¶1dissenting.
¶2I concur fully in Division 1, but I dissent from Division 2 and the judgment of reversal.
¶3The majority reverses the judgment because the assistant district attorney was allowed to ask the defendant why he was in jail, the objection being that he had not put his "reputation” into issue. A deputy sheriff *799had been called as a witness for the defendants to establish an alibi that the defendants were somewhere else on the occasion of the burglary. The witness-deputy had testified on direct examination that he knew the defendants and had known them when they were "serving time in Whitfield County jail where I work.” Thereafter, when the defendant Dennis Carroll was on cross examination with reference to the defendants’ connection with the deputy sheriff who had testified in their favor, he was asked: "How have you known him?” A. "When I was over in the jail, I was over there in the jail and I knowed him over there.” Q. "You knew him because you were in the jail?” A. "Yes, sir.” Q. "And where is this jail located?” A. "Whitfield County.” Q. "Why were you in jail?” Whereupon objection was made, "I object, Your Honor, he has not put any reputation into this issue.” This objection was overruled, and the state was allowed to ask the question over, which was then phrased, "What were you in jail for at that time?” A. "Burglary.” No further objection or motion for mistrial was made other than the initial, "He has not put any reputation into this issue.” The majority contends that the evidence tends to show a general criminal propensity more than it tends to prove an issue in the case, and it should not be introduced to the jury, citing Hanson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 200. The majority then holds that the jury was undoubtedly influenced by testimony that defendants were recently in jail for a prior burglary. It is noted here that the defendants in their own testimony in their behalf had injected the fact that they had been in jail prior thereto. The majority holds that the fact that they were in jail was only "remotely and peripherally relevant.” The majority likewise holds that the defendants had not put in issue their character and that the question was not admissible for this reason also.
¶4On cross examination the opposing party, in this instance the state, is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross examination. Code § 38-1705; see Ralph v. State, 124 Ga. 81 (52 SE 298); Sullivan v. State, 222 Ga. 691, 693 (152 SE2d 382); Johnson v. State, 137 Ga. App. 308, 309 (223 SE2d 500). But generally, a witness cannot be asked the question, "How many times have you been in jail *800charged with crime?” A witness cannot be impeached or discredited in this manner. A witness may only be impeached by a conviction involving moral turpitude, and the highest and best evidence of such fact is the judgment of the court in which he was convicted. See Reid v. State, 49 Ga. App. 429 (1) (176 SE 100), in which Pierce v. State, 29 Ga. App. 68 (113 SE 47), was expressly overruled; also Howard v. State, 144 Ga. 169 (2) (86 SE 540); Beach v. State, 138 Ga. 265 (1) (75 SE 139); Swain v. State, 151 Ga. 375 (4) (107 SE 40); Smith v. State, 200 Ga. 188 (5), 199 (36 SE2d 350).
¶5It is quite clear from the above that the highest and best evidence of a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is the proper way to impeach a witness in this manner. If this had been the objection of defense counsel to the examination of the witness as to why he was in jail, his objection would be meritorious. But I do not agree that the objection here was meritorious, although I disagree with the trial court that since the defense had injected the fact that the witness-deputy sheriff knew the defendants because they had been in jail in Whitfield County where he saw them, this would authorize a cross examination in regard thereto. I agree fully with the majority that the state could not expand on this matter by delving into why the defendants were in jail. I do not agree that the case should be reversed because this question and evidence was not relevant to an issue in the case. Counsel for the defense simply did not raise this, and this court should not raise it for him. The evidence did corroborate and explain the admission that the defendants were previously in jail where they came to know the deputy sheriff. The objection as made simply was not the proper objection to be made in this instance. The objection was, "He has not put any reputation into this issue.” This objection simply does not authorize the majority to reverse as to relevancy and character.
¶6I, therefore, respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.