Volume 140 — New York Supplement

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.</p> <p>Action by Charles A. Du Bois and another, doing business under the firm name and style of Du Bois & Taylor, against Kathleen L. Mullins. From a judgment of the Municipal Court for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.</p>

<p>Action by the First- National Bank of Waterloo against Leonard Story. Judgment for defendant. -</p>

Action by Caroline F. Bond against Frederick Bond. On motion for release of defendant from custody under an order of arrest, granted pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 550, on the ground that he was about to leave the state. Granted.

Action by Nelson A. Farrand against Hyman Wittner. From an order striking out the answer, because he refused to obey an order requiring him to discover and produce certain books and papers, defendant appeals. Reversed, and motion denied.

<p>1: Pleading (§.'350*)—Judgment on Pleadings. ..</p> <p>A bill of particulars, demanded and furnished, may be considered on. motion for judgment on the pleadings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Gent. Dig. §§ 1053, 1054,. 1070-1077; Dec. Dig. § 350.*]</p> <p>2. Pleading (§ 345*)—Negligence—Judgment on Pleadings.</p> <p>In an action for personal injury, caused by negligent maintenance-of an elevator, sudden descent of which caused the accident, judgment dismissing the complaint on the pleadings was not warranted by averment in a bill of particulars that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff" was on the elevator to ascertain what was the matter with it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see ¿'leading, Cent. Dig. §§ 1055-1059;. Dec. Dig. § 345.*]</p>

Action by Ludwig Engel, doing business as Engel & Co. against Christo Georgiades, doing business as Christo Georgiades & Co. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the first defense of defendant’s answer and to two counterclaims therein, and in effect striking out the denials in the answer as friv.ol.ous, defendant appeals, De.murrers to first and second defenses, overruled, sustained as to the first and second counterclaims, and motion for judgment on the pleadings denied.

Action by Victor F. Cukor against Henry A. Rothman. From an order (139 N. Y. Supp. 1015) granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in an action on a contract of partnership, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.</p> <p>Action by Hyland P. Rice against Raymond P. Roberts. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.</p>

■ Action by Moses Gross against the R. & S. Outfitting Company for goods sold and delivered. From a judgment for defendant and from an order denying a motion to vacate the judgment and order .a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and new trial ordered.

Action by Harry Lack against Stephen K. Watts, impleaded with David M. Ingber and Jacob Verlit, doing business as copartners under the firm name and style of Ingber & Co., and Minnie K. Brown. From an order of the City Court of the city of New York denying his motion for an order vacating and setting aside the service of the summons and complaint and vacating the judgment entered thereon, defendant Stephen IC. Watts appeals. .Modified and affirmed.

Action by the L. B. Repair Company, Inc., against Louis E. Whicher, as trustee, etc., and another. From judgment for plaintiff, the defendant trustee appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 1152*)—Modification of Judgment—Statute.</p> <p>In an action for conversion, where the evidence shows that plaintiff has waived the tort, the Appellate Term under Code Civ. Proc. § 1317, relating to judgment or orders on appeal, is empowered to modify the judgment therein by striking out a provision holding defendant liable to arrest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4483-4496; Dec. Dig. § 1152.*]</p> <p>.2. Trover and Conversion (§ 22*)—What Constitutes Defenses.</p> <p>Where the tort has been waived so that an action for conversion is merely an action upon contract, the defendant is entitled to a credit for the amount paid plaintiff on his waiver of the tort.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trover and Conversion, Cent. Dig. §§ 152-162, 167-169; Dec. Dig. § 22.*]</p>

<p>Wills (§ 634*)—Contingent Remainders—Survivorship.</p> <p>Under a will giving all the property of the deceased to his wife for life, and providing that, after her death or marriage, it should be divided among their children, naming them, a child took only a contingent remainder which could not be passed by will upon her dying before her mother.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1488-1510; Dec. Dig. § 634.*]</p>

<p>Sales (§ 435*)—Counterclaim for Breach of Warranty—Sufficiency of Counterclaim.</p> <p>Under Personal Property Law (Laws 1911, c. 571) § 130, which provides that, in the absence of contrary agreement, acceptance of goods by a buyer does not release the seller’s liability for breach of warranty, etc., but that, if the buyer fails to give notice of the breach within a reasonable time after he knows or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable, a counterclaim by a buyer counting on a breach is demurrable, where it fails to aver that the goods involved were returned or tendered back, or that the seller was notified that they were of inferior quality.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 1239-1245; Dee. Dig. § 435.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Buffalo.</p> <p>Action by James J. Mclrnerny against the Baldwin Specialty Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Contracts (§ 163*)—Billheads—Written and Printed Matter.</p> <p>The words, “boiler guaranteed free from defects for one year,” written on a printed billhead at the time of the sale, overruled two printed clauses, “no special warranty,” and “no claims for labor or damages will be allowed.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 745: Dec. Dig. § 163.*]</p> <p>2. Sales (§ 442*)—Breach of Warranty—Special Damages.</p> <p>Where a factory bought a boiler informing vendor of the use to which it was to be put, who guaranteed it for a year, but it lasted only a few weeks and the vendor refused to repair it, damages were properly allowed for wages paid employes while awaiting the arrival of a new boiler, for rent of factory while shut down, and for loss of an order which had to be canceled.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 1284-1301: Dec. Dig. § 442.*]</p>

