Volume 140 — United States Reports

APPEAL EKOM THE CIKCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES EOR THE DISTRICT OE OREGON^ This was a suit in equity by the appellee, a citizen of California, against the appellants, who, under the constitution of Oregon, as governor, secretary of state, and treasurer of state, comprised the board of land commissioners of that State, to restrain and enjoin them from selling and conveying a large amount of land in that State, to which the apjlellee asserted title.

The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: On the 1st day of February, 1878, there was existing under the laws of the State of Illinois a corporation known as the Oarbondale Coal and Coke Company. It then executed a mortgage on its properties to secure the sum of fifty thousand dollars.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

■APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT -OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. This was an action brought by citizens, owners of real estate and taxpayers' in Wayne County, Illinois, against the officers.of that county to have certain issues of bonds of that county cancelled as invalid, and an injunction issued to prevent the levy of taxes to pay any of the principal or interest upon them.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES' FOR THE DISTRICT OP KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

. The declaration in this case “ complains for that whereas the. defendant is a corporation chartered under the laws of this Commonwealth and the operator of a steam railroad, with the TOual appliances for .the carrying of freight and passengers, and "fhe plaintiff alleges that heretofore, to wit, on the 12th day of.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

In equity, for the infringement of letters patent. The case was stated by the court as follows: This was a bill in equity for the infringement of two letters patent, granted May 22, 1883, to Cassius M. Richmond, viz., No. 277,941 for an artificial denture, and No. 277,943 for a process for preparing roots of teeth for the reception of artificial dentures. ■ The main contest took place over No. 277,941, which covered a device intended to replace the loss or destruction of…

Held: at which the town voted to subscribe the further sum of $10,000 to the stock of the railway company, and to issue its bonds, in equal amount, in payment therefor.

• This was an action on twenty bonds and a large number of interest coupons attached, issued by Harper County, Kansas, December 1, 1873, for the purpose of raising the necessary funds to build a court-house. Thé bonds and coupon? were in form like-the following, differing only as to their numbers: “United States of America, State of Kansas. “Number 1.

DISTRICT OE NEW ¿JERSEY. . This was an action on a policy of life insurance. There have been three trials of it by jury, in each of which there has been a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for the full amount of the policy. The case was before the court at October term, 1887, Ætna Life Ins.

Held: that the duties for which he was to be compensated by fees from borrowers, included giving to the company certificates of 'title; and that his successor, appointed on the same terms, except in being expressly required to grant certificates of title, and in being also made general attorney and counsellor of the company, could not recover anything from the company for making out such certificates. ' This was an action…

This was a suit in equity to subject to the payment of a debt alleged to be due and owing to the complainants by the defendant George Y. Scott, certain property owned by him and other property owned by his wife and codefendant, Lottie M. Scott.

Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that an indictment for murder is fatally defective if it fails to state the place of death or, if filed more than a year after the death, the time of death.

Held: That the conditional application for removal in December, 1884, was not a valid application for removal as contemplated by the statute; (2) That the application made at the trial term in 1886 was made too late. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Jerome F. Manning in person for plaintiff in error. Mr. Theodore F. II. Meyer for defendant in error.

Held: • (1) That the law of the State in which the services are rendered must be looked at in order to. determine what are necessary; (2) That in Tennessee a temporary mittimus may become necessary, and a charge for it should be allowed unless there has been an abuse of discretion in regard to it; ■ (3) That only one fee can be charged for taking the acknowledgment *143 of defendants’ recoguizances, but that one fee can…

Held: That he was entitled to charge as commissioner for drawing the-oaths of the supervisors, for administering them and for his jurat to each oath; (2) Also for drawing affidavits of services by each supervisor for which compensation was claimed, as such affidavit had been required by" the government; (3) That he should be allowed for drawing complaints in criminal proceedings ; (t) That the charges for docket fees…

Held: That he was entitled to charge a fee for filing recommendations for appointments (entitled by him informations), but not for recording and indexing them; (2) That he was entitled to charge for indexing appointments, but not for recording them; ,(3) That he was entitled to charge for preparing instructions to supervisors; (4) That he was entitled to charge a reasonable sum, within the discretion of the court, and the…

