¶1By the Gourt.
¶2delivering the opinion.
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¶5Here the plaintiffs in error, representing a judgment against Napier, and having ordered a levy, agreed with him to forbear tho levy, upon certain terms, upon his paying their fees as counsel in the case. Ho voluntarily entered into the agreement; and although induced doubtless so to do, to avoid a levy, was not imprisoned or threatened with loss of life, loss of member, with mayhem or imprisonment. It would be a novel judgment, to hold that a defendant, threatened with a levy, by virtue of a valid, subsisting execution, is under duress.
¶6Another class of cases, in which an agent is liable, is where money is paid to him, to which his principal has no legal right; or whore it is paid to him by mistake. I have no doubt but that the presiding Judge fell into error, by not distinguishing between this class of cases, and the caso before him. The rule given to tho jury, as applicable to this class of cases, however, is not laid down with sufficient fullness. The rule is this, to wit: so long as the money has not been paid over by the agent to his principal; nor his situation altered, relatively to his principal, as touching that fund, it may be recovered from him. Neither ho nor his principal, is, in conscience, entitled to retain it; but, ex equo et bono, it belongs to the payer; and an action lies to recover it. It is not the property of tho *97agent; and therefore he cannot retain it. And it is not the property of the principal; and therefore, ho docs not hold it for the use of the principal. He holds it for the use of him who illegally, or by mistake, has paid it. The agent is not liable to the principal for it. The equitable action for money, had and received for his use, will lie against the agent, to recover it back. To charge the agent, it would seem not to be 'necessary for the payer to give notice to him not to pay over the money — inasmuch as his right of action does not depend upon the notice; but upon the illegality of its receipt. (See the Bank of the United States vs. The Bank of Washington, 6 Peters T. C. R. 8 to 18. Hearsey vs. Pruyen, 7 Johns. R. 179.) Rut if notice be given before the money is paid over, and before the agent’s situation is altered, he will be liable, even if he does pay it over, or his situation is afterwards altered. In the cases in the books, in relation to this matter, the controversy very often turned upon the question, what amounts to payment over; and what constitutes such an alteration of the situation of the agent, as will protect him? I do not go into this inquiry, as this is not -a case of money to which the principal was not legally entitled; nor did the agents exceed their authority in the receipt -of it; nor was it paid to them by mistake, except so far as to say, that it is well settled that if before notice, the agent gives fresh credit to his principal, on the faith of the money received, his situation is altered, and he is not liable. For the general rule, see Paley on Agency, by Dunlap, 388, and notes. Story on Agency, §300. 3 Chitty on Com. and Manuf. 313. 2 Liverm. on Agency, 264 to 266. Duller vs. Harrison, Cowp. 565. Cox vs. Prentice, 3 M. S. 345. 1 Taunton, 359. 4 Burrow, 1987. 7 Cowen, 460. 5 Taunton, 815.
¶7This case stands apart from fraud, duress, mistake, or want of legal right in the principal, to receive the money. And we are clear, that if the recovery of the plaintiff below, depended upon the liability of the plaintiffs in error, as agents, he would be obliged to fail. The decree was a valid, unimpeached recovery, in favor of Rice, the Receiver of the Bank of Macon, *98against Carey, and his security on the Appeal, Napier. Upon, this decree, execution had issued and was in the hands of the plaintiffs in error, as Rice’s solicitors. They had placed the execution in the hands of the Sheriff of Bibb county, with instructions to levy, when Napier and the ¡vlaintiffs in error came together, and it was agreed between them, (Judge Powers acting for himself, and also for Messrs. McDonald and Bailey,) that that if he, Napier, would pay on the judgment, as security aforesaid, the sum of $3,000, to bo applied to their fees in the case, they would not hold him liable for the balance of their fees — would forbear a levy; and would turn over the Ji. fa. to him, when he should call for it, to enable him to reimburse himself out of his principal, Carey; he agreeing also, that if he should collect out of Carey, moro than sufficient to reimburse himself, then the balance was to be turned over to them, so- far as their fees remained unpaid. In pursuance of this-agreement, Napier executed his notes, payable severally to the plaintiffs in error, two for $1,250, and one for $500, at ft months; and they delivered to him the execution, and released as