Volume 14 — New Jersey Law Reports

<p>By the twelfth section of the act making lands liable to he sold for the payment of debts, Rev. Laws, 433, a sheriffs deed, as between the defendant and the purchaser, may be fairly considered as the defendant’s own deed made by the sheriff, as his legally constituted agent for that purpose.</p> <p>In an action of ejectment, the defendant who had sold the premises to the lessor of the plaintiff, will not he permitted to show a title out of himself, at the time of making the deed ; for it is an element of the law, that a man cannot recover in ejectment, or defend himself, against his own covenant or grant.</p> <p>The defendant in execution, if in possession of the premises, becomes quasi tenant of the purchaser, and will not be permitted to dispute his title in an action of ejectment, brought against the defendant in execution to recover the possession.</p> <p>Possession is a legal right, which may be levied upon and sold by the sheriff on execution.</p>

Peter Hall brought an action of trespass on the case, in the Court of Common' Pleas of the county of Middlesex, against Andrew Snowhill,… Held: or placed, and take and carry away the said goods and chattels, and sell and dispose of the same, for the best price they could obtain, and out of the money to retain and pay the said sum above mentioned, and all charges touching the same, rendering the overplus, if any, unto the said George W. Hall, and the said Charles C. Hall,…

The plaintiff, Alexander P. Allaire, brought an action of debt in the court for the trial of small causes against the defendants, to recover the sum of five dollars, being one penalty under the act, entitled, “ An act to prohibit the circulating- or passing of tickets,” passed February 16th, 1831.

This was a certiorari, removing a judgment rendered by William Williams, esquire, one of the justices of the peace, in and for the county of Essex. The constable returned, that he “ served this summons by reading it to George Brown, agent of the defendant, and leaving at his store a copy.”

This was an action brought in the court for the trial of small causes, tried before a jury and a verdict and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Before the next stated term of the Court of Common Pleas, the commission of the justice, before whom the cause was tried, expired. After the commission had expired, and before the said stated term of the Court of Common Pleas, the defendant tendered an appeal bond, to the justice, and demanded an appeal.

Andrew Rankin brought an action of debt against John D. Outcalt, as endorser of a promissory note. It appears from the transcript of the justice, that on the return day of the summons “ the plaintiff appeared and filed his statement of demand; the defendant not appearing, but having admitted to me the plaintiff’s demand, on a preceding day, after the service of the summons,” he gave judgment for the plaintiff, for the amount of the note, with costs of suit.

<p>David Lazadder brought an action of debt in the court for the trial of small causes against Christopher Midler. The summons was returned to the 23d day of May, 1831. The justice in his transcript, says, “June 6th the plaintiff appeared. Defendant did not appear. On the part of the plaintiff and on an affidavit made and filed by the plaintiff, ‘ that if the trial of the cause be adjourned for a period beyond throe days, he believes, he would be in danger of losing his demand,’ I adjourned the trial to the 7th of June instant.” On this day he had given judgment for the plaintiff, in the absence of the defendant. The proceedings and judgment are removed into this court by writ of certiorari.</p>

Isaac Pierson brought an action of trespass on the case against James E. Glean. The nature of the pleadings, and the question involved in the case, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court delivered by the Chief Justice. The cause was submitted to the court on the written arguments of the counsel.

<p>This was an application for a mandamus to be directed to the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Gloucester, to re-instate an appeal which had been dismissed.</p> <p>It appeared, that the Court of Common Pleas had dismissed an appeal, because it did not appear by the transcript of the justice “ at ' what time, or when the appeal was demanded.” The transcript immediately after the rendition. of the , judgment,, which was on the 7th May, 1831, stated, that “the defendant-demanded of me an appeal, which I granted, and June 4, 1831,. tendered me an .appeal bond, executed according to law, which I accepted.</p>

This was an action of debt, commenced by summons in the court for the trial of small causes, a trial before a jury in the presence of both parties, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, for the sum of seventy dollars, with costs. After the defendant had left the court, the plaintiff applied for an execution, upon making what is usually called the oath of danger. The justice issued the execution. The proceedings are removed into this court by certiorari.

