Parker v. Ormsby’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 84 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It was settled by many decisions, under the act of 1789, that a Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction of a suit brought against the maker by the assignee of a promissory note payable to order, unless it appeared, affirmatively, that it could have been maintained in that court in the name of the original payee. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8 , 11 [ 1 L. Ed. 718 ]; Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cranch, 46 [ 2 L. Ed. 545 ]; Gibson v. Chew, 16 Pet. 315 , 316 [ 10 L. Ed. 977 ] ; Coffee v. Planters’ Bank of Tennessee, 13 How. 183 , 187 [ 14 L. Ed. 105 ] ; Morgan’s Executor v. Gay, 19 Wall. 81 , 82 [ 22 L. Ed. 100 ], There were these recognized exceptions to that general rule in its application to promissory notes: (1) That an indorsee could sue the indorser in the Circuit Court, if they were citizens of different states, whether a suit could have been brought or not by the payee against the maker; for the indorsee would not claim through an assignment, but by virtue of a new contract between himself and the indorser. Young v. Bryan, 6 Wheat. 146 , 151 [ 5 L. Ed. 228 ]; Mullen v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537 , 538 [ 6 L. Ed. 154 ]. (2) The holder, of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or to a named person or bearer could sue the maker in a court of the United States, without reference to the citizenship of the original payee- or original holder, because his title did not come to him by assignment, but by delivery merely. Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318 ”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States Nat. Bank of New York v. McNair · Portage City Water Co. v. City of Portage

2. ““Prom this summary of decided cases it is quite evident that when the action is founded upon an express promise between the original parties it cannot be prosecuted by the assignee of the original promisee, unless the action would have lain by the assignor. * * * No distinction is intimated between oral and written contracts, and none can be justly inferred from the language of the act. The words, ‘or of any subsequent holder, if such instrument be payable to bearer, and be not made by any corporation,’ were not intended as a new limitation, and are referable only to the written instruments previously mentioned. The clause was introduced for the purpose of nullifying a series of decisions under the act of 1789, which held that promissory notes and other written instruments payable to a person named ‘or bearer’ were not within the exceptions of the statute, because the promise was in law made directly to the bearer, and he did not take by assignment from the person named. We are clear in our opinion that it was not intended to qualify or limit in any way the words ‘other chose in action.’ A right of action upon an oral contract is as much a chose in action as if the contract were in writing.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Utah-Nevada Co. v. De Lamar

3. ““Nor shall any circuit court have cognizance of any suit In favor of any assignee unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been made; or in favor of any subsequent holder, if such instrument be made payable to bearer, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no transfer had been made.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Skinner v. Barr