Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 143 F.2d 926 - Fox v. Summit King Mines, Ltd.

Fox v. Summit King Mines, Ltd.’s Empirical Analysis

143 F.2d 926 · 1944

Citation profile

42
cited by 42 later decisions
7
states following
July 2013
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 4 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently July 2013 · most notably Lindow v. United States (1984), Gulf King Shrimp Company v. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor (1969)

18 federal appellate · 4 district · 8 state decisions

15019441950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 151 (§ 1 of the National Labor Relations Act) · 29 U.S.C. § 203

Relies on Caminetti v. United States · Edwards v. People of State of California · International Textbook Co v. Pigg · National Labor Relations Board v. Sunshine Mining Co. · Walling v. Haile Gold Mines, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(T)he words 'suffer' and 'permit' as used in the statute mean 'with the knowledge of the employer.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “'(e)mploy' includes to suffer or permit to work.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Appellants’ argument seems almost to go to the extent of maintaining that the mere fact that employees were permitted to remain in or about the mill during the lunch period, or perchance that during such time they may have voluntarily performed some emergency service, that such circumstances would be sufficient to bring appellants within the provisions of the Act, notwithstanding the rule of the company as to free time or the further fact that the management assumed that any such occasional emergency service was charged as overtime by the worker on his time card and paid for as such. * * * “The answer to appellants’ argument that appellee suffered or permitted them to work is that in our opinion the words ‘suffer’ and ‘permit’ as used in the statute means ‘with the knowledge of the employer.’ ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.