This was an action brought by the Washington Banking Company against James W. King, on a promissory note, executed by Walker to the said King, payable at the Chemical Bank of New York, and endorsed by the said King to the plaintiffs. The cause was tried at the Essex Circuit, before Justice Drake, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiffs.

This was an action of covenant. The defendant pleaded non est factum, and with the plea, gave notice of several matters, which he intended, at the trial, to offer in evidence in bar of the action. It is unnecessary to give the notice at length, as the substance is stated in the opitiion of the court, delivered by Justice Ford. The counsel for the plaintiff applied to the court to set aside the notice.

This was an action of ejectment, and was noticed for trial at the circuit court, holden at Salem, in and for the county of Salem at the December term, 1831, before the late Chief Justice Ewing. The parties, by their attornies, agreed upon the following state of the case. First.

This was an action of ejectment, and came on to be tried before the late Chief Justice Ewing, at the Circuit Court, held at Salem in December, 1881, when the parties, by their attornies, agreed upon the following state of the case : Joseph Copner being seized of the premises in question, in and by his last will and testament, made and executed his last will and testament, bearing date the 14th June, 1809, and thereby devised as follows: I give unto my nephew Samuel Gilmore…

An action was brought by William L. Allen, as assignee of Townsend, King and Company, against.

This was a certiorari, removing the judgment and proceedings in this case from the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Warren. The facts are disclosed in the opinion of the court.

<p>Transactions taking place between the parties, or one of the parties, and the Justice, out of court, if material and proper to be inquired into, must be proved before this court by affidavit.</p>

<p>This was an application for a mandamus to be directed to the Common Pleas of the county of Warren. It appeared from a statement of the facts signed by the judges of the pleas, that when the above named appeal was called on in its order for trial, before the said court, the counsel for the appellee moved the court to dismiss the said appeal, for an alleged insufficiency in the appeal bond, inasmuch as the same did not specify the place of residence of either, the appellant or his surety ; and the court being of opinion, that the said bond was insufficient, ordered the said appeal to be dismissed, and thereupon the counsel of the appellant asked of the said court, and obtained leave to substitute a new appeal bond in the stead of the one, so adjudged insufficient to sustain the said appeal; whereupon a new'bond, signed by James" S. Williamson and Charles Sitgreaves, esq. conditioned, that the said Robert H. Kennedy should prosecute said appeal, &c.;—but not signed by him, and he not named therein, as one of the obligors, was executed in the presence of the said court, was presented to the said court for allowance, and accepted as an appeal bond in this cause. Which bond was also objected to as insufficient in law, for that the same was not executed by the said Robert H. Kennedy, and he was not named as one of the obligors therein, but said bond was in other respects declared by the court to be sufficient and legal. The said Robert H. Kennedy was not in person, attending the court, when the appeal came on to be heard, but was present by his counsel. This last bond was also by the court adjudged insufficient to sustain said appeal, and the same was dismissed by the court, for want of a sufficient bond; whereupon this ease is stated for the opinion of the Supreme Court, on an application to be made, for a mandamus.</p>

This was an information in the nature of a quo warranto. It was filed in pursuance of a rule made in this court, while the late Chief Justice Ewing, presided. The information was as follows : New Jersey Supreme Court of Judicature, of the term of February, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and' thirty-two. Essex County, ss.

Russell Stebbins, John Brower, and Jacob Brower, obtained a judgment in this court, against Peter Walker, upon which judgment an execution was issued, directed to Jacob K. Mead, then the sheriff of the county of Essex. The property of the defendant was sold, and the judgment of the plaintiffs was satisfied, leaving in the hands of the sheriff, surplus money.

This was an action of trespass, and judgment was entered against the defendants in this court, in the term of February, 1833, after, argument, see 1 Green Rep. 294. On this judgment, a ca. sa. was issued, returnable to this term. On the twenty-second day of August last, a notice, of which the following is a copy, was served on the plaintiff and his attorney: New Jersey Supreme Court.

