Ryan v. Mackolin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Thus, the code no longer contains any impediment to the joinder of causes of action of the kind asserted by the plaintiff in this case. The statutory changes reflect a constantly developing policy in the pursuit of simplified pleading and procedure. To save time and to relieve court congestion, parties are encouraged if not commanded, to litigate all their claims in one action, except to the extent that joinder of multifarious and complex issues would produce confusion and prejudice. Defendants and the courts are thus saved from vexation caused by multiple litigation.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 178 Wis. 2d 808 - Kluth v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin · Hager v. McGlynn

2. “‘ ‘ ‘ The result of the refusal to permit joinder is that: (1) in the separate suits it is open to each defendant to prove that the other was solely responsible, or responsible for the greater part of the damage, and so defeat or minimize recovery; (2) it is equally open to the plaintiff to prove that each defendant was solely responsible, or responsible for the greater part of the damage, and so recover excessive compensation; (3) the two verdicts will seldom have any relation to one another; (4) different witnesses may be called in the two suits, or the same witness may tell different stories, so that the full truth is told in neither; (5) neither defendant may cross-examine the other, or his witnesses, and plaintiff may not eross- examine both in one action; (6) time and expense are doubled.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State ex rel. Moritz v. Troop

3. ““Although we are obliged to indulge in every inference favorable to the pleader, we cannot ignore the allegation in the petition herein that following the first collision Ryan was hospitalized and received medical treatment for an injury to his back. The nature and extent of the disabling effect of that collision having been subject to medical scrutiny, we cannot assume that however indivisible in effect plaintiffs back injury became after the second collision, it will be incapable of separation as to cause. The sequence of events here is not such that, however difficult, it should be insurmountable to chart the course of cause to effect as a subsequent event adds its force to the flow. See Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267 , 190 N.E. 487 .” Id. at 222.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 7 Ohio App. 3d 369 - Williams v. Gragston