “Suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.” R. S., sec. 123. There is not one of the items of the claim in this bill which involves a question of trust, an unadjusted account, nor the necessity of a discovery.

This was a bill in equity praying an injunction to restrain the defendants, Commissioners of the District of Columbia, from interfering with its work of laying tracks from its main line of railroad, Maryland avenue in JVashington city, to the square (jf ground owned by it' and known as square No. 233.

Tbe plaintiff being in possession filed, bis bill, September 19, 1883, to quiet title to tbe west half of lot three in square 780, in tbe city of Washington. Held: can determine title to real estate in the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia. In 6 Cranch, 148, it is held that a court of equity may exercise jurisdiction in relation to lands outside of the State in a case of fraud, trust or contract, where it obtains jurisdiction over the parties.

This action was instituted on April 2d, 1880, and was first tried at the October Term of the Circuit Court, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, that judgment was reversed by the court in General Term, and a ne\fr trial ordered.