<p>Tbtjsts (§ 60*)—Continuation of Trusts—Agreements.</p> <p>A depositor of a trust company provided by deed of trust that the-trustee should pay the income of the deposit to a daughter of the depositor until her majority, and on her attaining majority the trustee-should pay her all accumulations of income and one-fourth of the corpus, and on her attaining the age of 25 she should receive a similar payment of one-fourth of the corpus. The trustee, on the daughter reaching the age of 27, called the attention of the depositor to the fact that the daughter had not drawn the half of the corpus, and in reply the-depositor inclosed a letter from the daughter directing the trustee to hold the entire trust fund. Held, that the transaction had the effect to continue the trust unimpaired.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 82; Dec. Dig. § 60.*]</p>

<p>Action by Henry Lowenstein against the International Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff.</p> <p>See, also, 75 Mise. Rep. 357, 132 N. Y. Supp. 653.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Buffalo.</p> <p>Action by Francisca Kasprzyk against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and new trial granted.</p>

<p>Action by Lillie Abramowitz against William Abramowitz for separation. Motion for alimony and counsel fees denied.</p>

Application by Henry Doscher and others to revoke the letters testamentary of Gesine Engel, as executrix of Claus Doscher, deceased. From a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Kings County (74 Mise. Rep. 308, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1105) denying the application, the petitioners appeal. Reversed. See, also, 152 App. Div. 931, 137 N, Y. Supp. 1119.

Action by William H. Miller against Caroline Breitenbecker, impleaded with Elizabeth Winfield. On motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Motion granted.

<p>Divorce (§§ 212, 224*)—Counsel Fees—Alimony Pendente Lite.</p> <p>Alimony and counsel fees will be allowed pending action by a wife for separation, where the husband admits a ceremonial marriage, but denies its validity on the ground of a prior marriage of the wife then in force; he having the burden of proof of its invalidity, [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 614-618, 646; Dec. Dig. §§ 212, 224.*]</p>

<p>1. Divorce (§ 37*)—Separation—Grounds—“Abandonment.”</p> <p>There is an abandonment, within Code Civ. Proc. § 1762, subd. 3, authorizing action for separation, where a husband ceases living with his wife and expresses a fixed determination not to resume living with her, her consent thereto, or conduct justifying his withdrawal, being absent, though he continues to provide for her support.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 107-132; Dec. Dig. § 37.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 4-13; vol. 8, p. 7559.]</p> <p>2. Divorce (§§ 214, 226*)—Temporary Alimony—Allowance.</p> <p>Allowance of alimony and counsel fees pendente lite, which Code Civ. Proc. § 1769, provides for “having regard to the circumstances of the respective parties,” may be on afBdavits; they disclosing sufficient facts for the court to act advisedly in fixing the amounts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 626-631, 651, 652; Dec. Dig. §§ 214, 226.*]</p>

Action by Louis Krasne against the New York Railways Company. Judgment for defendant by default. From an order denying a motion to vacate the judgment, the plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

G. Vogel Company against the Cauldwell-Wingate Company, From a judgment dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case, and from an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Action by Arnold Herrmann, as executor of the estate of Uriah Herrmann, deceased, against William Francis Chase. From a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.</p> <p>Action by Rubin .Eilenberg against Max Wax. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.</p>

_ _ Action by the Equitable Trust Company against Laurence Kirchhoff. From an order of the Municipal Court of the City of New York denying a motion to strike from the record a provision allowing costs to defendant, in a judgment on a dismissal rendered against plaintiff, it appeals. Dismissed.

Action by Simon Candel against Joseph Bankler and another. From a judgment dismissing the complaint upon the opening of plaintiff’s counsel to the jury in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

trict. Action by Ivy Courts Realty Company against Richard ^H. Lockwood and another. From a judgment for plaintiff against both defendants, they appeal. Reversed as to defendant Richard H. Lockwood, and affirmed as to defendant Kate M. Lockwood.

Action by the Lowenberg Company against Frank Block. From Municipal Court judgment in favor of defendant after a trial before the court without a jury, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.</p> <p>Action by the Welch, Holmes & Clark Company against the Central Chandelier Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.</p>

<p>Courts (§ 190*)—Municipal Court—Orders Appealable—Order Opening Default.</p> <p>An order opening a default but not vacating the judgment which was granted thereon is not within Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, c. 580) § 257, excepting -from appealable orders an order opening a default" and vacating a judgment entered thereon.</p> <p>. [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 190;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 103, 8379%.]</p>

In the matter of the application of the City of New York relative to acquiring certain lands, etc., in the block bounded by Chauncey Street, Marion Street, Hopkinson and Rockaway Avenues, for use by the Department of Highways as a storage yard. On motion to confirm report of referee. Report confirmed.

Action for divorce by Gertrude L. Shaw against William Barrett Shaw, defendant, and Lottie Goodman, an infant, co-respondent. After an interlocutory judgment for plaintiff, the co-respondent, by Pauline Goodman, her guardian ad litem, moves for leave to intervene. Motion granted. See, also, 140 N. Y. Supp. 109.