<p>This, was an application for a mandamus to the Common Pleas of the county of Gloucester. It appeared, that Wilson obtained judgment against Reeves and Loudenslager, before one of the justices of the peace of the county of Gloucester-From this judgment, the defendants below appealed to the Common Pleas of said county. In December term 1831, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the appeal, because it did not appear by the transcript that the defendant was present at the rendition of the judgment.</p> <p>Upon the justice’s transcript, under date of January- 1.6, 1830, there is an entry of the appearance of the parties, and trial of the cause; after which, the transcript proceeds to state as follows:</p> <p>“ The court,after- hearing the allegations of the parties, suspended judgment two weeks.”</p> <p>“ January 30, 1830. After having examined the evidence and plaintiff’s account, I gave a judgment for the plaintiff, for the sum of fifteen dollars and twenty-three and a half cents, debt, wi th one dollar and eighty-seven cents costs—Plaintiff demanded execution, took the oath of danger—defendant filed a bond with surety, viz: Joseph Wilson.”</p> <p>“ Issued execution, March 13th, &c.</p>

This was a certiorari to the Common Pleas of Hunterdon. From the papers returned in this case, it appeared, that Peter Smick, on the first of October, 1831, obtained a verdict and judgment before one of the justices of the peace of the county of Hunterdon, against Elijah Carman. That on the 22d October, 1831, Carman, the defendant, filed with the justice an appeal ■bond in the usual form, bearing date on the 20th of that month.

This was a certiorari, directed to one of the justices of the peace of the county of Morris, removing certain proceedings before him had, on a claim of property levied on by a constable by virtue of an execution. A number of reasons for reversal were filed and urged by J. W. Miller for plaintiff in certiorari, -which are stated in the opinion of the court delivered by Justice Ford.

This was an action of dower in which judgment by default had been entered for the demandant. A writ of inquiry, in the following words, was issued. “ New Jersey, ss : The State of New Jersey, to our sheriff of our county of Middlesex, greeting:—Whereas, Isabella S. Martin, lately in our Supreme Court of Judicature, at Trenton, impleaded Joshua Martin, in custody of the sheriff of our said county, in a plea of dower, unde nihil habet.

This was a writ of certiorari, directed to the Court of General Quarter Sessions of the county of Bergen. The writ was returned to September term, 1832, and no reasons were filed till this term.

This was a certiorari directed to the clerk of the county of Bergen, removing into this court proceedings in a matter of partition. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The cause was argued at the last term by E. B. D. Ogden and P. Dickerson for plaintiff in certiorari

This was an action of debt foruse-and occupation brought in the court for the trial of small causes, in the county of Warren. The defendant, Martin Andrews, obtained a judgment before the justice, which was appealed from to the Court of Common Pleas, by the plaintiff. A judgment was here obtained by Mary Andrews, which is removed into this court by certiorari.

A judgment had been rendered in this case, in the court for the trial of small causes, against Palsear Smith and John Ballinger, in favor of William Sherron. To remove which judgment, John Ballinger brought a certiorari in the name of both, but Palsear Smith refused to sign the certiorari bond, or to prosecute the certiorari.

This was an application made to the court by James Bennet, to set aside the report of commissioners appointed under the provisions of the act incorporating the Camden and Amboy Rail Road and Transportation Company, passed the 4th of February, 1830.

This was an application made by Jacob Vanwickle to set aside the report of commissioners appointed under the act of the legislature of this state incorporating the Camden and Amboy Rail Road and Transportation Company, passed February 4th, 1880. At the last term, W. Sainted and I. S. Williamson, argued in support of the application, and J. S. Sloan and S. L. Southard, contra; and that this term the following opinions were delivered.

Anna Eddy brought an action of assumpsit against Stephen Hull, surviving executor of Daniel Hull, deceased, in the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Hunterdon.

■ This was an action of debt brought in the court for the trial of small causes. The plaintiff’s state of demand will be found in the opinion of the chief justice.

