Wooley v. Lucksinger’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The provisions of this Chapter shall be applicable to all business organizations defined in R.S. 12:1502(B).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 223 So. 3d 556 - Hill v. TMR Exploration, Inc. · 224 So. 3d 14 - Salemi v. TMR Exploration, Inc.

2. “La. R.S. 12:1502 E provides that “The time limitations provided in this Section shall not be subject to suspension on any grounds or interruption except by timely suit filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue.” Language similar to this was interpreted by this Court in Conerly , 2002-1852 at p. 8, 858 So.2d at 644 : The period of limitation contained in LSA-R.S. 49:112 clearly has some aspects of a peremptive period. Most notably, as the State points out in its brief to this court, the statute provides that there will be no interruption or suspension of the time period. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized this * as a characteristic of peremption. Flowers v. Rausch, 364 So.2d 928, 931 (La.1978). However, the Legislature is free to enact statutes containing prescriptive periods and to dispense with exceptions to those prescriptive periods. See Hebert [v. Doctors Memorial Hosp.], 486 So.2d [717] at 724 [La. 1986]. Moreover, had the Legislature meant for the time period to be per-emptive, it could have expressed its intent in the title or text of the act enacting LSA-R.S. 49:112 or in the language of LSA-R.S. 49:112 itself. Basically, LSA-R.S. 49:112 creates a hybrid time period as concerns actions against the State. Despite having some characteristics in common with peremptive time periods, we find that the time period set forth in LSA-R.S. 49:112 is, as the legislature described it, a prescriptive period, with the qualifications that the prescriptive pe”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 55 So. 3d 941 - Suhren v. Gibert

3. “Art. 202. Judicial notice of legal matters A. Mandatory. A court, whether requested to do so or not, shall take judicial notice of the laws of the United States, of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States, ... B. Other legal matters. (1) A court shall take judicial notice of the following if a party requests it and provides the court with the information needed by it to comply with the request, and may take judicial notice without request of a party of: (d) Rules which govern the practice and procedure in a court of the United States or of any state, territory, or other jurisdiction of the United States, and which have been published in a form which makes them readily accessible. (e) Rules and decisions of boards, commissions, and agencies of the United States or of any state, territory, or other jurisdiction of the United States which have been duly published and promulgated and which have the effect of law within their respective jurisdictions. (2) A party who requests that judicial notice be taken and the court, if notice is taken without request shall give reasonable notice during trial to all other parties. C. Information by court. The court may inform itself of any of the foregoing legal matters in such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. D.Time of taking notice. Judicial notice of the foregoing legal matters may be taken at any stage of the proceeding, provided that befor”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wooley v. Lucksinger