<p>1. Animals (§ 3*)—Personal Injuries—Estrays..</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries caused by a horse running loose, evidence held to warrant a finding of defendant’s ownership of the horse.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Animals, Cent. Dig. §§ 8-12, 264: Dec. Dig. § 3.*]</p> <p>2. Evidence (§ 244*)—Admissions by President or Corporation.</p> <p>The admission by the president of a corporation of the ownership, of a horse which had injured plaintiff is binding on the corporation, and evidence to show such an admission is admissible.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent Dig. §§ 916-936; Dec. Dig. § 244.*]</p>

<p>1. Trial (§ 284*)—Instructions—Failure to Object—Effect.</p> <p>Instructions not objected to become the law of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 683-685; Dec. Dig. § 284.*]</p> <p>2. New Trial (§ 65*)—Verdict—Power to Set Aside.</p> <p>A trial court cannot set aside a verdict which is responsive to the "evidence and consistent with instructions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. § 130; Dec. Dig. $ 65.*]</p>

<p>1. Principal and Agent (§ 145*) — Undisclosed Principal' — Actions Against.</p> <p>One contracting with the" agent of an undisclosed principal may sue ..the agent and also the principal until he obtains satisfaction from one -of-them.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases) see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 499, 513-520; Dec. Dig. § 145.*]</p> <p>2. Principal and Agent (§ 190*)—Knowledge of Agency—Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence, - in an action for services, held not to show that plaintiff, before beginning a former action against another for services, knew that such other acted .as agent.for defendant herein with reference to the services now sued for.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—F.or other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 718-720; Dec. Dig. § 190.*] . '</p>

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fifth District.</p> <p>Action by Dan Talmage’s Sons Company against Solomon Epstein. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.</p>

<p>MASTEB AND SEBVA.NT (§ 8*)-TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT.</p> <p>A stipulation as to the method of payment, such as a monthly payment, constitutes merely a hiring at will, in absence of the fixing of a definite period of service.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 8-10; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]</p>

<p>1. Pleading (§ 350*)—Motion for Judgment—Procedure.</p> <p>Under Code Civ. Proc. § 547, enacted in 1908, providing that, if either party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, the court may, on motion at any time after issue joined, give judgment accordingly, a motion by defendant for. judgment on the complaint and answer made after joinder of issue is regular, and the court must determine the motion on the pleadings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 1053, 1054, 1070-1077; Dec. Dig. § 350.*)</p> <p>2. Pleading (§ 350*)—Judgment on Pleadings—Motion—Disposition.</p> <p>A motion by defendant for judgment on the pleadings after issue joined, as authorized by Code Civ. Proc. § 547, enacted in 1908, must be determined solely on the pleadings as they existed at the time of the motion, and they cannot be aided by affidavits or testimony, and, where the facts stated show that plaintiff is entitled to any relief, the motion must be denied, though the judgment demanded is not the relief to which he is entitled.'</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent Dig. §§ 1053, 1054, 1070-1077; Dec. Dig. § 350.*]</p> <p>3. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 91*)—Infringement—Parties.</p> <p>In a suit by a partner for the wrongful use of a firm name, the co-partner is a necessary party.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Gent. Dig. § 101; Dec. Dig. § 91.*]</p> <p>4. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 59*)—Infringement—Right to Exclusive Use of Name.</p> <p>Where no partnership existed in conducting, by two persons, a business under a firm name neither had the right, after termination of the association, to the exclusive use of the name.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 68-72; Dec. Dig. § 59.*]</p> <p>5. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 59*)—Wrongful Use of Trade-Name.</p> <p>One practicing dentistry under a firm name may not enjoin a corporation engaged only in the business of manufacturing and selling dental supplies from using the same name followed by the word “incorporated,” though no one of that name is connected with the corporation, especially in view of Public Health Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 45) § 203, regulating the practice of dentistry.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 68-72; Dec. Dig. § 59.*]</p> <p>6. Corporations (§ 49*)—Adoption of Name.</p> <p>A corporation on receiving its charter may select any name which it pleases, without regard to whether the name chosen represents any person connected with its affairs or not, unless the name is chosen purposely to mislead the public as to the identity of the corporation with another establishment, and so produce injury to the latter, resulting from the similarity of names.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Gent. Dig. § 137; Dec. Dig. § 49.*]</p> <p>7. Pleading (§ 8*)—Conclusions—Infringement of Trade-Name.</p> <p>The allegations, in the complaint by a dentist, carrying on business under a firm name to enjoin a corporation organized for and engaging only in the,business of manufacturing and selling dental supplies, from using the firm name followed by the word “incorporated,” that the corporation has displayed from its place of business signs misleading the public to the damage of plaintiff, in that patients seeking plaintiff’s dental parlor have been misled thereby, are mere conclusions of the pleader, in the absence of averments of the precise nature of the deception.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-28%; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>8. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 92*)—Wrongful Use of Trade-Name.</p> <p>It is essential to a sufficient statement of a cause of action for an infringement of a trade-name that there should be a dealing in competitive goods or competing for patronage of the same class of customers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 102, 103; Dec. Dig. § 92.*]</p> <p>9. Pleading (§ 8*)—Conclusions—Infringement of Trade-Name.</p> <p>The allegations, in the complaint by a dentist, practicing dentistry under a firm name, to enjoin a corporation engaged only in the business of manufacturing and selling dental supplies from using the same name, that if the corporation is allowed to continue the display of signs containing the name followed by the word “incorporated” followed by the word “dentists,” or signs of like import, plaintiff will suffer irreparable damage, is a mere conclusion, unless facts are pleaded from which the court can determine whether the conclusion is justified.</p> <p>• [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-28%; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>.*For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes</p>