<p>The affidavit required by the sixth section of the act of the 23d of November, 1821, to be made by the party demanding an appeal, must be made before the justice who tried the cause.</p> <p>Justices of the peace are not ex officio authorized to administer oaths of a civil nature, or in the course of civil proceedings. All their civil duties, powers and authorities, have heen superadded by statute to their original common law jurisdiction as magistrates ; they have no civil jurisdiction or power, except such as has been conferred on them from time to time by statute.</p>

This was an action on the case for words. The narration contained several counts, and the defendant demurred to the first, third and fifth counts. The cause was submitted to the court without any argument at the bar.

This was an application for a writ of mandamus. The following is a statement of the case agreed upon between the parties. “ Robert S. Hudnot, one of the constables of the county of Somerset, by virtue of a writ of attachment, issued out of a court for the trial of small causes in said county, at the suit of Samuel Skillman against one George Groves, an absconding debtor, attached and took into his possession, a certain horse, which was claimed by notice in writing, delivered…

This was an action of trespass for an assault and battery, and was tried at the Morris circuit in the month of March, 1832.

This was a certiorari directed to the Orphans Court of the county of Somerset, removing into this court the proceedings and the final decree of that court on the accounts of Albert P. Voorhees and Jacob Williamson, executors of Christopher Yanpelt, deceased. Several reasons for reversal were filed by the accountants.

This was an application for a mandamus to the Common Pleas of the country of Monmouth.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of the county of Salem. The case is fully detailed in the opinion of the court, delivered by the Chief Justice. The case was submitted to the court upon the written arguments of counsel.

This was an application to set aside an election held for directors of the Passaic and Hackensack Bridge Company. Depositions taken by both parties, were read on the argument which took place at the last November term. W. Pennington and Vanarsdcde argued for the applicants—Po'dd and Wall contra.

This was a certiorari directed to the clerk of the Common Pleas of the county of Morris, removing into this court, the proceedings of certain surveyors of the highways. It was submitted upon a statement of the facts, and the written argument of counsel, whether, under the circumstances of the case, the proceedings of the surveyors could be sustained.

This was an application to discharge the defendant on common bail. I. H. Williamson and Wall argued in support of the application on the part of the defendant. W. Pennington, contra.

This was ail action of assumpsit. The first count in the declaration, was on a note of hand, given to the plaintiff, Mary Story, dated nineteenth August, eighteen hundred and twenty-four, for two hundred and sixty-seven dollars, payable first of April, eighteen hundred and twenty-five, with interest from first April, eighteen hundred twenty-four. It also contained the common counts. The only plea was, non assumpsit.

This was an action of debt brought upon an administration bond. The declaration was as follows: “ New Jersey Supreme Court—Of the term of May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three. Somerset county, ss.

The return made by the Orphans Court to the writ of certiorari in this cause, and the affidavits taken in pursuance of leave given for that purpose, present the following case: John Potter, the husband of Hannah Potter, died intestate, more than twenty years ago. On the 10th March, 1813, administration of his estate was granted to Jotham Potter, Benjamin Potter and John Potter.

<p>A certiorari may be brought to remove a j udgment obtained against four defendants, ■where it appears that the summons was served upon one, who alone appeared and made defence.</p> <p>A general judgment against executors, is erroneous, and will be set aside.</p>

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas, to remove a judgment of that court, on an appeal from the court for the trial of small causes.

At the last term, Ryerson moved to dismiss the certiorari issued in this case, because, as he insisted, it appeared from the transcript of the justice, that the plaintiff in certiorari was present at the rendition of the judgment. If the party feels himself aggrieved, his remedy is by appeal.

This was an action of assumpsit brought in this court upon a promissory note, drawn by Nicholas Ryerson to William Darrah, or order, payable ninety days after date, at the Sussex Bank, for five hundred dollars, without defalcation or discount, for value received, dated Jnly 12, 1824. The note was endorsed by the said William Darrah to David Ford, and by Ford, endorsed to the plaintiff in this suit. The declaration contained but a single count on the note.

