Case: 23-30683 Document: 154-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
June 10, 2025
No. 23-30683 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Louis Vernon Jackson,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 1:21-CR-155-7
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Louis Vernon Jackson represented himself
before and during his criminal trial, as was his right under the Sixth
Amendment of our Constitution. Jackson argues that the district court erred
when it failed to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing for him to proceed
pro se. We see no error and AFFIRM.
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I
A
Jackson’s convictions are the direct result of two separate drug busts
at Louisiana motels—one in April 2020 and one in May 2020. 1 In April,
agents of the Natchitoches Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force received a
confidential informant’s tip that Jackson and Candiace Bronson, a co-defendant, were selling drugs out of multiple rooms at the local Motel 6. 2
After surveilling the motel, officers conducted separate and simultaneous
traffic stops of both Jackson and Bronson. The officers found two Motel 6
keys on Jackson’s person, and soon after obtained a search warrant for Rooms
164 and 162. 3 Jackson was then arrested; in a post-arrest interview, he
admitted to being aware of the rifle in Room 164. After obtaining a search
warrant for Jackson’s phone, officers discovered a trove of text messages
discussing the sale of drugs with his customers. Soon after, Jackson bonded
from state custody and resumed his illicit economic activities.
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1
The first bust was at a Motel 6 in Natchitoches, Louisiana on April 16, 2020. The
second bust was at a Best Western in Alexandria, Louisiana on May 13, 2020.
2
The task force was comprised of officers from the Natchitoches Police
Department, the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s Office, and other agencies and
municipalities.
3
Officers first obtained a search warrant for Room 164, and while executing the
warrant, noticed an internal connecting door to the neighboring Room 162. While sweeping
the first room, officers heard a commotion in Room 162 and immediately applied for a
second search warrant for the adjoining room. Three people were found to be “piled into
the bathroom.” In total, officers found a digital scale covered in methamphetamine residue,
two methamphetamine smoking devices, and one methamphetamine pipe in Room 162. In
Room 164, officers found another digital scale with methamphetamine residue, three grams
of marijuana, 34 Tramadol pills, a Marlin .30-30 rifle, an SCCY 9mm handgun, 30 rounds
of .40 caliber ammunition, two loaded 30-round 9mm magazines, plastic sandwich bags,
and a plastic container covered in methamphetamine residue. Officers also found multiple
documents and identification cards belonging to Jackson and Bronson.
2
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Less than a month later, law enforcement received another tip that
Jackson and Bronson were dealing drugs out of a Best Western in Alexandria,
Louisiana—and that Savannah Weeks, an eventual co-defendant, was en
route to retrieve methamphetamine from the duo. While conducting
surveillance, officers observed Weeks pay Jackson a short visit. After her
departure, officers conducted a traffic stop of Weeks and recovered 132.7
grams of methamphetamine from her car. 4 Officers then executed a search
warrant on Jackson’s hotel room and seized 498.2 grams of
methamphetamine and $11,300 in cash. 5
B
A grand jury in the Western District of Louisiana returned a ninecount indictment charging Jackson and six others with distinct drug and gun
offenses. 6 Jackson himself faced five separate charges: conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute
Tramadol (Count 5); possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking
(Count 6); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7); and
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (Count 9). 7
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4
After obtaining a search warrant for Weeks’ phone, officers found evidence that
she and her father, co-defendant James Weeks, were involved in drug dealing as well.
Weeks later admitted to receiving the methamphetamine from Jackson and Bronson.
5
Officers also recovered a digital scale, plastic sandwich bags, and Jackson’s
driver’s license and debit cards.
6
The grand jury indicted the seven Defendants on June 30, 2021.
7
The relevant statutory provisions are as follows: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846
(Count 1);
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 5 and 9);
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(Count 6); and
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count 7).
3
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From the beginning, Jackson insisted on self-representation. 8 At
Jackson’s initial appearance and arraignment, the magistrate judge
conducted a Faretta colloquy to ensure Jackson knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel. 9 The magistrate judge confirmed that Jackson
understood the charges and attendant penalties, that Jackson could read and
write, and that Jackson had attended college for two years. In addition, the
magistrate judge expounded on the “many dangers and disadvantages” of
self-representation—including the loss of an appointed counsel’s training
and experience to craft a trial strategy, to select the jury, to draft jury
instructions, and to preserve issues for appeal. 10
A little over a week later, at Jackson’s detention hearing, the
magistrate judge reiterated in no uncertain terms the “many dangers and
disadvantages” of self-representation. Once more, Jackson confirmed his
decision to exercise his right to self-representation.