Appeal fbom the disteict couet of the united states eoe THE MIDDLE DISTEICT OF .ALABAMA. This action was brought .to recover fees in 149 criminal-cases in which certain proceedings were had before the appellee, as commissioner of the Circuit Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Held: the transcript from the commissioner’s office is 00- part of the case in the Circuit or District Court; but the .court, in-this district, has adopted a rule that, “in all criminal cases, unless otherwise specially ordered, the final record entered therein shall include the. order made by the’ commissioner- binding the, party to appear before the grand jury, if any. such was made; the presentment therein; the bench…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA.</p> <p>This was a consolidation of three actions to recover for services as commissioner of the Circuit Court for the Middle District of Alabama. ■ The services are admitted to have been rendered, and the accounts therefor approved by the proper eourt under the act of February 25, 1875, 18 Stat. 333. The United States interposed .a demurrer to the petition, upon the Bearing of which judgment was entered in favor of the petitioner for $995.35, 35 Fed. Rep. 886, from which an appeal was taken and allowed to this;court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity to recover for the infringement of •letters patent No. 156,8S0, granted November 17,1874, to Hubert Cluétt for an improvement in shirts. In his specification the •patentee stated the object of his invention to be “first, to avoid 'the folding in of the edges of the bosom, and the raw edges- and loose threads thereof, which,disfigure the bosom when so •’folded in; second, to stay the bosom, rendering it firmer in itself, and less likely to rumple or break; third, to avoid wrinkling of the bosom by the unevenness or fulling up of any one of the layers composing the bosom in any part thereof, each and all of these three features having reference- to the1 preparatory stages of manufacture, but to be completed in the bosom as attached to the shirt.”</p> <p>“ Its construction consists in preparing and fixing the two or more layers in place smoothly in relation to each other, and then binding the edge with a folded strip of cloth like, the bosom front, cut bias (or diagonally) or straight from -the piece, so as to turn the curves of the bosom without tendency to gather on one side, and so as to suit round, square or any other shaped bosom, this binding extending entirely around the bosom (except at the neck and yoke) and holding the parts firmly in place by á line of stitches before the bosom is inserted in or placed on or attached to the bodjr of the - shirt, and finally attaching the bosom .so prepared to the shirt body, in the manner hereinafter shown. The invention consists in the shirt bosom or shirt and bosom, so constructed, and not in the bosom alone.”</p> <p>His claims Avere as follows:</p> <p>“1. In combination Avith a shirt body, a shirt bosom bound ■on the outer edge Avith a folded and stitched binding, and attached to the shirt body by a separate lining of stitching through such binding.</p> <p>“2. The shirt bosom S, composed of two or more thicknesses of cloth, B L, bound on the' outer edge Math the-binding B", and secured to the shirt front F by the line ■ of stitching O.”</p> <p>Upon the hearing in the Circuit Court the invention was held to be invalid for want of patentable novelty, and the bill Avas dismissed. 24 Blatchford, 412, and 30 Fed. Rep. 921. Plaintiff thereupon appealed to this court.</p>

Held: The license continued for the life of the patent; (2) The defendant could not renounce the license except by mutual '• consent or by the fault of the plaintiff; . (3) The plaintiff had a right to regard the license as still in force and to sue for the royalties; (4) This court could not review the finding that the invention was new.

The opinion of the court in this case is reported ante, 169. The seventh paragraph of the opinion is as follows (p. 175): “ 7.