<p>A trial at bar will be granted, when‘the matter in dispute is of the value of three thousand dollars, and when the ease is important and complicated.</p> <p>The court will not annex to a rule for trial at bar, the condition, that the plaintiffs give security for costs, though the plaintiffs are an insolvent and irresponsible corporation.</p> <p>In the action of ejectment, there are but three cases in which the court will interfere in behalf of a defendant, or require the plaintiff to give security for costs. 1. In the case of an infant lessor of the plaintiff. 2. If the lessor of the plaintiff resides abroad. 3. Where there has been a former ejectment, and then the rule is only to stay proceedings until the costs of the former suit are paid.</p>

This was a certiorari removing into this court the proceedings of the Frank and Guisbert Creek Company. The objections taken to these proceedings, and the facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court, delivered by the chief justice.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of the county of Middlesex.

Upon application in behalf of the defendant, representing him to be unlawfully imprisoned in the jail of the county of Bergen, the chief justice allowed a habeas corpus, returnable before him at chambers. On Monday, the 24th March, 1834, the prisoner was brought up, attended by his counsel. Notice having been given by the direction of the chief justice, to the plaintiffs, they also attended by their counsel.

The paupers, being the widow and four children of Elias L. Terril, deceased, were sent by an order of removal from the township of Springfield, to Orange in the county of Essex. The latter appealed and the order was affirmed. This certiorari is brought by the Overseers of Orange to reverse those proceedings.

A writ of attachment in this case was returned to the last October Term of the Common Pleas of Bergen. The defendant’s first default was then recorded, and auditors appointed. In the January term then following, the second default was recorded: since which this certiorari was sued out and returned to this court; thereby interrupting the progress of the suit, in the Common Pleas.

A rule having been entered in behalf of Addis and Addis, administrators of Daniel Addis, deceased, calling on Hazen and others, the adverse party, to shew cause, why the submission and award in this case, should not be made a rule of court; and a counter rule having also been entered in behalf of Hazen and others, calling on the administrators of Addis, to shew cause, why the award should not be set aside; the argument of both rules came on together.

This was an action of assumpsit brought in the Court of Common pleas of the county of Sussex, by Ross Winans against Richard B. Williams. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff, and removed into this court by writ of error. During the trial several bills of exceptions were sealed. The objections raised at the trial, and afterwards argued in this court, are fully stated in the opinions delivered.

A writ of attachment had issued out of this court at the suit of John Welsh, against Philemon Blackwell, upon which a judgment had been regularly entered. A writ of scire facias under the provision of the twentieth section of the act for the relief of creditors, against absconding and absent debtors, Rev. Laws 859, was issued against Jefferson Blackwell, returnable to May term, 1888.

<p>If the plaintiff, after notice of amercement, informs the sheriff by letter, “that he should not move to amerce him in pursuance of such notice, but should trust to his raising the money in the following vacation,” he cannot afterwards move to amerce the sheriff because he has neglected to file a just and true inventory of the goods and chattels of the defendant. But if the sheriff shall neglect to raise the money during the said vacation, or to proceed to a sale, as he ought to do, and has time enough to do, he will be amerced.</p> <p>The word to “ execute ”, as used in the 22d section of the act concerning sheriffs, ’ Bev. Laws, 241, means to “fulfil or complete the execution.”</p> <p>A notice of amercement is operative from the time of service, and is good without a date, or with an impossible date.</p>

This was an application for a mandamus submitted to this court, upon the following statement of facts, signed by the judges of the court of Common Pleas of the county of Somerset. “ The appeal stood No. 13 on the list of appeals to be tried at the present January term of the court, 1834, and that not only by an order made by said court, but also by the rules of the court.

This was an action on the case for overflowing a part of the plaintiff’s land. A verdict had been given for the defendant, and the plaintiff had obtained a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside anda new trial had. The substance of the testimony, and of the charge of the judge, who tried the cause, will be found in the opinions below, in which the Chief Justice concurred.

