140 N.C. App. 303 - Wall v. Wall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Defendant argues that his due process rights under both the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution were violated by the delay of 19 months from the date of trial to the entry of judgment in this matter. Defendant argues that an overall goal of our Equitable Distribution Act is “winding up the marriage and distributing] the marital property fairly with as much certainty and finality as possible.” Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 183 , 344 S.E.2d 100, 115 (1986). We recognize there is inevitably some passage of time between the close of evidence in an equitable distribution case and the entry of judgment. That is particularly true in a lengthy, complicated matter such as the case before us. Competent counsel for the parties carried out extensive discovery, submitted numerous legal briefs and responded to the briefs filed by their opponents. In many cases, a delay in the entry of judgment for 30 or 60 days following trial would not be prejudicial because there would be little or no change in the situation of the parties or the values assigned to the items of property. In this case, however, there was a nineteen-month delay between the date of trial and the date of disposition. This was more than a de minimis delay, and requires that the trial court enter a new distribution order on remand. Where there is such an extensive delay, even though it be due to factors beyond the trial court’s control, we believe it would be consistent with the goals of the Eq”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Plomaritis v. Plomaritis · 168 N.C. App. 198 - Britt v. Britt

2. “[I]t would normally be error for the trial court to fail to value an item of marital property as of the date of separation, excluding gains or losses on the property since the date of separation. Here, however, the parties and their counsel stipulated to the value of the profit-sharing plan as of the date of separation. Although that value obviously included some gains on the plan assets after the date of separation, defendant is bound by his stipulation, and estopped to question the value used by the trial court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 187 N.C. App. 305 - Byrd v. Byrd

3. “We continue to stress the importance of following the steps of first classifying, then valuing and distributing marital property. Each step is a prerequisite to the performance of the next, and failure to follow the prescribed order will result in a fatally flawed trial court disposition. Only those assets and debts that are classified as marital property and valued are subject to distribution under the Equitable Distribution Act[.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 261 N.C. App. 94 - Watson v. Watson