<p>Under § 5 of the act of March 3, 1891, entitled “ An act to establish Circuit Courts of Appeals, and to define and regulate in certain cases the jurisdiction of the fcourts of the United States and for other purposes,” a writ of error may, even before July 1, 1891, issue from this court to a Circuit.Court, in the case of a conviction of a crime under § 5209 of the Revised Statutes, where the conviction occurred May 28, 1890, but a sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary was imposed March 18,1891.</p> <p>A crime is “ infamous ” under that act, where it is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary, whether -the accused is or is not sentenced or put to hard labor.</p> <p>Such writ of error is a matter of right, and, under § 999 of the Revised Statutes, the citation may be signed' by a justice of this court, as an authority for the issuing of the writ under § 1004.</p> <p>At the time of the conviction, no writ of error from this court, in the case, was provided for by statute, nor was any bill of exceptions, with a view to a writ of error, provided for by statute-or rule; and, therefore, a mandamus will not lie to the judge who presided at the trial, to compel him to settle a bill of exceptions which was presented to him for settlement after the sentence; nor can the minutes of the trial, as settled - by the judge by consent, and signed by him, and printed and filed in July, 1890, and on which a motion for a new trial was heard in October, 1890, be treated by this court, on the return to the writ, of error, as a bill of exceptions properly forming part of the record.</p> <p>A criminal court in the Southern District of New York, sitting ás a Circuit</p> <p>. Court therein, under § 613 of the Revised Statutes, and composed of the three judges named in that section, to hear a motion for a new trial and an arrest of judgment, in a criminal case previously tried by a jury before one of them, is a legally constituted tribunal.</p> <p>A justice of this court on allowing such writ and signing a citation had authority also to grant a supersedeas and stay of execution.</p>

<p>A bona fide purchaser, before maturity, of coupon bonds of a railroad company payable to bearer, takes them freed from any equities that might have been set up against the original holder; and the burden of proof is on him who assails the bona fides of such purchase.</p> <p>Tested by this rule appellant’s case must fail.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ■ FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that this authorized only an extension assented to by both makers of the note; that an extension by agreement between the holder and the principal, without the consent of the surety, discharged the endorser; but that no agreement for an extension of time was shown by the following facts: The holder having agreed with the principal “ to extend the credit upon renewal notes made by the same parties who executed the…

Darling, the defendant in error, brought this action against the plaintiffs in error, partners doing business under the name of Elias Block & Sons, to recover the sum of $7144.37, for and on account of the sum of $5636 alleged to have been deposited with them by plaintiff, and accepted and received by defendants, to be paid to him on his order, and for certain articles of personal property sold and delivered by him to them at their special instance and request, particulars…

Held: upon full consideration, that the fifth section of the army appropriation act of July 13, 1866, c. 176, 14 Stat. 92 , above quoted, meant, “that whereas, under the act of July 17, 1862, as well as before its passage, the President alone was authorized to dismiss an army or naval officer from the service' for any cause which, in his judgment, either rendered such officer unsuitable for, or whose dismissal would…

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POK THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP GEORGIA.</p> <p>- The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

, and which is fully sustained by the opinion, is, that “ a decree in equity, which is entirely aside of the issue raised in the record, is invalid, and will be treated as a nullity, even in a collateral proceeding.” It appeared that on May 12, 1841, Asa Munday, the owner, with his wife, Hetty Munday,. conveyed the premises for which the action (which was one of ejectment) was brought, to John Conger, upon the following trust, to. wit: “ For the use and benefit of the said…

