Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

14 Tex. 400

Luckey v. State

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1855

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1855-07-01

The appellant was convicted, at the Fall Term, 1853, of the District Court of Rusk county, of playing at a game with cards, on which money was bet, and fined $19 50, for which, with costs of suit, judgment was then rendered against him; and it was therefore ordered “ that he stand committed to prison until said fine and costs be paid.” He escaped from custody, but appearing in the same Court, in person, at the Fall Term, 1854, he was, on motion of the District Attorney, by…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1855-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 1978

4 state decisions

101855186018701880189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Wheeler, J.

¶1There can be no question, that the action of the Court, in committing the convict to prison until the fine and costs be paid, was legal and correct. The imprisonment, authorized by the Statute, is designed to enforce punishment where it is imposed by fine; and it can make no difference, as respects the mode of enforcing the punishment, whether the of-fence is punishable by fine and imprisonment, or by fine only. The law gives the same means of enforcing the pecuniary penalty in either case. The imprisonment, authorized by the Statute, is an actual imprisonment, within the four walls of the jail; and where the Sheriff permits a convict committed to his custody to go at large, he is liable for an escape. When retaken, there can be no question of the authority of the Court to recommit. It was very properly so ordered by the Court in this ease ; and there is no error in the judgment, of which the appellant can complain. But the Court had no authority to remit any part of the fine and costs, and of this the State very justly complains. After conviction and assessment of the fine by the jury, the Court has no power to remit the punishment imposed. That is the exercise of the pardoning power, which appertains exclusively to the Executive. Neither has the *402Court the power to remit costs. Those are matters of private right, which neither the Court nor any one else on behalf of the State, can release, without the consent of those to whom they are due. The Statute, though its meaning is not very clearly expressed, was evidently intended to empower the Court to fix such a limit to the term of imprisonment, as the Court, in its discretion, might deem proper, upon satisfactory proof of the inability of the party to pay the fine and costs ; but not to empower the Court to remit any portion of either the fine or costs. (Hart. Dig. Art. 401; Dixon v. The State, 2 Tex. R. 481.) The Court therefore erred in its judgment remitting a portion of the fine and costs; and, in so far, the judgment is reversed and set aside ; in all other respects it is affirmed.

¶2Judgment affirmed.

/14/tex/400 · .json · Public domain