to him, the balance of their fees-. At maturity, the notes were paid. Sometime afterward, the decree was reversed ; and Napier brought this action against the plaintiffs in error for the $3,000 paid under these circumstances. Erom all of which, it appears that the money was paid to them as the solicitous of the plaintiff, on a subsisting judgment. They were the agents of their client, Rice, to receive it.. Notice being given of their claim for foes on this decree, before the-release of Napier, it stood a valid judgment in Rice’s favor, against Napier, to the extent of these fees; and the relation of client and attorney — -that is, of principal and agent — still subsisted between Rice and these plaintiffs in error. The payment to them, therefore, was a payment to their principal. They, upon receipt of the money, became liable to account to> their principal therefor; and to no other person. If liable te him, they cannot, at the same time, bo liable elsewhere. The act of receiving the money was within the scope of their agency ; it was, indeed, their duty as attorneys to represent the. *99judgment. They owed no duty to Napier; and their act being the act of their principal, there was no privity between him and them. If there was no privity, how, it may be confidently aslced, can he maintain an action against them ? But it is said, that they became liable when, subsequently, the decree was reversed; that the reversal made the receipt of the money illegal, ab initio ; and thereby, they became liable to Napier. The receipt of the money being lawful, when it was made, it was a fact finished; and could not become unlawful by subsequent reversal. At the time when the payment was made, Napier had no right of action against Rice, the principal, much less against his agents. The reversal cannot have a retroactive operation, so as to make illegal that which was lawful when done. It could not annihilate the relation of principal and agent, which then existed between the plaintiffs in error and their client, and create a privity between them and Napier, which at that time had no existence. The only effect of the reversal was to give to Napier a right of action against Rice, which, until the reversal, he had not. If it had become necessary to sell Napier’s property under this execution, before it was reversed, it is not questionable but that the purchaser would have acquired a good title. A party may justify, under an erroneous judgment, if there is a regular execution, until it is reversed. (1 Stra. 509. 1 Ver. 195. 6 Peters. T. C. R. 15.)
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¶10They are vindicated in Costigan vs. Newland, by the Supreme Court of New York, wherein the case from Comstock, [ubi supra,) is considered and affirmed. In Costigan vs. New-*102land, an attorney, who bad foreclosed a mortgage in favor of his client, and collected the money, was sued by the person having the oldest lien on the fund, for a balance remaining in his hands, after paying to his client the amount of his mortgage debt, and retaining the costs of the foreclosure. The Court held, that he was the agent of his client, in collecting the money; and as such, not liable to suit, although the money still remained in his hands; and that the plaintiff’s recourse was upon his principal. (12 Barbour’s B. 456.) In Sadler vs. Evans, the action was brought against the agent of Lady Windsor, to recover back money paid to him for her use. The Court of King’s Bench, sustained a non-suit awarded below, saying, through Lord Mansfield, “ The plaintiff ought not to recover against the defendant in this action — the action ought to have been brought against Lady Windsor herself, and not against her agent; this money was paid to the known agent of Lady Windsor. He is liable to her for it, whether he has paid it over to her or not — he received it for her.” He said farther, “ He kept clear of payments to third persons; but where it is to a known agent, in which case, the action ought to be brought against the principal, unless in special cases, (as under notice, or mala fide.”) (4 Burrow, 19, 86.) I consider the case of Stephens vs. Badcoclc, tried before Lord Tenter den, O. J., in the King’s Bench, as strongly vindicating our judgment in this case. Money was received by an attorney’s clerk, and receipted for by him, for the attorney. The client to whom the money belonged, brought an action for money had and received to his use against the clerk; and it was held by the Court, “ That the action did not lie ; for that the defendant received the money as the agent of his master, and was accountable to him for it; the master, on the other hand, being answerable to the client for the sura received by his clerk; and there was no privity between the present plaintiff and the defendant.” (3 Barn, and Adol. 354. 23 Eng. C. L. R. 93.)
