PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-1711
__________
MICHAEL GORRIO,
Appellant
v.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER FRANCIS; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER CARASELLY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
FETCHCO; SERGEANT WALSHAN; LIEUTENANT
ROBERT RHODES; LIEUTENANT PARKER;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EMMINGER;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER POLAND; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER SCOLES; SUPERINTENDENT MARK V.
CAPOZZA; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EVANS;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TERRAVECHIA;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DICKS; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER ROCKRIDGE; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
HAILEY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BURRIE;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MINOR; SERGEANT
MCKILEEN; LIEUTENANT ALBERT WOOD;
LIEUTENANT DAILEY; LIEUTENANT RUSNAK;
EDWARD BOHNA; BRITTANY KIMMEL;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER REGINA; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER COX; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER OHRMAN;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TWARDZIK;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SAXION; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER HENRY; SERGEANT HAINES; SERGEANT
WILES; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JOHN DOE,
Other Unknown Officers; JANE DOE, Other Unknown
Medical Personnel; JOHN DOE, Other Unknown Sergeants;
JOHN DOE, Other Unknown Lieutenants; RHONDA
HOUSE, Superintendent Assistant; LUIS ALLEN; BETH
RUDZINSKI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-01297)
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 22, 2025
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit
Judges.
(Opinion filed )
Michael Gorrio
Indiana, PA
Pro se Appellant
Daniel B. Mullen
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Appellate Litigation Section
1251 Waterfront Place
2
Mezzanine Level
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Hannah Kogan
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street
Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellees
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Michael Gorrio appeals from the
District Court’s order denying his motion for a new trial after
the jury verdict and final judgment. He also appeals from
various pre-trial orders entered by the District Court
concerning the scope of discovery and amendment of Gorrio’s
complaint.
The limitations that the District Court placed on
discovery impermissibly conflict with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, to obtain relief, Gorrio must
demonstrate prejudice from the improper limitations. He has
not done so. Seeing no other errors in the challenged orders,
we will affirm the judgment.
I.
3
Michael Gorrio is a Pennsylvania state prisoner. In
2019, he filed a complaint against numerous Correctional
Defendants alleging a variety of constitutional and statutory
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the RICO Act, the
Hobbs Act, the Clayton Act, and Pennsylvania law. 1 Pursuant
to the District Court’s standing practice order for all civil rights
cases filed by pro se incarcerated plaintiffs, a Magistrate Judge
was assigned to perform certain tasks. Among other things, the
Magistrate Judge was responsible for deciding non-dispositive
motions and managing discovery.
After several claims in Gorrio’s complaint withstood a
motion to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge issued a case-management order. That order stated that “no formal
discovery, such as depositions, interrogatories, requests for
production or requests for admission will be allowed in this
case without leave of court.” Dist. Ct. ECF No. 117 at 1.
However, the order instructed the Defendants to provide all
reports, documents, and records relating to Gorrio’s claims and
any information in Defendants’ possession that would help
Gorrio identify the John and Jane Doe Defendants. It also
provided Gorrio a month after receipt of those materials to
“advise the court of any further discovery” he required, and to
submit formal requests to the court for review so that the court
could determine if the discovery would be permitted. Id. at 2.
Gorrio filed multiple motions seeking depositions,
interrogatories, and documents beyond what Defendants had
1
Gorrio’s list of Defendants included John Doe correctional
officers who were later dismissed because Gorrio had failed to
identify them. Gorrio later attempted to reinstate them and
appeals the District Court’s denial of those attempts.
4
provided him, as well as extensions of the discovery period.
The Magistrate Judge permitted Gorrio additional time to
explain the discovery he sought, but she denied each motion
for discovery.
Gorrio also filed motions to amend his complaint by
reinstating previously unidentified defendants. The District
Court denied each of those motions.
Eventually, the case proceeded to a jury trial on Gorrio’s
state law claims of assault, battery, and negligence and his §
1983 claims of excessive use of force, deliberate indifference
to safety and medical needs, and sexual harassment. After a
multi-day trial in February 2024, the jury rendered a verdict in
favor of the Defendants on each claim. The District Court
entered final judgment on the same date.
Gorrio filed a motion for a new trial, arguing for the first
time that two of the jurors knew him from interactions they had
a decade prior, and alleging that they had been prejudiced
against him. The District Court denied his motion, ruling that
Gorrio had waived the argument by not raising it before jury
deliberations and that he did not meet the standard for a new
trial based on juror bias. Gorrio appealed. 2
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review the denial of a motion for a new trial generally for abuse
of discretion; however, if the district court “bases its denial of
the motion on an application of law,” we apply de novo review.
McKenna v. City of Phila.,
582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). The District Court’s orders denying further
discovery and leave to amend are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa.,
211 F.3d 760, 778 (3d
5
II.
On appeal, Gorrio argues that the District Court abused
its discretion by denying his pre-trial motions for additional
discovery and by denying him leave to amend his complaint to
reinstate now-identified John and Jane Doe defendants a month
before trial. Gorrio further contends that the District Court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial,
particularly without having held an evidentiary hearing
regarding his allegations of juror bias. We address each of his
arguments in turn.
A.
On its face, the case-management order disallowing
discovery without leave of court conflicts with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) (“A
party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a
party, without leave of court except as provided in Rule
30(a)(2).”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1) (“A party may, by written
questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave
of court except as provided in Rule 31(a)(2).”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
34(a) (“A party may serve on any other party a request . . . to
produce . . . any designated documents or electronically stored
information.”).