Action by Otto Fleishner against Irving Sacks. From judgment for plaintiff after trial of a traverse as to service of a summons, defendant appeals. Reversed, and complaint dismissed.

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.</p> <p>Action by Henry Dux against Harold Spielberg. From- a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.</p>

<p>1. Corporations (§ 432*)—Secretary—Authority—'Burden op Proof.</p> <p>Since the secretary of a corporation is an agent with limited powers, and can bind the corporation only within the scope of his duties, the burden is on one who sues the corporation for breach of a contract made by its secretary to prove Ms authority to make it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1717, 1718, 1724, 1726-1737, 1743, 1762; Dec. Dig. § 432.*]</p> <p>2. Corporations (§ 425*)—Secretary—Authority.</p> <p>Plaintiff was entitled to rely upon the authority of the secretary of a corporation to contract with him to procure accident insurance upon the company’s teams, where the president referred plaintiff to the secretary as the person having charge of such matters.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1697-1701, 1705; Dec. Dig. § 425.*]</p> <p>3. Corporations (§ 425*)—Officers—Authority.</p> <p>A concern sued for breach of a contract made by one clothed with apparent authority as secretary of a corporation cannot defeat liability by showing that, while there was a corporation, a partnersMp trading under the same name conducted the business, and that the secretary had no authority to bind the corporation, which merely existed on paper, where plaintiff had no knowledge of such facts, and was not put upon inquiry respecting them.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1697-1701, 1705; Dec. Dig. § 425.*]</p>

Action by Harris Averbuck against Nathan Becher and another. From a judgment'for defendants, after a trial with a jury, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>Mortgages (§ 311*)—Satisfaction*—Cancellation of Record.</p> <p>Under Laws 1912, c. 254, authorizing the cancellation of the record of • a mortgage where no satisfaction can be procured, a mortgage shown to have been satisfied could be canceled by the court where the mortgagee, a trustee, was dead, and his executor was before the court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 919-929; Dec. Dig. § 311.*]</p>

<p>Action by Johanna Healy against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. Submitted on an agreed statement of facts. Judgment for defendant.</p>

Action by Clinton W. Kinsella against Traviss D. Lockwood. From a judgment overruling defendant’s demurrer that the complaint did not state a cause of action, defendant appeals. Reversed, and demurrer sustained, with leave to plaintiff to plead over.

<p>Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.</p> <p>Action by John J. Murphy against William S. Hurley and others. Plaintiff appeals from an order. Affirmed.</p>

Action by Schrenk & Company against Joseph Gurfein. From an order denying defendant’s motion to open a default unless he should deposit the amount of the judgment or give an undertaking as provided in Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, c. 580) § 256, defendant appeals. Reversed, judgment vacated, and new trial ordered.

<p>Action by Adolph Maltz and another against the Westchester County Brewing Company. Judgment for plaintiffs. See, also, 138 N. Y. Supp. 1128.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court' of New York, Trial Term.</p> <p>Action by the American Woolen Company of New - York against Harry Moskowitz and another. From a judgment for plaintiff and an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, defendants- áppeal. Reversed, and judgment directed for defendants. .</p>

Action by Isaac Cohen arid another against Abraham Yalkut. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>1. States (§ 187*)—State Printing Contracts—Amount of Compensation— Overpayment.</p> <p>Executive Law, § 73, as added by Laws 1893, c. 248, § 2, requires the Secretary of State, Comptroller, and Treasurer to designate a daily newspaper published in Albany as a state paper, in which shall be published the state laws. Defendant newspaper was designated as state paper for the city o£ Albany, ánd was also designated by the board of supervisors as the county paper for the publication of the Session Laws, and was paid 75 cents a folio as a state paper for publishing the state laws and 30 cents a folio for publishing the Session Laws as a county paper. Only one publication of the laws was made which was claimed to be both as a state and county paper, bills were presented to the Secretary of State for payment at the above rates, and he certified the publication, and the Comptroller examined the bills, and made an award for the amount, and drew a draft upon the State Treasurer, who certified that the state treasury owed defendant such amount for services rendered in publishing the state laws of the state as a state and county paper. It had been the custom for years to designate the same paper as both the state and county paper, and pay it the amount mentioned, though there was no separate publication of the laws as a state and county paper. Held, that the state could not recover the amount paid to defendant as a county paper for publishing the Session Laws, since, in absence of fraud, there was a legal audit of the claim.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 177; Dec. Dig. § 187.*]</p> <p>2. Newspapers (§ 1*)—Publication of State Laws.</p> <p>One newspaper may be designated both as a state and as a county paper.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Newspapers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1-13; Dec. Dig. § 1.*]</p> <p>3. States (§ 185*)—Public Printing—Auditing of Claim.</p> <p>The auditing of a bill for the publication of state and Session Laws by a state and county paper by the proper state officers authorized to make the award was a judicial act, and would be valid if the claim was legally chargeable against the state, but they would have no power to allow a claim not legally chargeable against the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 176; Dec. Dig. § 185.*]</p>

