Huckabay v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 federal appellate · 4 district · 18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 148 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This inquiry, of necessity, turns on the facts and context of each particular case. Relevant to the determination are the following three factors, which we discuss, but by no means consider to be exhaustive. The first is subject matter. Do the alleged facts involve the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation? The second is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment or employment decision? The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of permanence which should trigger an employee’s awareness and duty to assert his or her rights, or which should indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate?”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cox v. Indian Head Industries, Inc. · 743 So. 2d 181 - King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP

2. “The continuing violation theory relieves a plaintiff of establishing that all of the complained-of conduct occurred within the actionable period if the plaintiff can show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period.... The core idea of the continuing violations theory, however, is that equitable considerations may very well require that the filing periods not begin to run until facts supportive of a Title VII charge or civil rights action are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated. The focus is on what event, in fairness and logic, should have alerted the average lay person to act to protect his rights. At the same time, the mere perpetuation of the effects of time-barred discrimination does not constitute a violation of Title VII in the absence of independent actionable conduct occurring within the statutory period. Thus, a plaintiff can avoid a limitations bar for an event that fails to fall within the statutory period where there is a persisting and continuing system of discriminatory practices in promotion or transfer that produces effects that may not manifest themselves as individually discriminatory except in cumulation over a period of time.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Angela Vann v. Mattress Firm, Incorporated · 310 F. Supp. 2d 819 - In Re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. &" ERISA" Lit.

3. “A supervisor is considered an “employer” under title VII if he wields the employer’s traditional rights, such as hiring and firing. And a county commissioner such as Moore, who possesses almost total executive authority within his precinct as well as legislative authority as a member of the commissioners court, certainly wields sufficient authority to be considered an employer. This power is necessarily exercised, however, by a person who acts as an agent of the corporate or municipal body he represents. Because the wrongful acts are performed in his official capacity, any recovery against that person must be against him in that capacity, not individually. Further, if Moore acted only in his individual capacity, he did not act as an “employer” and would not be liable under title VII to the extent that he acted individually. Thus, a public official cannot be held liable in his individual capacity for backpay damages under title VII.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 86 F. Supp. 2d 854 - Luder v. Endicott · 173 F. Supp. 2d 521 - Rhyce v. Martin