¶11We are content to rest our judgment on this assignment, upon the principles stated and the authorities quoted; but respect for counsel admonishes me, that a single view taken for *103the defendant in error, remains to be noticed. The release, say they, of Napier by Rice, dissolved the relation of principal and agent, between the latter and his counsel; for after the release, Rice had no interest in the judgment against Napier, for them to represent. This being so, Rice had no right to the money paid to them; and they receiving it, without authority, are liable, even without notice, so long as the money remains in their hands. I have already said that the release being a nullity, as to the extent of the foes of the plaintiffs in error, the relations of the parties, as client and solicitors, continued, as to this transaction. But if it be as counsel consider it, then I say that plaintiffs in error are not liable ; because, there being no notice to them, they arc discharged, by a virtual payment of the money to Rice. The money was not literally turned over to him and handed back to them ; but whilst the payment was a credit in Napier’s favor, on the execution, it was also, in the very terms of the arrangement, a payment to them of fees to that amount, duo to them by Rice, and a credit to him, Rice, for so much paid to them on account of fees. And directly to this point, see the case of Mowats vs. McLelan, when the retainer of a sum for fees, by counsel collecting it, was held equivalent to an actual payment over. (1 Wend* 173.)
¶12Eor these reasons, the judgment of the Court excepted to in No. 17 is reversed.
¶13The defendant below, Mr. Napier, dissatisfied with the decision of the Court against him, also sued out a writ of error; and he assigns for error, the instructions of the Court to the jirny, that the defendants in error, Messrs. McDonald, Bailey & Powers, had, notwithstanding Rice’s release, a lien upon the execution against Napier for their fees, which they could enforce upon him. That their right to enforce this lien, and their forbearance to do so, together with their discharge of Napier from further liability, for fees; and their delivery to him of the execution for his remuneration out of his principal, Carey, were sufficient consideration to support the contract between them *104and Napier; and therefore he could not recover back the money paid to them under that agreement.
¶14The counsel for the plaintiff in error, joins issue with the presiding Judge on the attorney’s lien, denying that in Georgia attorneys have a lien for any thing but the taxable costs, and asserting that in this case, they have no lion for that. If they are right in either of these propositions, the plaintiff in error is entitled to recover, because the contract between him and the defendants in error, can, we concede, be supported only upon their right of lien for their fees upon the execution. This is an important question, and is now before this Court for the first time.
¶15The condition of the profession in Georgia is different in one important particular from what it is in most of the States, and differs toto codo in that particular from the condition of attorneys and solicitors in England. Here, no costs whatever, are allowed to attorneys, unless indeed it be the three dollars paid to the jury. So that although by Law, it is payable by the plaintiff, in the first instance, they are entitled, when advanced by them. Even that, however, is not due to them directly as attorney’s cost; but being taxed in the bill of costs, is receivable by them, as costs due to their client, which having advanced, they are entitled to retain. (Cobb’s N. D., 353, 363.)
¶16Lawyers in this State, are compensated by fees upon agreement with their client; and in the absence of any special agreement, by an implied understanding to pay them a reasonable fee. Attorneys in England are paid by taxing in the bill of costs the cost fees allowed by law, and charges and disbursements made by them in and about the business of their clients. Eor these they are entitled to sue; and' have also by Statute, and the usage of the Courts, certain summary remedies in certain cases, as well as the liens to which I shall directly advert.— (See Tidd’s Practice as to Attorney’s Bills, 324 to 336) Nor have we in Georgia the grades in the profession, which obtain in England — to which several grades belong different duties, and appertain different rights. We know not the distinctions of Attorney, Advocate, Barrister, Sergeant, &c., to which so *105great importance is attached in our fatherland. Advocates or counsellors at C. Law cannot sue for compensation according to Blaclcstone, Lord Mansfield and Lord Hardwick. The latter, in Thornhill vs. Evans, exclaims with holy horror, “ Can it be thought that this Court will suffer a gentleman of the bar to maintain an action for fees, which is quiddam honorarium? (2 Atk. 332, Black. Com. 2nd vol. 24, 25.)