Action by the McDougall & Potter Company against the Manhattan Chocolate & Confectionery Company. From a judgment entered on a dismissal of the complaint at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, and from an order denying a motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

In the matter of the probate of papers propounded as the last will and testament and a codicil thereto of Corneliús H. Van Ness. On motion to permit Alice Wood Van Ness as proponent to introduce further evidence in support of the original petition. Petition denied. See, also, 78 Mise. Rep. 592, 139 N. Y. Supp. 485.

Action by Mary Ann Towner and others, on behalf of themselves and all other heirs of Sarah E. Maurice, deceased, against the Trustees of the Diocese of Long Island. On motion by plaintiffs for an order overruling the demurrer to the complaint. Motion denied.

In the matter of the application of the Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Association for writ of certiorari to review the action of assessors in assessing relator’s property. Judgment exempting property from assessment.

<p>1. Injunction (§ 62*)—Breach of Covenant by Tenant—Remedy.</p> <p>Where the owner of two adjoining houses, heated by a single boiler, the cost being shared equally by the tenants, leased the one with the boiler to a tenant who had full understanding of the situation, and recognized an easement by implied reservation requiring him to do nothing to the disadvantage of the adjoining property, and he thereafter disconnects the heating pipes leading thereto, because his lease is silent as to heating it, there is no adequate remedy at law for his breach of the implied covenant, and equity will furnish a remedy therefor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 124r-127, 129; Dec. Dig. § 62.*]</p> <p>2. Landlord and Tenant (§ 41*)—Lease—Construction by Parties.</p> <p>In case of doubt as to whether a lease required the tenant to furnish heat to an adjoining tenement, its practical construction by himself, recognized and acted on for several months, would control where he thereafter attempts to construe it otherwise for his own advantage.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]</p> <p>3. Landlord and Tenant (§ 160*)—Surrender at End of Term—Condition of Premises.</p> <p>Where a tenant is required to surrender the premises at the end of his term in as good condition as reasonable use and wear would permit, damages by the elements excepted, he has no right to disconnect and plug up heating pipes leading to an adjoining tenement, rendering them useless for the purposes for which they were constructed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. SS 612-626; Dec. Dig. § 160.*]</p> <p>4. Injunction (§ 136*)—Temporary Injunction—When Granted.</p> <p>An injunction pending suit will be granted where defendant will not be harmed, and, if it be not, very great detriment to plaintiff is likely to ensue.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 305, 306; Dec. Dig. § 136.*]</p>

Rathburn, against Ernest C. Tabor, clerk of the board of supervisors of Cayuga county. Motion granted.

, Appeal from Special Term, Kings County. Action by Watson & Pittinger against the Hoboken Planing Mills Company and the Long Island Railroad Company. From an order on motion of the Railroad Company vacating a sale of personal property and directing a resale, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Action by Roland M. Smythe, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders of the New York Phonograph Company similarly situated, against John C. Tomlinson, Jr. On motion by plaintiff for judgment on the complaint and demurrer. Motion granted, with leave to withdraw demurrer and answer.

Action by Anton' Follert, as administrator, against John Erikson and another. On application by plaintiff for the settlement of a proposed case on appeal. Denied.

Action by Marion Shieeler and another against Edward S. Ireland and others. On application to continue an injunction pendente lite in a taxpayer’s action. Application granted.

<p>Action by one Walter against one Carroll. Defendant moves for ■judgment on her counterclaim. - Denied as premature.</p>

Action by E. Platt Stratton against Elizabeth J. Graham. Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, consisting of an amended complaint, the answer thereto, and plaintiff’s reply to a counterclaim in the answer. Motion denied.

<p>Venue (§ 52%*)—Place of Trial.</p> <p>Where it cannot be determined which party may have the largest number o£ witnesses who would be convenienced by change of place of trial if the place of trial were changed as moved for by defendant, and plaintiff would have to abandon her action because of her physical and financial inability to try the action in the proposed place of trial, the motion to change will be denied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Venue, Cent. Dig. § 78; Dec. Dig. § 52%.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fifth District.</p> <p>Action by Charles & Heller against Fannie Grossmayer. From an order of the Municipal Court of the City of New York, setting aside a verdict, rendered by a jury in favor of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and judgment in favor of plaintiffs reinstated.</p>