The Supreme Court and Congress approve the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribe the procedures to be
followed by parties and the courts. Sempier v. Johnson &
Higgens, 45 F.3d 724, 736 (3d Cir. 1995). Although district
Cir. 2000); Shifflett v. Korszniak,
934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir.
2019).
6
courts have discretion to manage discovery, In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), they may not
circumvent or deviate from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as a matter of course, see Holloway v. Lockhart,
813
F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The conflict between the local
rule, which requires leave of court before filing a request for
production of documents, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b), which
permits such requests without leave of court, is clear.
Accordingly, Local Rule 23(VIII)(B)(6) is invalid, and we so
hold.” (footnote omitted)).
Here, the Magistrate Judge provided no case-specific
basis for requiring leave of court to conduct discovery, let
alone one consistent with the exceptions provided by the
federal rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
31(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). And no basis is apparent from
the record. To the extent that the Magistrate Judge issued the
case-management order as a matter of course, that was
improper.
Nonetheless, to obtain relief on a claim concerning
discovery issues, an appellant must make “the clearest showing
that the procedures have resulted in actual and substantial
prejudice” to him. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d
at 817 (cleaned up). Specifically, an appellant must “show that
the district court’s denial of discovery made it impossible to
obtain crucial evidence.” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc.
v. Am. Bar Ass’n,
107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (cleaned
up).
Gorrio has failed to make this showing. Specifically,
Gorrio has not identified what crucial evidence he was
prevented from obtaining—particularly given the Defendants’
7
compliance with turning over records 3—that would have aided
his case. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., 107 F.3d at
1032. The closest Gorrio comes is arguing that it disallowed
him “the fundamental opportunity to discover affirmative
evidence negating a material and essential element of a party’s
claim.” Gorrio Supp. Br. at 18. That vague assertion is not
sufficient to establish that he was deprived of “crucial
evidence,” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc.,
107 F.3d at
1032, and is “speculative and lack[s] any support in the
record,” Cyberworld Enter. Tech. v. Napolitano,
602 F.3d 189,
200 (3d Cir. 2010). See generally Martel v. Cnty. of L.A.,
56
F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Gorrio therefore is not
entitled to relief.
B.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s
denial of Gorrio’s motions to reinstate previously unidentified
John and Jane Doe defendants. District Courts “may deny
leave to amend a complaint if a plaintiff’s delay in seeking
amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to
the opposing party.” Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). By itself, delay is not
3
The Defendants’ production was addressed at the pretrial
conference, and “[t]he Court [found] Defendants’ statements
that they properly disclosed the relevant documents credible.”
Dist. Ct. ECF No. 326 at 1. Gorrio has provided no grounds
for us to set aside that determination. See Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
215 F.3d 407, 417
n.11 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We apply a deferential standard of review
to the District Court’s credibility determinations . . . .”).
8
a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend, but it may become
undue delay “when a movant has had previous opportunities to
amend a complaint.” Id. at 273 (citations omitted). Finding
prejudice to the opposing party requires “consider[ing]
whether allowing an amendment would result in additional
discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or
new theories.” Id.
Here, the District Court denied Gorrio’s motions to
reinstate the previously unidentified Doe defendants, deeming
amendment untimely and prejudicial given his receipt of the
relevant unredacted documents almost two years prior. On
appeal, Gorrio asserts that the Defendants had failed to comply
with the discovery case-management order and had withheld
the relevant reports until the last minute. As noted earlier, the
District Court found credible Defendants’ statements that they
had provided all relevant documents to Gorrio in early 2022.
Gorrio has provided no basis for us to conclude otherwise.
C.
Finally, by waiting until after trial to raise his concern
of juror bias, Gorrio arguably forfeited his right to raise this
challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117,
126-27 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Gootee,
34 F.3d 475,
479 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Gorrio has not shown
that he realized the misconduct only after trial, and that his
failure to discover it during trial was not “the result of lack of
diligence.” Pelullo,
105 F.3d at 126 (cleaned up). Regardless,
we agree with the District Court that Gorrio’s claims of juror
bias have no merit. The District Court evaluated Gorrio’s
claims under the test articulated in McDonough Power Equip.,
Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). McDonough
9
requires a party to show that “a juror failed to answer honestly
a material question on voir dire,” and that “a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”
Id.
As the District Court correctly determined, Gorrio has
failed to meet either requirement. Gorrio’s alleged isolated
interactions with the two jurors occurred over a decade prior to
the trial, and his affidavit alleging that the jurors had failed to
answer the voir dire honestly did not present “clear, strong,
substantial . . . evidence that a specific, nonspeculative
impropriety ha[d] occurred” such that a hearing was required.
United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 301 (3d Cir. 2014)
(cleaned up); see also United States v. Noel,
905 F.3d 258, 274-
75 (3d Cir. 2018). Further, as the District Court correctly
noted, even if actually established, a juror’s mere acquaintance
with a party does not render a potential jury member unfit to
serve on the jury. See United States v. Calabrese,
942 F.2d
218, 224 (3d Cir. 1991). We therefore discern no abuse of
discretion or error in the District Court’s denial of Gorrio’s
motion for a new trial.
…
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment. 4
4
We deny Gorrio’s motions for sanctions, as he has not shown
that Appellees acted in bad faith related to his delayed receipt
of their response brief. Gorrio was granted extensions to file
his reply brief, which we have considered.
10