C
Prior to Jackson’s four-day trial in April 2023, the district judge
conducted another Faretta colloquy with Jackson to confirm his continued
waiver of appointed counsel and intention to represent himself. The district
judge inquired as to Jackson’s educational background and emphasized the
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8
Before his initial appearance and arraignment, Jackson requested an in-person
hearing and informed the district court of his desire to represent himself.
9
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (“When an accused
manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional
benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself,
the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” (citing
Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464-465 (1938))).
10
Furthermore, the magistrate judge underscored counsel’s ability to perform their
duties objectively, with “his or her emotions [] not get[ting] in the way of defending the
case.”
4
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different sets of rules that would apply before and after his trial—including
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the Sentencing Guidelines.
The district judge broke down the basic structure of the trial, witness
examinations, objections, the Government’s burden of proof, and Jackson’s
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, the district
judge also ensured that Jackson had standby counsel, explained to him that
the court could remove Jackson from self-representation if necessary, and
clarified that standby counsel could not try portions of the case as long as
Jackson maintained his pro se status.
A jury of Jackson’s peers convicted him of Counts 1, 7, and 9—
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine paired with felon-in-possession—and acquitted him on
Counts 5 and 6. The district court sentenced him to 360 months of
imprisonment; Jackson timely appealed. 11
II
A
“Due process prohibits the prosecution of a defendant who is not
competent to stand trial.” 12 “A defendant is deemed mentally competent
when he has the ‘present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
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11
With a criminal history category of VI, and a total offense level of 38, Jackson’s
calculated sentencing range was 360 months to life. USSG § 5A.
12
Dunn v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348 (1996)). See also Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“If a
defendant is incompetent, due process considerations require suspension of the criminal
trial until such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his
defense and understand the proceedings against him.” (citing to Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam))); Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
5
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degree of rational understanding’ and ‘has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’” 13
The Supreme Court recognized in Indiana v. Edwards, however, a
higher threshold of competency for proceeding pro se at trial than for standing
trial.14 We noted that this “rule applies only in the ‘exceptional’ situation
where a defendant is found competent to stand trial and elects to appear pro
se, but is so severely mentally ill that his self-representation threatens an
improper conviction or sentence.” 15 “Even then, Edwards is permissive,
allowing the state to insist on counsel, but not requiring that the state do so.” 16
B
We review a district court’s determination of a defendant possessing
competency for pro se representation for an abuse of discretion. 17 And, we
review for an abuse of discretion whether a district court erred by not sua
sponte holding a competency hearing for a defendant. 18
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13
Dunn, 162 F.3d at 305 (quoting Dusky,
362 U.S. at 402).
14
See 554 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008) (“In certain instances, an individual may well be
able to satisfy Dusky’s mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel
at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present
his own defense without the help of counsel.”).
15
Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Edwards,
554 U.S.
at 176).
16
Id.
17
United States v. Sterling, 99 F.4th 783, 801 (5th Cir. 2024). See also United States
v. Berry,
565 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The question for us is whether the verdict that
came out of these proceedings must be vacated because the court should not have allowed
Berry to represent himself. We review that decision for an abuse of discretion, keeping in
mind the constitutional principles it implicates.” (citations omitted)).
18
United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 901 (5th Cir. 2009).
6
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III
The right to self-representation reflects “a nearly universal
conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a
lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend
himself if he truly wants to do so.” 19 Exercising this right requires a defendant
to waive his right to counsel, an explicit guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. 20
In doing so, he must “knowingly and intelligently” waive a lawyer’s counsel
and “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation[.]” 21 And, the record must “establish that ‘he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” 22
Here, the record clearly establishes that Jackson knew what he was
doing and that he elected to proceed pro se with eyes wide open. Not once—
but twice—did the district court explain the difficulties of trial, warn against
the dangers of self-representation, and confirm Jackson’s waiver through a
full-fledged Faretta colloquy. Sailing far above the bare minimum, the district
court took care to remind Jackson of the complexities and pitfalls that are part
and parcel of any criminal trial.
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19
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817. See also
id. at 821 (observing that “[i]n the long history
of British criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice
of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was
the Star Chamber.”); Martinez v. Ct. App. of Cal., Fourth App. Dist.,
528 U.S. 152, 165
(2000) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment) (“That asserting the right of self-representation
may often, or even usually, work to the defendant’s disadvantage is no more remarkable—
and no more a basis for withdrawing the right—than is the fact that proceeding without
counsel in custodial interrogation, or confessing to the crime, usually works to the
defendant’s disadvantage.”).
20
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
21
Id. at 835.
