¶1dissenting.
¶21. The Supreme Court, in Brooks v. State, 238 Ga. 435, held that Powell v. Allen, 140 Ga. App. 186 (230 SE2d 343) would not be followed. Consequently, its correctness is no longer an issue.
¶32. Assuming but not deciding that appellant was ordered to testify under a grant of use and derivative use immunity, the purported grant was defective. Paragraph 7 of the immunity document prepared by the district attorney and approved by the court provided in part: "In the event the testimony of Amy Ruth Corson is not full, or complete or truthful in every particular then this grant of immunity by the State, with the approval of the court, is void and the State can exercise its discretion as to whether or not it will prosecute the said person for any crime arising out of the transaction.” Clearly the inclusion of this sentence constituted a conditional grant of immunity. There is and can be no such thing as a conditional grant of immunity. A grant of immunity, in order to be valid, must be full and complete and must afford the witness complete protection against the use of *756the evidence derived from the compelled testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (92 SC 1953, 32 LE2d 212). The condition in the district attorney’s request prevents this from being a full and complete grant for it authorizes the district attorney with approval of the court to void it. A conditional grant of immunity is void and is ineffective to take away the sacred constitutional right against self-incrimination. As the grant here was void for this reason, the judgment of contempt should be reversed.
¶4I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian and Judge Marshall join in this dissent.