This was an action of debt brought upon a sealed bill executed by Thomas Tilton, to Rachel Lippincott, for eight hundred dollars. The cause was tried at the Monmouth Circuit, in April term, 1882, and a verdict taken, by consent, for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court at bar. The nature of the pleadings, and the points discussed on the rule to show cause, fully appear in the opinions delivered at this term.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common^ Pleas of Morris. The facts and nature of the suit are fully disclosed' in the opinion of the court, delivered by the Chief Justice.

This was an action of trespass tried at the Monmouth Cir*euit, at the October term, 1831, before Justice Drake. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. On the return of the postea the defendant obtained a rule to shew cause, why the verdict .should not be set aside, and a new trial had.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of the county of Morris, removing into' this court the proceedings in a matter of road. The reasons relied upon, for a reversal, are stated in the opinion of the court delivered by Justice Ryerson.

This was an action of debt brought to recover back the price of three different policies, a wager depending upon the result of the drawing of the Connecticut and Rhode-Island lotteries.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of Monmouth, to remove into this court the application of the defendant for the benefit of the insolvent laws, and the subsequent proceedings and discharge.

On or about the 30th Dec. 1833, the Washington Banking Company, sued out of the Common Pleas of Bergen county, a foreign attachment against Peltier, for $12,000; under that writ, the Sheriff attached property, as appears by his inventory and return, to an amount between 12 and 18 thousand dollars. Afterwards and' while that writ was in force, the plaintiffs in this suit, were appointed Receivers, for the creditors and stockholders of the Bank.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of Somerset, removing into this court the proceedings in a matter of road. The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Ford. Tenbroeclc, and J. S. Green, for plaintiff in certiorari.

This was an application, on the part of the defendant, to quash the writ of attachment issued in this ease, and for an order on the sheriff to restore the goods and property attached. It appeared that on the 16th July last, one of the plaintiffs made an affidavit for bail, against Curtis and his partners, of a debt due from them as partners to the plaintiff.

At the November term, 1832, on motion of N. Saxton, the following writ of certiorari was allowed. “The state of New Jersey to Jehu Patterson, William N. Shinn, and John Clement, Esquires, commissioners appointed under the act entitled “ An act to incorporate a company to form an artificial navigation between the Passaic and Delaware •rivers,” passed the 31st day of December, 1824, greeting: We being willing, for certain reasons, to be certified of a certain “ estimate .and…

<p>Where the plaintiffs (a foreign corporation) filed their declaration in season,* the court refused an application to require them to file security for costs made by the defendants at the term next after the return of the writ, who offered no excuse for neglecting to make an earlier application, nor any affidavit of merits.</p>

<p>This was an application for a mandamus to be directed to the Common Pleas of Middlesex; that court having dismissed the appeal for want of a sufficient affidavit as required by the act of 23d November, 1821. liar. Com. 6, seo. O. J. S. JVevim, for the appellants, moved for the mandamus and cited, The Trenton Bank v. Haverstick, 6 Halst. 171.</p>

TMs was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas, of Middlesex, and the case was submitted to tMs court on the following statement of facts: “ William Teel, assignee of Elisha Snowden, sued William Wright, as the maker of a promissory note payable to the said Elisha Snowden, before a justice, and obtained judgment; whereupon said Wright appealed to the Middlesex Pleas, having made and filed with the justice, an appeal bond, in the usual form, with Elias Tice, as co-obligor,…

