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143 F.2d 468

Docket No. 10948.

Brown v. Commissioner

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided June 23, 1944.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1944-06-23

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"The term `capital assets' * * does not include * * * property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business * * *."”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Garrett v. United States, Erickson v. Commissioner

“The fact that he bought no additional lands during this period does not prevent his activities being a business. He merely had enough land to do a large business without buying any more. He was not reselling land in the condition in which he bought it, but was subdividing and platting it and sometimes improving it, so as to make wild lands into town lots, thus adding the business element of development. All was done with such purpose, system and continuity as well to constitute it a business.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Commissioner

Relies on Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. · Snell v. Commissioner · Richards v. Commissioner

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1944-06-23

How this case has been cited

Cited by 66 later decisions — most recently November 1979 · most notably Galena Oaks Corporation v. Frank Scofield, Collector of Internal Revenue (1954), Smith v. Dunn (1955)

30 federal appellate · 2 district ·

4501944195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1J. L. Lockett, of Houston, Tex., for petitioner.

¶2Howard P. Locke, Sewall Key, and A. F. Prescott, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., Samuel *469O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. P. Wenchel, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Bernard D. Daniels, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

¶3Before SIBLEY, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

¶4LEE, Circuit Judge.

¶5This case involves deficiencies in income tax found by the Tax Court to be due by petitioner for the calendar years 1937, 1938, and 1939, respectively. The sole question is whether the net profit to the taxpayer from the sale of lots in the taxable years was capital gain or ordinary income. The applicable statutes and regulations are set forth below.1

¶6The taxpayer and her husband owned some 500 acres of unimproved land near a settlement called Woster, about three miles from Baytown, in Harris County, Texas. The land was community property and had been used for grazing cattle. The husband died in 1928, and his will devised his undivided half interest in the land to the taxpayer. Thereupon she became sole owner of the entire tract. The land, decedent’s sole asset, was covered by mortgage to a Houston, Texas, bank to secure an indebtedness due it of approximately $20,000. The bank in 1930 demanded payment, and a son of the taxpayer obtained a new loan for her from another Houston bank, sufficient in amount to pay the existing indebtedness and leave a surplus from which to pay interest on the new loan until the land could be sold. Petitioner listed the land for sale early in 1929, with a licensed real estate broker named Montgomery, in Houston, Texas. His attempts to sell the property were unsuccessful and it was then listed for sale, at his suggestion, with other real estate agents, with no results.

¶7In 1936 Montgomery sold two small parcels of the tract, and in 1937 he became convinced that he could dispose of the land if it were subdivided. He consulted with the taxpayer and her children and was authorized to sub-divide the property and develop it for sale, provided it could be independently financed. No formal contract was entered into between the parties, and all arrangements were made by them orally and through correspondence. The Tax Court found that their relationship in regard to the land was that of principal and agent. The taxpayer knew nothing about business and her children knew nothing about the real estate business, so all details were left to Montgomery. He platted and laid out two subdivisions of 106 lots in 1937, and two other subdivisions *470of 94 lots in 1938 and 1939. No improvements were made on the lots themselves but streets were cleared, graded, and shelled; storm sewers were put in at street intersections; gas and electric lines were constructed; and a water well was dug. Taxpayer executed the plats to all subdivisions and dedicated to public use the streets and parks.

¶8Montgomery received a commission of 5% on sales in 1937, and a commission of 10% in subsequent years. In 1937, 32 lots were sold for $26,661.03; in 1938, 29 lots brought $30,706.35; and in 1939, 19 lots were sold for $15,955.00. Subsequent to 1939, additional acreage from the original tract was platted in 131 lots, and subsequent to that year 42 lots were sold. The taxpayer treated the profit each year as a long-term capital gain, and reported as taxable income only the specified percentage provided by statute as the amount subject to the tax. The Commissioner treated the entire profit' as ordinary gains and the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner, holding that the lots sold were not capital assets but were assets held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the regular course of the taxpayer’s business.

¶9The facts, we think, clearly sustain the Tax Court. Section 117(b) of the statute defines capital assets as “property held, by the taxpayer but does not include ■ * property held" by the taxpayer primarily for sale to- customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.” While the petitioner did not personally conduct the business of selling lots she did conduct it through another.2 She sold to all comers, subdividing and developing to attract purchasers. Anyone who wished to buy could do so. Her sales were not isolated transactions; neither were they casual rather than continuing.3 They were substantial and frequent. In the taxable years 80 lots for a total sales price of $73,322.38 were disposed of.

¶10In Ehrman v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 120 F.2d 607, 610 certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 668, 62 S.Ct. 129, 86 L.Ed. 534, the taxpayers inherited property which was put up for sale without result. Later, as here, the land was subdivided for sale into lots. The taxpayers, as here, conducted their business through an agent, paying him a stipulated commission. The Court said:

“We fail to see that the reasons behind a person’s entering into a business — whether it is to make money or whether it is to liquidate — should be determinative of the question of whether or not the gains resulting from sales are ordinary gains or capital gains. The sole question is — were the taxpayers in the business of subdividing real estate? If they were, then it seems indisputable that the property sold falls within the exception in the definition of capital assets in the statute above quoted —that is, that it constituted ‘property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.’ ”4

¶11In Snell v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 97 F.2d 891, 893, this Court said:

“The fact that he [the taxpayer] bought no additional lands during this period does not prevent his activities being a business. He merely had enough land to do a large business without buying any more. He was not reselling land in the condition in which he bought it, but was subdividing and platting it and sometimes improving it, so as to make wild lands into town lots, thus adding the business element of development. All was done with such purpose, system and continuity as well to, constitute it a business.”5

¶12The decision of the Tax Court is correct. It is accordingly

¶13Affirmed.

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