Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate · 2 district · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 107 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is to be observed that out of the , principal sum loaned the trust company retained, by way of discount, what was claimed to be the present value of such amount as would pay, in advance, 3 per cent, of the stipulated interest for the whole period of the loan, 5 years. In view of this feature in the case there was much discussion at the bar as to whether it was permissible, in Illinois, for the lender to exact and receive interest in advance upon a loan made at the highest rate allowed by its laws. In view of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of that state, it is not necessary to examine this question upon principle; for it is the settled doctrine of that court that the mere taking of interest in advance does not bring a loan within the prohibition of usury. In Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490, 498 ( 83 Am. Dec. 240 ), it was said: ‘The remaining plea sets up usury in this, that the interest was made payable semi-annually. It has long been settled such reservation is not usurious. The whole interest may be lawfully reserved in’ advance.’ McGill v. Ware, 5 Ill. 21 , 28; Mitchell v. Lyman, 77 Ill. 525, 529, 530 ; Brown v. Scottish-American Mortgage Co., 110 Ill. 235, 239 ; Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 Ill. 390, 394 ; Telford v. Garrel, 132 Ill. 550, 554 ( 24 N. E. 573 ). Whether that doctrine would apply where the loan was for such period that the exaction by the lender of interest in advance would, at the outset, absorb so much of the principal as to leave the b”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Garland v. Union Trust Co.

2. ““ The trust company insists that the decree should have made to it an allowance for solicitor’s fees. There is no foundation for this claim. The trust deed provides that, in the case of a sale by the trustee at public auction, upon advertisement, all costs, charges, and expenses of such advertisement, sale, or conveyance, including commissions, such as were at the time of the sale allowed by the laws of Illinois, to sheriffs on sale of real estate on execution, should be paid out of the proceeds. This provision does not impose upon the borrower the burden of paying to the lender a solicitor’s fee where a, suit is brought for foreclosure. The commissions referred to in the deed are allowed only where the property is sold upon advertisement by the trustee witiiout suit. Tile trust deed made no provision for a solicitor’s fee to the company in the event suit was brought. That a suit became necessary because of the refusal of the trustee to act is no reason for taxing such a fee against the mortgagor.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Robinson v. Alabama & G. Manuf'g Co.

3. ““It is not the case simply of a borrower employing a broker, — who has no regular or established connection with the lender as agent, and no arrangement with the lender with respect to compensation for his services, — to effect a loan, and agreeing to pay him commissions. * *. The arrangement amounted to no more nor less than requiring the agent to loan for a per cent sufficiently high to yield * * * the highest rate of interest allowed by the law and to pay the agent for his responsibility, labor, skill, and trouble. * * The policy of the statute is to protect the weak and necessitous from the oppression of the strong, and to sanction such transactions as this would be to defeat that policy.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Modern Pioneers Insurance Company v. Nandin