Dixon v. Eckenroth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1 ‘ Contestants contend, however, that in any event the evidence is sufficient to establish a confidential relationship between Lucy Harnett and the testatrix, which gave rise to a presumption of undue influence legally sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence and thus sustain the verdict. We are unable to sustain this contention. The legal doctrine sought to be invoked is stated in the Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397 [ 14 Pac. (2d) 768 ], as follows: ‘Where one who unduly profits by a will sustains a confidential relationship to the testator and actively participates in procuring the execution of a will, the burden is upon him to show that the will was not induced by his undue influence. (Estate of Shay, 196 Cal. 355, 363 [ 237 Pac. 1079 ]; Estate of Gallo, 61 Cal. App. 163 [ 214 Pac. 496 ].).’ But as indicated by the foregoing statement, such presumption is not generated alone by the existence of a confidential relationship. (Estate of Presho, 196 Cal. 639 [ 238 Pac. 944 ].) Such relationship ‘assumes probative importance when disclosed in con june tion with the facts that the provisions of the propounded instrument are unnatural or unjust, and that the alleged wrongdoer was active in procuring the writing to be executed. If the facts of injustice and activity on the part of the wrongdoer are not established, a denial of probate cannot be sustained.’ (26 Cal. Jur. 652, citing authorities.) In other words, to use the language of the Supreme Court: 1 There must in addit”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Estate of Jacobs

2. ““The legal principles to be used in determining whether a will is the product of undue influence are well settled by a continuous line of decisions. They are set forth in the Estate of Morcel, 162 Cal. 188 [ 121 P. 733 ], Estate of Bryson, 191 Cal. 521 [ 217 P. 525 ], Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699 [ 235 P. 45 ], and several later cases hereinafter cited. As pointed out therein, the kind of influence that may be held to be undue influence warranting a repudiation of a will ‘must be such as in effect destroyed the testator’s free agency, and substituted for his own another person’s will’ (Estate of Motz, 136 Cal. 558, 563 [ 69 P. 294 ]); and mere general influence, however strong or controlling, not brought to bear on the testamentary act, is not enough; it must be influence used directly to procure the will, and must amount ‘to coercion destroying free agency on the part of the testator’ (Estate of Keegan, 139 Cal. 123,127 [ 72 P. 828 ]; Estate of Fleming, 199 Cal. 750 [ 251 P. 637 ] ; Estate of Holloway, 195 Cal. 711 [ 235 P. 1012 ]). So, also, proof of mere opportunity to influence the mind of the testatrix, even though coupled with an interest or with a motive so to do, is insufficient. In order to warrant setting aside a will on this ground there must be substantial proof, direct or circumstantial, of a pressure which overpowers the volition of the testator and operates directly on the testamentary act.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 86 Cal. App. 2d 139 - Estate of Trefren

3. “The unbroken rule in this state is that courts must refuse to set aside the solemnly executed will of a deceased person upon the ground of undue influence unless there be proof of 'a pressure which overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was made'.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 16 Cal. 2d 573 - Peterson v. Logan