¶17This honorarium is a voluntary donation, in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. Advocates are deemed (God save the mark 1) to practice for honor or influence. And they were deemed so to do at Rome in the time of Cicero. He held in small esteem the strictly legal profession, and declined a fee or present for prosecuting Verres, and twits Jlortensius, for receiving -an Ivory Sphinx for defending him. Yet the great Advocate of Rome grew rich on presents. And so much was the bestowal of the honorarium abused in his day, that the Senate interfered and regulated the matter by a decree. Notwithstanding Lord Hardwick’s exclamation, it is not questionable that lawyers in Great Britain above the grade of attorneys are better paid in money, and more liberally rewarded with honors, than in any other country. Our professional brethren, however, need not be informed, that to realize the highest honors and the richest rewards of the British Bar requires industry, integrity, years of labor and profound science. And if the kind critic will pardon this little departure from the lean and bald condensation, which some hold to be necessary to a Judicial opinion, I will add, that the greatest of English lawyers was an -accomplished scholar, -and the most finished rhetorician of his day; and so was Cicero in -his day; and so was Chancellor D’A-guesseau in his day; and so also was .LeGare in his -day. In this State, I believe that usage does recognize two designations of members of the bar — Attorneys and -Solicitors, which implies, however, no distinction as to rights or obligations. When in a Court of Law, we call them Attorneys ; when in a Court of Chancery they are called Solicitors. By Statute, when a citizen is admitted to the Bar, he as admitted to-practice in all the Courts of Law and Equity in *106the State, and all who are admitted, are equally entitled to the privileges, and equally incur the obligations of the profession, (Cobb’s N. D., 89, 92.) No quaffieation is prescribed by Law, hut “moral rectitude,” not even' maturity as to age. If the applicant can produce satisfactory evidence of moral rectitude and can sustain an approved examination in open Court, he is-entitled to1 a commission to practice in the Courts of Law and. Equity in this State, It is in the Act of 1847, that the Law recognizes all -who are admitted as attorneys, when it declares, that any person who is a citizen of the State, may on application to a Judge of the Superior Court, ho' admitted to practice' as an attorney in the Courts of Law and Equity in this State, (Cobb’s N. D. 92.) The same recognition is found in the Act ©f 1806. (Cobb’s N. D. 89.) Thus, we seo that attorneys here are the- attorneys and advoeatesfof the Common Law: — And so far as our condition, and the character of our institutions will admit, an attorney becomes, by admission to the bar, entitled to the privileges which belong to the different grades: ©f the profession in England. He is entitled, therefore, to the liens which exist at €. Law, in favor of attorneys. It becomes-necessary now to inqtaire what those liens are.
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¶24That the lien of the attorney upon a judgment is restricted, to the costs of the particular suit, see Tidd’s practice 338, 3 Barn. & Cress 535, 5 Dowel. & Ryl. 399 S. C., 4 Bing. 17, S. C.
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¶26In the King’s Bench the former rule prevails. (Tidd’s Practice 338, 4 Durnford and East 123 4, 6 Ibid 456, 8 Ibid 70, 1 Maul Selw 240, 8 Taunt 526, Montague on Liens 59 to 63.) In the Courts of Chancery, and formerly in the Common Pleas, the latter. (Taylor vs. Popham 15 Vesey 79, Ex parte Rhodes 15 Vesey 541, 2 Black R. 826, 1 H. Black R. 23, 217, 2 Bos. & Puller 28, 4 Taunt 320, 8 Ibid 526, 4 Bing, 16, 1 Price 376, 2 Ball & Beat. 34.)
¶27Since 1832, however, the practice has been uniform in all the Courts of Common Law in Great Britain, for at the. Hilary Term of that year, by virtue of the statute which authorizes the Judges of those Courts to make rules with a view to uniformity in practice, they adopted a rule allowing the lien. (4 Bligh, N. S. 604, 1 Dowl. Pr. Cas. 196, 3 Idem, 638.)