Action by Dora Safran against Nathan Rosenzweig and another. From a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York in favor of the plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 654*)—Streets and Highways—Action to Enjoin Trespass—Sufficiency op Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence in an action by the owner of land abutting on a highway to restrain defendant village from trespassing thereon, and in which defendant claimed that plaintiff’s fence was an encroachment on the highway, held to show that such fence was upon substantially the true westerly line of the highway.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1428; Dec. Dig. § 654.*]</p> <p>2. Adverse Possession (§ 8*)—Highways—Title and Right of Abutting Owner.</p> <p>No length of adverse possession by user upon the side of a highway, by an abutting owner can give him title to that part of the highway; the maxim being, “Once a highway, always a highway.”</p> <p>- [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. 1§ 14, 27, 43-57; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations (§ 697*)—Streets and Highways—Action to Enjoin Trespass—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In an action by the owner of land abutting upon a highway to enjoin a trespass thereon by defendant village, where official surveys and maps as public records, with long and undisputed possession, tended to show that plaintiff’s fence was upon the true line of such highway, the burden was on defendant to show some prior official laying out or definition of bounds, making the line of the fence an encroa'chment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1502-1505; Dec. Dig. § 697.*]</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations (§ 654*)—Streets and Highways—Action to Enjoin Encroachment—Presumptions.</p> <p>Where legislative acts relating to the laying out of a highway indicated the general purpose that it should be 66 feet in width, yet left it to the discretion of commissioners to make the width less through any meadow, grove, or cornfield, it cannot be presumed, in the absence of records, that it was laid out in any particular part to that width.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § , 1428; Dec. Dig. § 654.*]</p>

<p>Brokers (§ 86*)—Right to Compensation—Evidence—Sufficiency.</p> <p>In an action for broker’s compensation, evidence held, insufficient to show that plaintiff rendered services to defendant in selling machines at defendant’s request.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. §§ 116-120; Dec. Dig. § 86.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, First District.</p> <p>Action by Patrick Coughlan against Barney Elfin and others, doing business as Elfin, Enoch & Co. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Brooklyn, Sixth District. Action by Reuben Wilson against Dexter B. Horton. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.</p>

Actions by John A. Fellows and another against Kate Mulligan and another. Judgments for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and new trials ordered.

Action by Abraham Margolies against Samuel Brettschneider. From so much of a judgment in favor of plaintiff as denied plaintiff’s right to the insertion in the judgment of a provision for defendant’s arrest, he appeals. Modified and affirmed.

<p>1. Landlord and Tenant (§ 22*)—Agreement Constituting “Lease.”</p> <p>A memorandum, reciting a letting of an apartment at a specified monthly rental and that the tenant would sign a written lease in a specified form before moving in, constitutes a valid “lease.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 55-59; Dec. Dig. § 22.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4043-4049; vol. 8, pp. 7702, 7703.]</p> <p>2. Landlord and Tenant (§ 200*)—Breach by Tenant—Damages Recoverable.</p> <p>On vacation of an apartment by a tenant before the end of the term, the landlord is entitled to recover rent and telephone charges stipulated for, but not the expense of preparing the apartment for the tenant’s use.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 794r-797; Dec. Dig. § 200.*]</p>

<p>Municipal Gobpobations (§ 187*)—Police—Pension Fund—Amount—DÓuble Pensions.</p> <p>Under the Greater New York Charter, providing a single police pension fund, consolidating those of the consolidated municipalities, providing that service in the police force of the old municipalities shall be counted and held to be service in the police force of the consolidated city, and providing “an annual pension” to be paid to police officers entitled thereto by such service, a detective sergeant retired in 1893 with a pension of $1,000 a year, to which his rank entitled him, who thereafter became a member of the police force of a town which subsequently became a part of New York City, and who thereafter obtained the rank of lieutenant and then retired, was only entitled to an increase in his pension of $125 a year, in order that the pension would amount to that to which his rank as lieutenant entitled him, and was not entitled to the full pension as lieutenant, in addition to that to which he became entitled on his first retirement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 518-521; Dec. Dig. § 187.*]</p>

Borough of the Bronx, Second District. Action by Heloise F. Van Damm, as executrix of Joseph B. Van Damm, against Albert Van Damm and others, for the possession of certain chattels. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Action by Miles S. Vickery against Ralph A. Stemm and the Shorthand Reporting Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed, plaintiff’s complaint dismissed,- and judgment rendered for defendants for $23.30.

<p>Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.</p> <p>Action by Benjamin Goldberg against Benjamin Shapiro. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order refusing to set aside the verdict, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.</p>

<p>Action by David Waldman against Picker Bros. Judgment for defendants. On motion to set aside judgment. Denied.</p>

