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← 141 N.C. App. 302 - State v. Funchess

141 N.C. App. 302 - State v. Funchess’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
1
states following
May 2017
most recently cited

30 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Modjeski & Masters, Applicant, V · State v. Bagley · State v. Hartness · State v. Diaz · State v. Moore

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) Speeding in excess of 15 miles per hour over the legal speed limit. (2) Gross impairment of the person’s faculties while driving due to: a. Consumption of an impairing substance; or b. A blood alcohol concentration of 0.14 or more within a relevant time after the driving. (3) Reckless driving as proscribed by G.S. 20-140. (4) Negligent driving leading to an accident causing: a. Property damage in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000); or b. Personal injury. (5) Driving when the person’s drivers license is revoked. (6) Driving in excess of the posted speed limit, during the days and hours when the posted limit is in effect, on school property or in an area designated as a school zone pursuant to G.S. 20-141.1, or in a highway work zone as defined in G.S. 20-141(j2). (7) Passing a stopped school bus as proscribed by G.S. 20-217. (8) Driving with a child under 12 years of age in the vehicle.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Although many of the enumerated aggravating factors [for speeding to elude arrest] are in fact separate crimes under various provisions of our General Statutes, they are not separate offenses . . . , but are merely alternate ways of enhancing the punishment for speeding to elude arrest from a misdemeanor to a Class H felony.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[A] disjunctive instruction, which allows the jury to find a defendant guilty if he commits either of two underlying acts, either of which is in itself a separate offense, is fatally ambiguous because it is impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found that the defendant committed one particular offense. . . . [However,] if the trial court merely instructs the jury disjunctively as to various alternative acts which will establish an element of the offense, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.