¶28In New York, I do not consider that the rule is very certainly settled; The old practice of the Court of Common Pleas ha *109England has certainly been adopted, so far as all the equities between the parties are concerned, which grow out of the case in which the lien of the attorney originates. But Chancellor "Walworth, in two cases, has decided that other equities give way to the lien, and he also insists that no other rule than that has ever been adopted by the Courts of that State. In Bun-kin vs. Vanderbug, he decided, that a party, against whom a decree for costs had been made, will not be permitted to sett off against such costs a decree or judgment in Ms favor in relation to a distinct matter to the prejudice of the Solicitor’s lien. — • But when different claims arise in the same suit, or in relation to the same matter, they may be arranged and set off agreeably to equity, without reference to the lien of the Solicitor. (1 Paige’s R. 622. 3 John’s R. 247, also to the same effect, 4 Paige 647. 2 Caine’s R. 105. See also in favor of the general equities against the Solicitor’s lien. (6 John’s Ch. R. 317. 8 John’s R. 357. 16 Wend. 446.)
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¶30There being no equities set up in this record by the defendant in the execution against the plaintiff Rice, this question does not arise ; and as the Court expressed no opinion on it, I shall express none for myself. As to the general lien of the attorney upon the papers of his client and his special lien on money and judgments, see Story on Agency §383. 2 Sch. & Lefroy 279. Ex parte Sterling 16 Vesey 259. Ex parte Pemberton 18 Vesey 282. Stevens vs. Blacklock 1M. & S. 535. Hollis vs. Claridge 4 Taunt. 807. Montague on Lien 59 to 67. Smith on Mercantile Law 338, 339. 2 Bell Com. §796. 2 Kent’s Com. 640. 1 Hoffman’s Ch. Pr. 34, 35, 12 Wend. 261.— 15 Johns 405. 1 Cowen 172. 4 Ibid 416. Turn. & Russ. 304. 2 Keen 181. Sausse & Sc. 634. 9 Sim. 508. Paley on Agency, by Dunlap 131 note A. Cr. & Ph. 458. 6 Madd. R. 93. 1 Russ. & M. 361. 4 Myl. & Cr. 354. 3 Smedes *110& Marsh. 214. 32 Law Library (Cross on Lien 147.) 10 Verm. R. 184. 6 Price 203. 1 Douglass 238. C. T. P. 361. 3 Atk. 720. 3 Barn & Cress. 534. 10 E. C. L. R. 245.
¶31The alloivance of the Attorneys’ and Solicitors’ liens in the Courts of Great Britain, seems to have originated there at no very early day as a matter of practice. Lord Mansfield someAvhere says (I think it is in Willems vs Carmichael, Douglas 97) That he himself had argued the right of the attorney to his lien in a Court .of Chancery, and it does not therefore date farther back than his day. He says farther in the case last referred to, that it “Was established-on general principles of justice.” Lord Kenyon said in Read vs. Dupper, “The principle has been long settled, that a party should not run aivay with the fruits of a cause, Avithout satisfying the legal demands of his attorney, by ivhose industry and expense those fruits were obtained.” (6 Term R. 361.) Gradually the practice of the Courts, founded on principles of justice, took the form of a fixed principle of the Common LaAV, and noAV the Attorney’s lien is as firmly seated in English jurisprudence as any other. But it is insisted that in England the lien exists only as security for the costs which by Law are taxable in the course of the business of the Attorney, and has never been extended to any compensation other than that, and can be extended here no farther. Upon this reasoning lawyers in Georgia have no lien whatever; for with us they are entitled to no costs. But I do not understand it to be limited in England to legal costs. It exists there, for the Attorney’s bill, and that is made up of his fees ascertained by Laiv, and his disbursements and charges on account of his client. If the idea of the Counsel was true as to the limitation in England, I should find no difficulty in extending the lien to the fees of Counsel in Georgia. The ride which secures legal costs where legal costs are provided by Law as a compensation, Avill by an irresistible implication, secure the compensation agreed upon by the parties, where none is provided by law. Disbursements, however, come in under the lien in England, and although these aro made to constitute a part *111of the Attorney’s bill, yet stand upon a different footing from the costs which the Law provides as a compensation. They are claims standing in account, against the client, and if for them the lien prevails, why should not a claim for services rendered, be also covered by the lien ?
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