<p>By certain articles of agreement, for tlje sale and conveyance of a tract of land, the defendant was to pay one fourth of the purchase money, on the 25th of March, 1819, and the residue in three equal annual payments. The plaintiff, on payment of. the first instalment, was to make a title, and to give a deed in fee simple, to the defendant, for the premises; and the defendant, at the same time was to give to the plaintiff a bond and mortgage on the premises, or such other security, for the residue of the purchase money, as might be required by the plaintiff. Possession of the premises was to be delivered to the defendant, on the said 25th day of March, on receipt of the first payment, but that no transfer of title,'or possession, should take place, unless the first instalment should be in hand paid. Held that this is a ease of dependant covenants, and as the one party was not bound to part with his land, and the title thereto, without payment, neither was the other required to pay, without, at the same time, receiving the stipulated equivalent. Neither party can maintain an action without showing performance, or what is equivalent on his part, or some valid excuse. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff, in an action brought upon the said agreement, to aver that lie executed a sufficient deed, which, on the day appointed for consummating the contract, he was ready and willing to deliver to the defendant, on the payment by him of the first instalment, and securing the residue. Nor will it-be suffleient for the plaintiff to allege, that 011 the day, &c. he went upon the premises, and attended, and remained, at the dwelling house thereon, during the usual hours of business, for the purpose of delivering the deed and possession, with the averment that the defendant did not attend upon the premises to receive the deed, &e. bnt wholly neglected ; for by the express, or implied, terms of the agreement, there is no designated, or proper x>lace to deliver, or tender the deed, and consummate the bargain.</p> <p>The stipulation in the articles to deliver possession to the vendee, on the 25tli March, would have been fully and legally satisfied by a delivery of the deed on that day, by force of the statute, transferring uses into possession. Ren. Laws, 9, see. 7. Actual livery of seizin, or i)ossession, was not eontemx>lated by the x>arties; nor was it necessary by the terms of the contract. The deed might have been lawfully tendered to the vendee at his own house, or x>laee of business. If he aecex>ted it, well and good; if he did not, lie refused at his peril. Or if he absented himself, or could not be found, it should have been so averred in the declaration</p>

This was an application for a mandamus. The facts in this case appear in the opinion of the court, delivered by the chief justice.

An action of trespass quare clausum fregit, was commenced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, in a court for the trial of small causes. On the return of the summons, the plaintiffs-filed their state of demand, and the defendants, protesting that there was no such corporation, pleaded title and gave bond under the statute. Itev. Laws 639, sec. 33, &c. Thereupon, the plaintiffs commenced this action, and declared for the same trespass complained of below.

<p>No man may dig a ditch in a lane of a city, without authority. An individual suffering special damage by a common nuisance, may sue for the injury peculiar to himself, by means of it. Trespass on the case is the proper remedy for digging a ditch roundabout and in front of the plaintiff’s land.</p>

This-was a certiorari directed to the Common. Pleas of the county of Warren.

This was an action brought on the following bond: “ Know all men by these presents, that we, Joseph Wright, Edmund W. Wright, and Allen Smith, of the county of Salem, are held and firmly bound unto His Excellency, Isaac H. Williamson, Ordinary or Surrogate General of the said state, in the sum of three thousand dollars, lawful money of said state, to be paid to the said Isaac H. Williamson, his successors or assigns: to which payment, well and truly to be made, we b*ud…

This was an action of debt upon a bond, and the defendant having craved oyer of the condition, it is read to him in these words, to wit: “ The condition of this obligation is such, that the above bound Isaac Sayre, has made his will for the distribution of his real and personal estate; which will is witnessed by Benjamine Moorehouse and Elijah Stites, and Abrm.

An application was made in this suit, to admit John Rutherfurd to defend, as landlord, along with Henry Simpe, the tenant in possession.

The plaintiffs having filed their declaration on a bond executed by the defendants to James Shotwell, in his life time, the defendants pleaded first, non est factum; second, as follows: And for further plea in this behalf, the said Isaac and George, by leave of the court, for that purpose first had and obtained, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, say, that they ought not to be charged with said debt, by virtue of the said supposed obligation…

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of Middlesex county. The history of the case will be found in the opinion of the court, delivered by the Chief Justice.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of the county of Essex. The facts and history of the case, will be found in the opinion of this court.

TMs action was brought on a promissory note, purporting to have been made by the defendant, bearing date the 23rd of April, 1816, for |1,716 50, payable to the plaintiff or order, 545 days after date. The declaration, besides a count on the note, iontained the usual money counts. The cause was tried upon the general issue, at the Gloucester Circuit in March, 1828, and the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $694 50.