is as follows: “ Where a patent is issued in pursuance of the act of 1788,” “ which includes in its general courses, a prior claim, it does not pass to the patentee the title of the Commonwealth in and to the lands covered by such prior claim, subject only to the title, whatever it may be, in -the prior claimant; but, if that title is only a prior entry, and becomes vacated by neglect to survey and return the plat, • my one may lay a warrant on the same, as in other, cases…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The ease, as stated by the court, was as follows:</p> <p>The appellant, Joseph Wood, being held in custody by Augustus A. Brush, agent and warden of Sing Sing Prison in the State of New York, presented to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of that State, on the 29th day of September, 1890, a petition for a writ -of habeas corpus, setting forth the facts concerning his detention. His application having been denied, an appeal was taken under sections 751, 753, 763; 764 and 765 of the Revised •Statutes and the act of Congress of. March 3,1885, 23 Stat. 437, c. 353, giving, an appeal to this court from, the final decision of a Circuit Court, upon habeas corpus, in the case of a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation off the Constitution or any law or treaty of the United States.-</p> <p>The petitioner stated that he was a citizen of the United 'States, of the African race; that he was convicted in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace for the city and county of New York, of the crime of murder in the first degree, and, being sentenced to death under chapter 489 of the Laws of 1888 of that State, was committed to the custody of the appellee to await the execution of the sentence, which was fixed to occur in the week beginning December 1, 1890; that the indictment upon which he was arraigned was found by a grand jury of that court at its October term 1889, and his conviction by a petit jury was at its March term 1890; “that from the panels and lists of jurors whence said grand jury and petit jury were drawn and from said juries all persons of African race and descent and black in color were excluded,” because of their race, and in said city, county and State have always been excluded for a like reason; that upon his arraignment on the 28th day of October, 1889, he -was then without counsel or means of procuring counsel, and was required to and did plead to the indictment in ignorance of his rights in •the premises; that upon the trial he was ignorant of the above facts “ without his fault, and was, therefore, unable to challenge or otherwise object to the lists, panels and array of grand and petit jurors for the ground aforesaid; ” that after conviction, learning the facts in relation to such exclusion of persons of his race from the list of grand and petit jurors, he moved, with due diligence, upon allegation and tender of proof of the facts aforesaid, for a new trial; that according to law and the practice of the court his motion should have been entertained and decided upon its merits, and upon due proof, should have been granted, but the court refused altogether to entertain it or to pass upon his said contention upon proofs tendered, and a time was thereupon fixed' for his execution; that by reason of such facts “ he has been deprived of all the privileges and just rights of citizens of the United States, and of the equal protection of the laws, and is in like manner deprived of his liberty, and about to be deprived of his life, without due process of law; ” and that his commitment and detention under said conviction and sentence are void and of no validity. The petitioner prayed also for a writ of certiorari to the Court of General Sessions of the Peace and its clerk, commanding it or him to certify to the court below true copies of the lists of grand jurors for the October term 1889 of that court, of the lists and panels of trial jurors or additional trial jurors for its March term 1890, and of the indictment and other papers in the prosecution under and by virtue of which he was held in custody.</p> <p>The above motion by the prisoner was in writing, and ivas to the effect that the verdict of guilty be vacated and set aside, the judgment of conviction stayed, and a new trial granted upon the following grounds: “First. That the defendant is of the African race and black in color, and that all persons of this race and color were excluded in the drawing of the panel of the petit jurors, from which the trial jury herein was selected. Second. That by reason of such exclusion the defendant was denied the equal protection of the laws and did not have the full and equal benefit thereof in the proceedings for the security of his life' and liberty as is enjoyed by white persons, and to which he is and was justly entitled. Third. That all persons of the African race-and of color were excluded from the grand jury, by which the indictment against ■the defendant was found and upon' which he was tried, and consequently said indictment was illegal and void, and the defendant Ought not to have been put upon trial upon said indictment, as said trial court was without jurisdiction^ Fourth. That persons of the African race and color have always been excluded from the list and drawings of both the grand and petit jurors in- and for the city and county of New 'York, though there were and for many years last past have been many such persons qualified by law in ¿11 respects to sit as grand and petit jurors in this court and residing in the city and county of New York. • Fifth. That the honorable recorder who presided at the trial, as a member of the board who selected the grand jury by which defendant was indicted, had judicial knowledge and notice of the exclusion" of persons of said African race and color, and should have advised the defendant of such fact when called' upon to plead, as defendant was without counsel and unable to procure the same. Sixth. That the honorable recorder, sitting as trial judge, had judicial knowledge and should have taken judicial notice of the fact of the exclusion in manner aforesaid, of persons of the African race and color from the panel of petit jurors in attendance at the' term of court and - from which the jury in defendant’s case was selected. Seventh. That the entire proceedings herein were contrary to the just rights and interests of the defendant and not in accordance with the guaranteed rights of the defendant. This motion is based upon the affidavit of the defendant, herewith filed, all .proceedings in said cause, and the request to subpoena and examine- witnesses -concerning the material allegations in the affidavit of said Wood contained.”</p> <p>There was a further motion at the same time that subpoenas be issued directed to the commissioners of “jurors of the city of New York and to all other officers, clerks and persons who are known to the court to possess personal knowledge of the facts relating to these' matters alleged in the affidavit of defendant at this time filed, and whose testimony may enable defendant to establish the facts in said affidavit set forth, and that' said commissioners and others' be examined and their evidence be taken in support of this motion and before the court passes upon the' same.”</p> <p>This motion was supported by the affidavit of Wood, which, after reciting his conviction and stating that when arraigned he had no counsel, and was without means to procure any, and that the plea of not guilty was entered without an examination of the indictment by counsel for him, proceeded: “ Deponent further says that he is a citizen of the United States and was. born in the State of Virginia, and that he is of the African race and descent and black in color. Deponent further says that there are at least several thousand citizens of the African race and descent and black in color who are and were for more than ten years last past residents of the city, county and State of New York, and who are qualified in all respects to sit as grand and petit jurors in the court where this deponent was heretofore tried, convicted and sentenced to death; that the officers authorized by the laws of the State of New York to select the names of and the persons to serve as grand jurors and petit jurors to serve for and in the Court of General Sessions'of the Peace of the city and county of New York, selected no persons of the African race or color to serve as. such jurors,' but, on the contrary, excluded all persons of such race and color from those to serve as and be drawn for jurors j that said officers in and for said city and county of New York drew from the list of those so selected to serve as grand jurors, the grand jurors by whom the indictment against the defendant was found, and drew from the list of those selected to serve as petit jurors the petit jurors before whom the defendant was to be and was tried for his life under said indictment, and that from both the grand and petit jurors sitting in said court by whom the deponent was indicted and tried all persons qualified by law to serve as jurors who were persons of the African race and color were excluded because of their race and color, and that no one person of said African race and color was drawn or summoned, but that said grand and petit jurors were composed exclusively of white persons, and that, in fact* all per-' sons, as deponent is informed and believes, of the African race, although qualified to serve as jurors, have always in said city, county and State been excluded from serving upon juries because of their race and color, and that by reason of such exclusion the said juries have been composed wholly of the white race, and the defendant, in the finding of the said indict- ' ment and the trial thereupon, was denied the equal protection of the laws and did not have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the said State of New York for. the security of his person, as is enjoyed by white persons. Deponent asks that said judgment and the verdict herein be set aside and a further hearing be granted and such proceedings had as may be consistent with defendant’s just rights.”</p> <p>This was the case presented to the court below, and is the case presented on this appeal from the order refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus.</p>