22
Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
7
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A
Nevertheless, now Jackson contends that the district court abused its
discretion when it did not sua sponte conduct a competency hearing prior to
trial and asserts that his behavior before and during trial indicated “severe
mental illness.” 23 We disagree.
1
A district court “must conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s mental
capacity sua sponte if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to
competency.” 24 And, “[i]f the trial court received evidence, viewed
objectively, that should have raised a reasonable doubt as to competency, yet
failed to make further inquiry, the defendant has been denied a fair trial.” 25
The trial court, however, is “often in the best position to judge the matter.” 26
The statutory requirements for a district court to hold a competency
hearing are found in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), and are as follows:
The court . . . shall order [] a [competency] hearing on its own
motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that
he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.
To determine if there is “reasonable cause” to doubt a defendant’s
competence, we consider: (1) any history of irrational behavior, (2) the
_____________________
23
See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.
24
Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2000).
25
Ruston, 565 F.3d at 901 (citing Mata, 210 F.3d at 329).
26
Sterling, 99 F.4th at 801 (citing Edwards,
554 U.S. at 177 (“[T]he trial judge . . .
will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to
the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”)).
8
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defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion of
competency. 27
2
Jackson argues that because he filed “erratic and incoherent” pre-trial motions—and made rambling and nonsensical remarks to the jury—that
the district court was “on notice” of his incompetency for self-representation. 28 Jackson asserts that put together, these acts are indicia of
his status as an inexperienced pro se defendant, and lead to the conclusion
that he may have been better off accepting counsel.
We harbor no doubt that, with the benefit of an extensive legal
education and training, Jackson could have made better and more persuasive
arguments. This is precisely what the district court warned him of repeatedly
before trial. Under Edwards, a district court is allowed—but certainly not
required—to appoint counsel and thereby extinguish a defendant’s right to
self-representation. 29 The record does not paint the picture of a severely
_____________________
27
See United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995).
28
Most, if not all, of his pre-trial motions were based on existing legal principles,
only misinterpreted. Furthermore, we DENY Jackson’s motion to supplement the record
on appeal with medical records from Natchitoches Behavioral Health Clinic, as we do “not
ordinarily enlarge the record on appeal to include material not before the district court.”
United States v. Randolph, 103 F.4th 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Flores,
887 F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). Under FED. R. EVID. 201(b), courts can
take judicial notice of any fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned.” We decline to exercise our discretion to enlarge the record here. We are being
asked to take judicial notice of records from nearly a decade ago, which show the Defendant
received anti-depressant medications and counseling. Even if we did grant the motion, it
would not alter our conclusions.
29
See 554 U.S. at 178 (“That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist
upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but
9
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mentally ill defendant incapable of conducting his own defense. 30 Rather, it
shows a persistent—and sometimes misguided—effort by Jackson that
resulted in an acquittal by the jury on two of five counts.
Jackson had a cogent defense theory and sought to convince the jury
that law enforcement had found him guilty through his close relation with
Bronson—and that Weeks and Bronson were lying about his involvement for
leniency. Despite his lack of legal knowledge and polish, Jackson’s use of
competing explanations and impeachment belies critical thinking and
strategy, not incompetence. His partial acquittal only serves to buttress our
conclusion that Jackson was far from incompetent to represent himself. 31
…
At bottom, the requirements for occupying the liminal space Edwards
creates—competent enough to stand trial, yet unable to perform the basic
tasks necessary to present one’s own defense—are “exceptional.” 32
_____________________
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point they are not competent to conduct
trial proceedings by themselves.”).
30
See also United States v. Rose, 684 F. App’x 403, 404 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding
that, despite an obvious lack of legal knowledge and training, “because Rose clearly and
unequivocally invoked his constitutional right to self-representation after extensive
questioning, the district court had no choice but to allow him to proceed pro se as to do
otherwise would have violated his Sixth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Johnson,
610 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting an equivalence between nonsensical legal
antics and incompetency as to self-representation and concluding that “the defendants are
fools, but that is not the same as being incompetent.”).
31
A main pillar of Jackson’s defense theory was that Bronson alone trafficked
Tramadol pills, and that the handgun in the Motel 6 room was hers alone. As the
Government correctly notes, these counts were premised on Bronson and Weeks’
testimony. The jury, however, was not convinced when it came to the methamphetamine
and felon-in-possession charges, which were supported by Jackson’s personal text
messages and officer testimony.
32
Panetti, 727 F.3d at 414.
10
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Jackson’s case does not meet the mark. Finding no abuse of discretion by the
district court, we AFFIRM.
11