<p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 220*)—Officers—Salaries—Resolutions.</p> <p>A resolution of the board of aldermen, approved by the mayor, fixing the salary of draftsmen in the department of bridges at $1,950 a year, adopted pursuant to Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, c. 466) § 56, requiring the board of aldermen to fix salaries, fixes the salary of all draftsmen, and supersedes a prior resolution of the board of estimate and apportionment, fixing salaries at varying sums, adopted pursuant to then existing power to fix salaries.</p> <p>- [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 599-608; Dec. Dig. § 220.*]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations (§ 120*)—Resolutions—Construction.</p> <p>A resolution of the board of aldermen of a city, adopted pursuant to statutory authority, must be interpreted according to its terms, where it is free from ambiguity, and contains no qualifications or exceptions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 274-280; Dee. Dig. § 120.*]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations (§ 220*)—Officers—Salaries—Resolutions— Construction.</p> <p>Where a resolution of the board of aldermen, adopted pursuant to Greater New York Charter .(Laws 1901, c. 466) § 56, fixes the salary of draftsmen in the department of bridges, letters oí the commissioner of bridges, written prior or subsequent to the resolution, do not affect a draftsman’s salary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 699-608; Dec. Dig. § 220.*]</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations (§ 162*)—Officers—Salaries—Acceptance of Part—Waiver of Balance.</p> <p>The acceptance by a city officer of a salary less than that fixed by law is not a waiver of the statutory salary at a higher rate, though he signed the pay rolls reciting that the moneys received were in full payment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 357-367, 369, 372, 374; Dec. Dig. § 162.*]</p>

<p>Action by Clarence L. Carman against the City of New York. Judgment for plaintiff.</p>

Term. Action by the Drescher Rothberg Company against Adolph Landeker. From a judgment óf the City Court of the City of New York, vacating a verdict for plaintiff, and ordering judgment for defendant, and from a judgment entered on the order, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>T. Landlord and Tenant ■ (§ 44*)—Covenants—Construction—“Surren-DEB.”</p> <p>Where the lessee abandoned the premises before the end of his term, a covenant for liquidated damages in case of surrender of the premises by the tenant," had no application, and will not bar an action for rent; for to constitute a surrender of demised property there must be an acceptance on the part of the landlord.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 108-110, 732; Dec. Dig. § 44.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 6819-6821.]</p> <p>2. Landlord and Tenant (§ 195*)—Covenants—Construction. ^</p> <p>A covenant in a lease providing for a deposit as security for the lessee’s performance of all the covenants, terms, and conditions of the lease, to be treated as liquidated damages on the ground that the damages could not be ascertained, cannot bar an action for rent, where the tenant abandoned the property before the end of his term, because the amount of rent is fixed and ascertainable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 790-793; Dec. Dig. § 195.*]</p> <p>*For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep*r Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, First District.</p> <p>Action by Max Schoenberg against Victor Thorner and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of New York, Special Term.</p> <p>Action by Meyer Adler against the Joseph Autler Company and others. From an order of the City Court of the City of New York, denying a motion to open the default of plaintiff, he appeals. Reversed.</p>

<p>Discovert (§ 40*)—Examination Before Trial—Scope.</p> <p>In the absence of special circumstances, an examination of an adverse party before trial should not be granted to meet issues which that party must first establish; but the examination should be limited to the issues raised by the complaint and denials in the answer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Discovery, Cent. Dig. §§ 52, 53; Dec. Dig. § 40.*]</p>

Action by Patrick Barry against the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying: defendant’s motion for new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

<p>1. Negligence (§ 121*)—Bubden of Pboof.</p> <p>Plaintiff in a negligence action must prove defendant’s negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 217-220, 224-228, 271; Dec. Dig. § 121.*]</p> <p>2. Negligence (§ 122*)—Burden of Proof—Negativing Contributory ■ Negligence. • ■ -</p> <p>Plaintiff in a negligence action must prove her own freedom from negligence; defendant not being required to show affirmatively that plaintiff was not free from negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 221-223, 229-234; Dec. Dig. § 122.*]</p> <p>3. Negligence (§ 121*)—Evidence—Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine.</p> <p>The fall of a board from a shed erected by defendant, in front of a building being erected by it, to protect, pedestrians, raised the presumption of negligence by defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent Dig. §§ 217-220, 224r-228, 271; Dec. Dig. § 121.*]</p> <p>4. Negligence (§ 121*)—“Res Ipsa- Loquitur.”</p> <p>The rule of “res ipsa loquitur” merely means that, where the circumstances of an accident naturally raise the inference that it could not have occurred except through defendant’s negligence, plaintiff need not prove the exact manner in which the accident occurred, and defendant must rebut the presumption of negligence; but the mere fact that the circumstances raised a presumption of negligence would not authorize a recovery,. unless the jury found, that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 217-220, 224-228, 271; Dec. Dig. § 121.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6136-6139; vol. 8, p. 7787.]</p> <p>*For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes</p>

Action by Elizabeth T. Bell against Julia Wath Lawrence • and another. On motion to set aside the service of the summons and complaint. Motion granted.

Appraisal under the Transfer Tax Acts of the property of Samuel Roebuck, deceased. From an order assessing and fixing the transfer tax, certain parties appeal. Affirmed.

<p>Action by Alexander Anderson against Annie Knobloch and others, in which the New York Interurban Water Company appeals.</p>

New York, Trial Term. Action by Pasquale Basciana against the Title Guaranty & Surety Company. From a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Modified and affirmed. Mantón M. Wyvell, of New York City, for appellant. Samuel Wechsler, of New York City, for respondent.

