14 Kan. App. 2d 632 - State v. Matson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[T]he United States Supreme Court has considered in a number of different circumstances whether a tax is, in fact, a penalty. In Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 , 66 L. Ed. 2d 1061 , 42 S. Ct. 549 (1922), the court considered a federal prohibition era statute which made the manufacture and sale of liquor illegal and imposed a tax on the “ ‘illegal manufacture [and] sale’ ” of liquor. The court stated: ‘The mere use of the word “tax” in an act primarily designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that within the true intendment of the term a tax was laid. [Citation omitted.] When by its very nature the imposition is a penalty, it must be so regarded. [Citation omitted.] Evidence of crime ... is essential to assessment . . . [of the tax]. It lacks all the ordinary characteristics of a tax, whose primary function “is to provide for the support of the government” and clearly involves the idea of punishment for infraction of the law—the definite function of a penalty.’ Lipke, 259 U.S. at 561-62 . “In more recent decisions, however, the Court has backed away from this strong position against such taxes. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 , 95 L. Ed. 2d 47 , 71 S. Ct. 108 (1950), the Court upheld a federal tax on marijuana. The statute levied a tax on ‘every person who imports, manufactures, produces, compounds, sells, deals in, dispenses, prescribes, administers, or gives away marijuana.’ 340 U.S. at 43 . Additional penalties were provided for failure to pay t”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Gulledge · State v. Berberich

2. ““1. That the defendant knowingly and intentionally agreed with Eric Riley to assist in the commission of the crime of arson; 2. That the defendant did so agree with the intent that the crime of arson be committed; 3. That the defendant or any party to the agreement acted in the furtherance of the agreement by transporting six long-neck beer bottles filled with gasoline and rag wicks by automobile to a location of 12150 Tim[b]erlane, Olathe, Johnson County, Kansas. Further, on January 23, 1992, the defendant acted in furtherance of the agreement by throwing a gas-filled beer bottle, commonly termed a [M]olotov cocktail, into the house of Paula Combs; 4. That this act occurred on or about the 23rd day of January, 1992, in Johnson County, Kansas.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 20 Kan. App. 2d 973 - State v. Eastridge

3. ““The general rule is that a conspiracy to commit a crime is an offense separate and distinct from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, and the legal consequences of a conspiracy to commit a crime are separate and distinct from the commission of the crime itself. Because the conspiracy is the crime and not its execution, it is punishable both where it fails in its object and where the intended crime is accomplished.” 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conspiracy § 5. In Matson , the Court of Appeals followed the general rule that conspiracy is a separate crime from the object of the conspiracy.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Berberich