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141 F.2d 723

Docket Nos. 8579-8581 and 8604.

Bates v. Colpoys

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued Feb. 11, 1944.

Decided March 27, 1944.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1944-03-27

3 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The District Code [1940, § 16-415] authorizes suits for maintenance. It does not expressly authorize awards of maintenance and suit money pendente lite, but those awards were within the District Court’s discretion under its general equity powers. “However, the District Code provides that where a decree directs only the payment of money, ‘no defendant shall be imprisoned except in those cases especially provided for.’ The court has ‘no power’ to overstep that limitation. Imprisonment is ‘especially provided’ for enforcement of permanent maintenance, and also for enforcement of alimony ‘during the pendency of a suit for divorce.’ But the orders in this case are not in either of those categories. Imprisonment is not ‘expressly provided’ for enforcement of maintenance pendente lite. It is true that the code permits enforcement of interlocutory orders by the same process as final decrees. But an order requiring the payment of maintenance, even pendente lite, is a final and not an interlocutory order. It follows that the court had no power to imprison appellant.””

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Lundregan v. Lundregan, Thomas F. Lundregan v. Mrs. G. Jeannette Lundregan

Relies on Pedersen v. Pedersen · Howard v. Howard · Rapeer v. Colpoys

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1944-03-27

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently December 1972 · most notably Hopson v. Hopson (1955), Thomas F. Lundregan v. Mrs. G. Jeannette Lundregan (1958)

20 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

2801944195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Mr. Arthur J. Hilland, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

¶2Mr. Jean M. Boardman, of Washington, D. C., for appellee Dorothy Bates.

¶3Messrs. Edward M. Curran, U. S. Atty. (John L. Ingoldsby and Charles B. Murray, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee Colpoys.

¶4Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.

¶5EDGERTON, Associate Justice.

¶6Appellee Dorothy N. Bates filed a complaint for maintenance against her husband, appellant Harrison Bates. She charged that his cruelty had compelled her to leave him and that he had refused to support her. She asked for maintenance pendente lite. She did not ask for divorce, either absolute or limited. The court, upon the pleadings and depositions, ordered appellant to pay $500 forthwith, $150 a month pendente lite, and $308.80 suit money. He failed to do so and was committed for contempt. He siied out a writ of habeas *724corpus which was discharged. He appealed (Nos. 8579, 8580) from the award of maintenance pendente lite and suit money, (No. 8581) from the order imprisoning him for contempt, and (No. 8604) from the order discharging his writ of habeas corpus. He gave bond for the satisfaction of the contempt judgment and was released from custody. He is now in Florida.

¶7The District Code authorizes suits for maintenance.1 It does not expressly authorize awards of maintenance and suit money pendente lite, but those awards were within the District Court’s discretion under its general equity powers.2

¶8However, the District Code provides that where a decree directs only the payment of money, “no defendant shall be imprisoned except in those cases especially provided for.”3 The court has “no power” to overstep that limitation.4 Imprisonment is “especially provided” for enforcement of permanent maintenance,5 and also for enforcement of alimony “during the pendency of a suit for divorce.”6 But the orders in this case are not in either of those categories. Imprisonment is not “expressly provided” for enforcement of maintenance pendente lite. It is true that the code permits enforcement of interlocutory orders by the same process as final decrees.7 But an order requiring the payment of maintenance, even pendente lite, is a final and not an interlocutory order. It follows that the court had no power to imprison appellant.

¶9“The argument that the appeal [in the habeas corpus case] should not be entertained, because the appellant has been released on bail, and therefore; as is claimed, is not now restrained of his liberty, is plainly unsound. The appellant may not be in prison; but he is in the custody of the law, and is most unquestionably restrained of his liberty.” 8 The motion of appellee Colpoys to dismiss the appeal as moot is therefore denied.

¶10Appellee Dorothy N. Bates will be allowed counsel fees of $250 on these appeals.

¶11Nos. 8579, 8580, affirmed;

¶12Nos. 8581, 8604, reversed.

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