Porter, the defendant, gave to Mary Gulick, in the life time of Abraham Gulick, her husband, and during coverture, the promissory note in question. Abraham Gulick survived his wife, and then died leaving the plaintiff in certiorari, his executor. The justice before whom the suit was originally brought» gave judgment for the plaintiff.

This was a certiorari directed to two justices of the peace of the county of Sussex, removing the proceedings by them had under the ninth section of the act for the settlement and relief of the poor. Rev. Laws, 39. The case, as it appeared before the justices, and the objections urged in this court for a reversal, are stated in the opinion of the court, delivered by the chief justice.

This was an action of ejectment tried at the Sussex circuit in November term, 1832. The facts as proved at the trial, fully appear in the opinion of the court delivered by the chief justice.

This was an action of assumpsit brought in this court. The plaintiff filed the following declaration. “ New Jersey Supreme Court, of September term, in the year 1834. Essex County, ss. Thaddeus Beardsley, plaintiff in this suit, by Andrew S. Carr, his attorney, complains of Henry Southmayd and Thomas Dwight, defendants therein.

This case having been tried at the Somerset Circuit, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiffs, on the return of the postea the court granted a rule to shew cause, why the verdict should not be set aside and a new trial granted. This rule was argúed at the last term by Wall and J. S. Q-reen, in support of the rule, and by Southard and Field, contra.

This was a certiorari directed to the Sessions of Warren county : the facts of the case are fully mentioned in the opinion of the court delivered by the Chief Justice.

This action was commenced in the court of Common Pleas of the county of Middlesex, and was removed into this court after judgment upon demurrer, by writ of error. For the declaration filed by the plaintiff, the reader is referred to the ease argued in this court in the term of May, 1883, page eight of this volume. The cause was tried at the Middlesex circuit, in the term of December, 1833, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff.

This was an action of dower, and was tried at the Sussex circuit, in November, 1882. The defendant pleaded, first, ne unques seizie que doiver ; and secondly, that he was not tenant of the freehold. A verdict was rendered for the demandant on both issues. The cause now comes before the court, on a rule to shew cause why that verdict should not be set aside and a ■ new trial granted.

This was a certiorari directed to a justice of the peace of the county of Salem, removing a judgment rendered in the court for the trial of small causes. The transcript of the justice, is as follows: “ October 19th, the plaintiff appeared and produced a note of hand given by the defendant, whereon the defendant confessed judgment.

This is the same action which is reported in 1 Green 69. The question now determined, arose at the bar of the court upon the production of the record under the plea of nul tiel record.

This was a certiorari directed to the Orphans’ Court of the county of Gloucester. A. L. Bakin for the plaintiffs, stated that the writ of certiorari in this case, had been allowed on the 23d of December, 1834, and was returnable to this term; but that no term of the Orphans’ Court had intervened between the allowance and return of the writ; and consequently that no proper return had been or could be made to the certiorari to this term.

<p>This was an application to strike out certain counts in the declaration filed by the plaintiff.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit brought in the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Somerset, by William Gulick, against John Gulick and Jacob Gulick. A verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and removed into this court by the defendants. The reasons relied upon for a reversal, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court delivered by the chief justice.

This was an action of debt brought upon a bond, in the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Salem. The defendants pleaded non est factum. On the trial, the bond was overruled as evidence, and a bill of exceptions sealed. The proceedings are removed into this court by a writ of'error. The question raised on the argument, is fully stated in the opinion delivered by the judges of this court.

This was a certiorari directed to a justice of the peace, removing a judgment rendered in the court for the trial of small causes. The opinion of the court was delivered by the chief justice.

This was an application for leave to suggest on the record, the death of the plaintiff, and that the action be continued at the suit of David S. Crane, administrator de bonis non, cum testamento annexo, of Stephen Crane, deceased.

This was a certiorari directed to the Common Pleas of Hunterdon county, removing proceedings in a matter of insolvency. The facts of the case are fully detailed in the opinion of the court delivered by the chief justice.

This was a certiorari directed to a justice of the peace, removing a judgment rendered by him in the court for the trial of small causes. The opinion of the court was delivered by the chief justice.