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140 Ala. 316

Mitchell v. Gambill

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided November 15, 1903

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1903-11-15

Tried before tbe Hon. A. A. Coleman. Tbis was an action brought by tbe appellant, James A. Hitcbell, against tbe appellee, A. A. Gambill, to recover for an assault and battery committed by tbe defendant on tbe plaintiff. Tbe complaint was in • tbe Code form. Tbe defendant pleaded six pleas. Tbe 1st, 2d and 3d pleas were tbe general issue. Tbe other pleas numbered 4, 5 and 6 were, upon tbe motion of tbe defendant, withdrawn.

Relies on Keiser v. Smith · Prior v. State · Lunsford v. Walker

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1903-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently March 1971 · most notably Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy (1933), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carter (1924)

2 federal appellate · 23 state decisions

7019031910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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DOWDELL, J.

¶1This is an action of trespass for assault and battery. The complaint is in Code form. The three pleas to the complaint upon which issue was taken and the cause tried, presented in different forms the general issue. Under this issue, matter in justification of the alleged assault is not competent in evidence. Such defense must be specially pleaded.Lunsford v. Walker, 93 Ala. 36.

¶2Section 4345 of the Criminal Code of 1896, which provides that, “on the trial of any person for an assault, an assault and battery, or an affray, he may give in evidence any opprobrious words or abusive language used by the person assaulted or beaten at or near the time of the assault or affray; and such evidence shall be good in extenuation or justification, as the jury may determine,” has no application to civil actions for damages, and applies alone to criminal prosecutions for the offenses named in the statute.Prior v. State, 77 Ala. 56. Moreover, as was said in Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 42, this statute was “intended as a shield and not as a sword,” and it cannot be invoiced by a defendant who first used, insulting words, and struck the first blow. But independ*320ent of the statute, in a civil action for damages at the common law, while mere words, although of provocation, do not constitute a defense to the action, yet when used at the time or immediately preceding the battery, they may be shown in evidence under the general issue in mitigation of damages.Keiser v. Smith, 71 Ala. 481; 46 Am. Rep. 312, and authorities there cited.

¶3Since the recovery in actions of this nature may include punitive or vindictive damages, as well as actual damages, the language used by the plaintiff at the time of the transaction, was competent in evidence, and it was permissible for the jury to consider it in mitigation of punitive damages, but not of any actual damages sustained by the plaintiff.

¶4Charge seven requested by the plaintiff correctly stated the law and its refusal was error. What we have said above sufficiently expresses our views as to the rulings of the court complained of, for the purpose of another trial. For the error indicated, the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and the cause remanded.

¶5Reversed and remanded.

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