In re Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291 (1891), also called Jugiro v. Brush, was decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that habeas corpus did not reach errors committed by a state court of competent jurisdiction.

Held: comprised in the word “orders,” as associated with bills of exchange, rather than otherwise.

Held: That'the interest of each company in it was as a stockholder in the company which constructed it; (2) That no company had an interest in the property itself which it could mortgage; (3) That such stock would not pass to a mortgagee of one of the railroads under a general description as an appurtenance to the road.

The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: This suit, which was commenced April 5, 1879, arises out of an act of the legislature of California, approved March 23, 1876, entitled “An act to authorize the widening of Dupont Street in the city of San Francisco.” An assessment was made to meet the cost incurred in its execution.

Held: and could hold, no real estate in a proprietary or private sense, and after it was empowered to bid in at its own sale, it acquired no more proprietary interest in the real estate struck off to it, than it had had in the assessment.

In 1880, Elon A. Marsh had devised and applied for a patent upon a valve gear for steam engines; and Nichols, Shepard & Co., which is a corporation of the State of Michigan, contended in this action, as hereafter set forth, that in that year, while his application was pending in the Patent Office, Marsh agreed with Nichols, an officer of the corporation, that Nichols was to do certain things in exploiting the invention, in return for which Marsh was to allow a shop right to…

Held: that the claimant was entitled to a finding in regard to this point.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,</p>

Held: both by the Federal and state courts, that such meander lines are intended for the purpose of bounding and abutting the lands granted upon the waters whose margins are thus meandered ; and that the waters themselves constitute the real boundary.

