140 Ill. App. 3d 387 - People v. Eure’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It cannot be said, therefore, that the use of a weapon in the commission of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm cannot be deterred. The decision to so use a weapon is not one forced on an accused, as in voluntary manslaughter/unreasonable belief in self-defense, nor is it a spontaneous decision, as in voluntary manslaughter/sudden and intense passion. It is an intent offense, unlike involuntary manslaughter. The use of a weapon in such a case can be deterred; the purposes of the armed-violence statute may therefore be achieved by application of that offense to the predicate felony of aggravated battery.” Eure, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 395 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. People v. Young · 230 Ill. App. 3d 192 - People v. Hugues

2. ““The armed-violence statute must therefore be read as a strong statutory deterrent to carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon, the sanctions of which statute are activated when coupled with the commission of a felony. The armed-violence statute, however, does not seek merely to penalize the commission of the underlying felony, although that certainly is an inevitable adjunct of an armed-violence conviction. Rather, it seeks to deter the use of weapons in the commission of the predicate felony. *** In short, the gravamen of the armed-violence statute focuses on the offender, and not on the results of the offense.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. People v. Varela

3. ““It is conceivable that an individual can be charged and convicted of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, and armed violence based on the aggravated battery, all arising out of the same physical act. In such circumstances, only one conviction may validly be entered. [Citation.] Since the conduct causing the offenses includes the mitigating factor of either unreasonable belief in self-defense or a sudden and intense passion, the provisions of the armed-violence statute would be inoperative.” Eure, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 395-96 , 488 N.E.2d at 1273 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 226 Ill. App. 3d 453 - People v. Renehan