FORTIS

Interim Decision #2261




                            MATTER OF FORTIS

                        In Deportation Proceedings

                                  A-10761351
                   Decided by Board January 29, 1974
Respondent's conviction on a plea of nolo contenders of possession of marijuana
  in violation of section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code of California is
  sufficient to sustain a charge of deportability under section 241(a)(11) of the
  Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.
CHARGES:

  Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(11) [8         1251(a)(11)]--At any time after
                       entry has been convicted of a violation of a law relating
                       to the illicit possession of marijuana.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Michael R. Crosner, Esquire
                       8447 Wilshire Boulevard
                       Beverly Hills, Calif. 90211


   This is an appeal from an order of an immigration judge finding
 the respondent deportable, denying his request for termination of
 the proceedings, and directing his deportation to El Salvador. The
 appeal will be dismissed.
   The respondent is a 36-year-old married male alien, native and
citizen of El Salvador, who was admitted to the United States for
 permanent residence on November 22, 1959. At a hearing before
 an immigration judge, at which he was represented by present
counsel, respondent denied that he was convicted of possession of
marijuana in violation of section 11530 of the Health and Safety
Code of California, and denied deportability. The immigration
judge found the respondent to be deportable and, finding him
ineligible for discretionary relief, ordered his deportation_
  The record indicates that on Apri130, 1970, in the Superior Court
of California for the County of Los Angeles, the respondent,
through other counsel, pleaded nob, contendere to an information
charging him with the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana
under section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code of California
(Ex. 2). The record shows that this plea was approved by the court
and the respondent was sentenced to three years' probation and

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                                             Interim Decision #2261
 fined $300 (Ex. 2). The immigration judge concluded that this
 evidence established that the respondent was deportable as
 charged.
   On appeal counsel maintains that a conviction on a plea of nolo
 contendere is not a conviction within the scope of section 241(a)(11)
 of the Act. We reject this contention. It is settled that a plea of
 nolo contendere, when accepted by the court, becomes for all
 practical purposes the, full equivalent of a plea of guilty, Farrington v. King, 

 (C.A. 8, 1942). A conviction on a plea of
nolo contenders has been held sufficient to sustain a deportation
 charge under section 241(aX11) of the Act, Ruis Rubio v. INS, 380
                                                  -


 F.2d 29 (C.A. 9, 1967), cert. denied 

. See also Chu v.
Cornell, 247 F2d 929, 938 (C.A. 9, 1957), cert. denied 

 and Matter of W — , 

 (B IA 1954).
   Counsel further contends that since the respondent was never
 advised that his plea would make him deportable, he was denied
due process of law. The fact that a defendant is not made aware of
every possible collateral consequence of his plea, including that of
deportation, does not amount to a denial of due process which
would vitiate the plea, United States v. Santelises, 476 F2d 787,
789 (C.A. 2, 1973); Wurzinger v. INS, 

 (table), unreported opinion (C.A. 7, No. 72-1448, August 6, 1973), cert. denied

 (1974); United States v. Sambro, 454 F2d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); U.S. ex reL Durcente v. Holton, 228 F2d 827, 830 (C.A. 7,
1956), cert. denied 

 ;Joseph v. Esperdy, 

 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This rule has been applied even where an alien
has been affirmatively misled by counsel into believing that his
plea would not subject him to deportation, United States v.
Parrino, 

 (C.A. 2, 1954). We have held that insofar
as deportation proceedings are concerned, an immigration judge
cannot entertain a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction
unless that judgment is void on its face, and he cannot go behind
the judicial record to determine the guilt or innocence of the alien.
See Matter of Sirluen, 13 T. & N. Dee. 592, 594 (B IA 1970); Wilson v.
Carr, 41 F2d 704, 706 (C.A. 9, 1930); U.S. ex rel. Freislinger v.
Smith, 41 F2d 707, 708 (C.A. 7, 1930). Counsel's reliance on United
States v. Briscoe, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1970), is misplaced, since
that case involved a collateral challenge to a conviction in criminal, not deportation, proceedings.
   We note that while this appeal was pending the Supreme Court
denied respondent's petition for a writ of certiorari, 

(December 20, 1971). The following order will be entered.
   ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.


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