Davis v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 72 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is our opinion that to sustain the ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals and the contention of respondents would be to permit the admission of extrinsic evidence either to contradict the plain legal effect of the three deeds or to render wholly ineffective the deed from Jeff D. Davis to his wife conveying the undivided one-half interest. This cannot be done in the absence of allegations of fraud, accident or mistake in the preparation or in the execution of the written instruments. There is no such pleading in this case. ‘It is well settled that the legal effect of a deed cannot be varied simply by showing that the grantor misunderstood the legal effect of its terms, or intended a different effect from that which the language of the instrument imports.’ Rogers v. Rogers, Tex.Com.App., 15 S.W.2d 1037, 1039 . See, also, Cauble v. Worsham, 96 Tex. 86, 93 , 70 S.W. 737 , 97 Am.St.Rep. 871 ; Lindly v. Lindly, 102 Tex. 135, 144 , 113 S.W. 750 ; Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32 , 151 S.W.2d 1004 ; McCormick & Ray’s Texas Law of Evidence, p. 989, Sec. 739a. “There is no ambiguity in the three deeds executed January 2, 1935. By the first two deeds Mrs. Davis, through Mrs. Passow conveyed to her husband, Jeff D. Davis, as his separate estate, an undivided one-half interest in the land. The third deed was a warranty deed by which Jeff D. Davis conveyed to Mrs. Davis an undivided one-half interest in the land. He had no interest except the one-half interest conveyed to him on the same ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pevehouse v. Pevehouse

2. “Does hereby release the said Anderson Furniture Company of and from any and all claims, demands, causes of action, damages, suits or cost whatever by reason of said occurrence and any and all resulting loss or damage to the dwelling owned by Emory E. Manning and wife, Mary Oleta Manning, on the date of said loss. " (Emphasis added). These releases, drawn by an attorney of many years experience in this field of law, were full releases and were required to be reformed or set aside before judgment could be granted appellees as against appellant. Under the conclusion arrived at in the above paragraphs that the releases were full releases and were required to be reformed, appellant's points 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 raise the issue on which this dissenting opinion is based, to wit: "It is too well settled to need citation of authorities that a court of equity, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, cannot change the terms of a contract.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Anderson Furniture Co. v. Roden

3. “amount to nothing more than an averment that the intention of the parties was different from that which the deeds (releases) expressed and the parol evidence went no further. There was, therefore, neither pleading nor proof that could serve as the basis for reformation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Anderson Furniture Co. v. Roden