Held: took title not merely to the land surveyed, but to the .twenty-five acres of *416 dry land outside of the survey, as .well as .the large area of land under the lake and in front of the bank. This result is certainly suggestive.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The petitioner, who is also the appellant, is a member of the Chinese race, but claims to have been born within the United States, and consequently to be a citizen thereof. He is sixteen years of age, and arrived at the port of San Francisco in the steamship City of ,-New York, in February, 1888. The officers of customs refused to allow him to land, holding that he was a subject of the emperor of China, and within the restrictions of the act of May 6, 1882, and the supplementary act of 1884. He was accordingly detained by the captain of the steamship on board ; and he applied, through a friend, to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his discharge from such detention, alleging that he was not within the restrictions of the acts of Congress, but was a citizen of the United States, having been born therein. The writ was issued and the petitioner brought before the court, when his testimony and that of his father, was taken in support of his pretension. He testified as to his birth, as counsel observe, with surprising particularity. His story was that he was sixteen years old; that he was born in San Francisco, “on Dupont Street, upstairs,” and remained in that city until he was ten years of age, when he went to China with his mother. He also mentioned the names of three persons on the ship whom he knew. When asked how he remembered their names, he answered, “ When I got to China, my mother told me very often of' those people and their names; she repeated them to me, and I remember them.” When reminded that that was six years before, he responded: “ My mothér sometimes speaks those names to me very frequently.” His mother was in China, and he knew nothing of the three men named. Although in the city, according to his statement, for ten years, he did not, upon his examination, show any knowledge of any places or streets therein, or of the English language. The following is a specimen of his testimony:</p> <p>“ Q. Can you count in English ? A. I do not understand English.</p> <p>“ Q. Can you count in English ? A. I can count in Chinese, but not in English.</p> <p>“Q. Do you know the names of the days of the week in English ? A. I am too small; I did not learn it.</p> <p>“Q. You do not know anything at all in English? A. No, sir'; .not a word.”</p> <p>Nor did he mention any circumstance, incident or occurrence, except being born in Dupont Street, upstairs, which, would lead one to suppose that he had ever been in the city. His only memory seemed to be of the names of the three men who accompanied ihim back to China, whom he had not seen since, and whose names he only knew from having heard his mother repeat them. The father, who was examined, stated that he worked on a sewing machine ; that the petitioner was his boy, and that he was born “at 1030 Dupont Street, upstairs,” and went to China with his mother, and one of the witness’s friends; and that he wanted his boy to come back to learn English. He also produced what he called his “ store-book,” in which he had entered the purchase of a ticket for the boy and his mother. He gave no particulars of his residence-in San Francisco, of his having a family there, or of his being known among his neighbors or others as having any ■children.</p> <p>The court, after hearing these witnesses, held that the petitioner was not illegally restrained of his liberty, but was a ■Chinese person forbidden by law to land within the United States, and had no right to be or remain therein. It accordingly discharged the writ, and ordered that the petitioner be remanded to the marshal to be returned to the captain of the steamship. From this judgment an appeal is taken to this court.</p>

The case, as stated by tbe court, was as follows: ' The petitioner, who is also appellant here, is a subject of the Emperor of China, and carné from that country to the port of San Francisco, California, in the steamship* Arabic, arriving there August 7,- 1889. The officers of the customs refused to allow him to land in the United States, holding that he was a Chinese laborer and as such within the. provisions of th'e exclusioii act.

Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 (1891), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a label describing the contents of a container is not subject to copyright. The case has been read narrowly since it was decided. It applies to labels with "no artistic excellence."