<p>Action by the Bon Ton Tailoring Company against the Champion Laundry. S. Meyers, of New York City, for appellant. C. A. Riegelman, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by the Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban Railroad Company against Maria A. Bird and the City of New York.</p>

<p>In the matter of the estate of Charles S. Cary, deceased.</p>

<p>Action by John Cárroll against John IT. McArdle, as Supervis- or of- the Town of Mamaroneck.</p>

<p>Action by William E. Carroll, as receiver, etc., against the Silver Creek Gas & Improvement Company.</p>

<p>Action by the Business Men’s Realty Company against the Comet Company and others. S. Rothschild, of New York City, for appellants. A. Nelson, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by James Corso, as administrator, etc., of Amelia Corso, deceased, against the Nassau Electric Railroad Company.</p>

<p>Action by William F. Connell against Louis V. Heydenreich and others.</p>

<p>Action by Richard J. Donovan against the United Fruit Company. I. Untermyer, of New York City-, for appellant. W. lit’ Stone, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Herman Ellis against Leopold Miller and others. T. G. Strong, of New York City, for appellant. M. S. Guiterman, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by John Faigle against Henry Bockroth and another.</p>

<p>Action by Hugh C. Fox and others against George H. Peacock and another.</p>

<p>Action by Patrick A. Fogarty against William P. Fogarty.</p>

<p>Action by Helen Margaret Ferguson, an infant, etc., against the Town of Lewisboro.</p>

<p>Action, by Charles A. Glover against H. P. Nelson- Company.</p>

<p>Action by John L. Gerety .against the Continental Public Works Company.</p>

<p>Action by Charles A. Glover against H. P. Nelson Company.</p>

<p>In the matter of Elias B. Goodman, an attorney.</p>

<p>Action by Lucy A. Grissinger against the International Railway Company and another.</p>

<p>Action by Louis Hochstein and another against the Vanderveer Crossings, Incorporated. A. A, Silberberg, of New York City, for appellants. C. O. Clark, of Brooklyn, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Phoebe Hatch and another, as administrators, etc., against Willis Luckman. Proceeding by the People of the State of New York, on the relation of William Hatch and others, against Cornelius Carplenter and others.</p>

<p>Action by Lawrence Jacob, as sole surviving trustee, etc., of Leonard Jacob, deceased, against the Town of Oyster Bay and others.</p>

<p>Action by Jeanette H. Joseph against Irwin M. Herzig. A. G. Meyer, of New York City, for appellant. W. F. Severance, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Catherine Lynch against the Richmond Light & Railroad Company.</p>

Action by Julius Marqusee against the Norfolk Fire Insurance Corporation. F. M. Czaki, of New York City, for appellant. H. Cabell, of New York City, for respondent. With this case has been consolidated in this court cases bearing titles as follows: Kline Bros. & Co. v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co. of New York; Same v. Ottawa Fire Ins: Co.; Same v. Missisquoi & Rouville Mutual Fire Ins. Co.; Same v. Montmagny Mutual Fire Ins. Co.

Action by Anton H. Meyer, as assignee for the benefit of creditors of the United States Restaurant & Realty Company, against Ernst L. A. Christiansen and others. From a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits after a trial by the court without a jury, plaintiff appeals. Modified. See, also, 146 App. Div. 114, 130 N. Y. Supp. 606. William F. McCombs, of New York City, for appellant. Frank E. Loughran, of New York City, for respondent Kragh.

<p>Action by John Morrison against Elverton R. Chapman and others. C. E. Rushmore, of New York City, for appellant. J. M. Gifford, of New York City, for respondents.</p>

<p>Action by Jacob Nudelman, an infant, etc., against Borden’s Condensed Milk Company.</p>

<p>Action by Christopher J. O’Connell against the Press Publishing Company.</p>

<p>Proceeding by the People of the State of New York against Joseph Lapolla.</p>

<p>Proceeding by the People of the State of New York, on the relation of Frederick M. Price, against James Creelman and others. T. Farley, of New York City, for appellants.</p>

<p>Action by Elizabeth B. Riley against Eleanor M. Ransom and others.</p>

<p>Action by Franz Sad an against B. Crystal & Son.- J. M. Proskauer, of New York City, for appellants. F. V. Johnson, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by J. L. Emil Schueler against Mary Louise Dooley.</p>

<p>Action by Louisa Schultz against Louis Vogel.</p>

<p>Action by Lambert Schouten against John R. Alpine, as President, etc.</p>

<p>Action by Thomas Sealy against Clarence Foote. E. A. Sumner, of New York City, for appellant. F. R. Greene, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Bernard A. Schweid and another against Carl W.« Storandt.</p>

<p>Action by Mary S. Sidway against Harold S. Sidway.</p>

<p>In the matter of supplementary proceedings, Joseph Shorwitz against Jacob Caminez.</p>

<p>Action by James H. Skinner against Jacob I. Den-ton.</p>

<p>In the matter of Val Trainor against the AVhite Rats Actors’ Union. M. L. Malevinsky, of New York City, for appellant. G. T. Murray, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by the Van Burén & New York Billposting Company against the C. J. Sullivan Advertising Company. M. L. Stovey, of New York City, for appellant. C. O. Maas, of New York City, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Flordnce R. Weeks against the Rodisi Holding Company and others.</p>