Moline Plow Co. v. Webb’s Empirical Analysis
141 U.S. 616 · 1891
Citation profile
32 federal appellate · 3 district · 20 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 61 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 1986 · most notably Madden v. Lancaster County (1894), Smith v. United States (1894)
32 federal appellate · 3 district · 20 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ewell v. Daggs · Boardman v. Toffey · Norris v. Jackson · Insurance Company v. Folsom · Martinton v. Fairbanks
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A leading case in tbe Supreme Court of Texas on this subject is Harrison Machine Works v. Reigor, 64 Tex. 89 . This was an action upon promissory notes payable at different dates, each containing an agreement to the effect that ‘a failure to pay that note when due should mature both notes.’ The note first falling due was not paid at maturity, and more than four years elapsed without suit. The question was presented whether limitation on the note last falling due commenced upon default in the payment of the one first maturing. It was held that it did, the court saying: ‘That the effect of the agreement was to authorize suit or give a right of action upon the last note at the same time that it could be commenced upon the first, cannot be doubted. By the express terms of our statute of limitation, it commences to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. It is immaterial from what cause a note becomes due, so far as the right of the holder to enforce it by suit is concerned. * * * If the holder of a note may, at his option, treat the claim as due at a later date than the maker has agreed that it shall mature, and thus prescribe a different date at which it shall be barred, the evidence for its enforcement may be preserved, whilst that for its resistance may be destroyed, and thus the purpose of the statute be wholly defeated.’ After referring to Hemp v. Garland, 4 Q. B. 519, as sustaining that view, but recognizing the fact that that case had been somewhat criticised ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““In our judgment, the parties intended to give the holder of the notes an option after default in the payment of interest, not only lo declare the principal due, hut to foreclose the deed of trust, in advance of the dates of maturity named in the notes and deed. [Italics supplied.] That option not having been exercised when or after the several defaults occurred, limitation began to run on the several notes only from their respective dates of maturity, as specified in them * *”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wentland v. Stewart
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.