On the 11th of October, 1875, Robert J. Glendy executed a deed of trust to Alexander F. Mathews on a tract of land in Greenbrier County, West Yirginia, to'secure his two certain promissory notes for $10,000 and $5000, respectively, held .by the Bank of Lewisburg, and also “any and all other debts which the said Glendy may at any time hereafter owe to said bank, either by the renewal of the said negotiable notes or by original loans made to him by the said Bank of Lewisburg,…

In re Ross, or Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), was a US Supreme Court case decided on May 21, 1891, that dealt with the application of American law by US consular courts over foreign sailors on American-flagged ships in countries in which the United States exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Held: strictly to the terms of his patent' and was entitled only to the specific form of device described and claimed therein; and the evidence is very clear to the effect that the defendants never used such *493 device. It is unnecessary for us to enter into an examination of the evidence on this subject.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: Mr. Justice Brewer (then Circuit Judge) delivering the opinion, that *516 the plea was good; and tbe bill was dismissed. 28 Fed. Rep. 909 . From that decree, of dismissal this appeal was prosecuted. Mr. James II. Anderson submitted for appellants. Mr. D. P. Dyer submitted for appellees. We are entirely convinced that the decree of the court below, in this case, was correct.

Held: Mr. Justice Woods delivering the opinion, that the certificate of the judge was not conclusive evidence of the fact that money lent to a married woman was for her sole use and benefit; but that she might be allowed to contradict it, the burden of proof being ■upon her to show that it did not enure to her benefit. In Chaffe v. Oliver, 33 La.

This was an action for money had and received, brought in the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for the county of Suffolk, by John Heard, Augustine Heard and Albert E. Heard, against their assignees in bankruptcy, to recover the amount of an award made by the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, under the act of Congress approved June 5, 1882, 22 Stat. 98, c. 195, on account of war premiums of insurance paid by the plaintiffs during the war of…

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR TH% EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>In equity. Decree for complainant. Defendant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Prior to 1885 the District Courts of a Territory had jurisdiction over the crime of murder, committed by any person other than an Indian, upon --an Indian reservation within its territorial limits; and such jurisdiction was not taken away by the act of March 3, 1885, c. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385.</p> <p>A deficiency in the number of grand jurors prescribed by law, there being present and acting a greater number than that requisite for the finding of an indictment, is not such a defect as vitiates the entire proceedings, and compels his discharge on habeas corpus, though unnoticed by the prisoner until after trial and sentence.</p> <p>If it be doubtful whether the defendant can, after trial and verdict, take advantage of such a defect by direct challenge, it is clear that the defect does not go to the jurisdiction, and cannot be taken advantage of by a collateral attack in habeas corpus.</p> <p>It is unnecessary to decide whether the “sixty days’” limitation of the sessions of the legislative assemblies of the Territories means a term of sixty calendar days.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO. ■</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that it was not entitled to priority of lien over the mortgage creditors, on the foreclosure and sale of the road. In other words, it,was held that the bondholders, represented by the appellant, the beneficial owners of the property, could not be held liable for rental value during the time the receivership was. at the ■instance of a judgment creditor.

Held: that they ought to have been allowed to take issue on the pleas. The act of 1889 intended a full legal investigation of the facts, and did not ' intend that the interests involved should be determined on the untested allegations of the defendants. The claims of the United States cannot be treated as, stale claims, nor can the defences of stale claim and laches be set up against them.

Held: The irregularities were not cut off, because the prior owners of the lot were deprived of a substantial right; (2) The oath prescribed by statute was not taken by the assessor, or ' endorsed on the assessment books; (3) There was no record proof of the publication of the notice of the sale for taxes; (4) The right to redeem was prevented from being exercised within the two years by dereliction of duty on the part of…

<p>The provision in Rev. Stat. § 3309, that if tiie Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on making a monthly examination of a distiller’s return, “ finds that the distiller has used any grain or molasses in excess of the capacity of his distillery as estimated according to law, he shall make an assessment against the distiller,” etc., refers to the real average spirit-producing capacity of the distillery, and not to a fictitious capacity for any particular day or days.</p>

<p>The court now orders a decree entered in this case, for which purpose it was reserved at the last term. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 66.</p>