majority"> Walker, J.,

after stating tbe case: Tbe only contention made in this Court by tbe defendant’s counsel was tbat be fully complied with tbe order of Judge Jones when be executed tbe deed to tbe trustee therein appointed. In support of this position, it was argued tbat Judge Jones necessarily found as a fact tbat tbe deed from tbe defendant to his son was fraudulent and void, because be recited in, bis order tbat it appeared tbe defendant owned-a one-balf interest in the land. We do not think tbat any such inference can reasonably be deduced from tbat recital, when it is considered with tbe context of tbe order, as it should be. It is clear tbat tbe recital was based upon tb© fact tbat on 10 March, 1899, a deed for the one-balf interest bad been made by John N. Hunter to tbe defendant (tbe other half having been conveyed to bis son by the same deed), and tbe admission of tbe parties tbat tbe defendant was, at tbe time the order Avas made, tbe owner of tbe one-balf interest acquired by tbe deed. But, evidently, Judge J ones did not know of tbe subsequent deed of tbe father to tbe son, or be would not have made such a recital, as the defendant’s representation tbat be owned an interest in tbe land was not true. It would appear tbat tbe defendant was concealing tbe existence of this deed *409 from tbe Court and from bis wife, and attempted to commit a fraud in doing so. lie knew that be bad made tbe deed to bis son, and be must bave known that tbe Court and bis wife were ignorant of tbe fact. Tbe recitals in tbe order of Judge Jones all tend conclusively to show it. But however this may be, whether be was guilty of an intentional or fraudulent concealment or not, we do not think be has complied with tbe order. He was required to convey a one-fourth interest to tbe trustee, whereas it turned out that, when be made tbe deed, be bad no such interest to convey. He bad, before that time, conveyed all of his interest to bis son. Perhaps this was his reason for making tbe deed in tbe form of a quitclaim. Tbe law and tbe Court intended not merely a color-able, but a real and substantial compliance with tbe order. We would mock at this plaintiff’s calamity and turn her away empty-handed, when she is entitled to relief, should we bold that there bad been any genuine attempt by the defendant to comply with tbe order. We bave found no evidence in this record of any fraud committed by the defendant when be conveyed to bis son; and besides, if bis deed was fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff, tbe Court did not intend that, under its order, she was not to receive tbe use and benefit of the land, but instead get a lawsuit. Besides, should tbe defendant be permitted to plead bis own fraud, in order to delay and vex the plaintiff, whose claim for alimony is at least meritorious ? Tbe purpose was that a good title to tbe one-fourth interest should be conveyed to the trustee; for bow could be well lease tbe land or sell it without such a title ? Tbe Court assumed that tbe defendant bad a valid 'title, for otherwise it would simply bave ordered payment of tbe money. No other conclusion can be legitimately drawn from tbe facts.

But Judge Shaiv bad adjudged tbe defendant in contempt and ordered him to stand committed until be bad complied *410 with the order. His ruling was affirmed by this Court on appeal. It has not been modified by Judge McNeill, but on the contrary affirmed in every particular, and the said order was directed by him to be executed. The defendant cannot, by .a second appeal, review the former decree of this Court. Pretzfelder v. Ins. Co., 123 N. C., 164.

Judge McNeill found as a fact that the defendant had denied that he had any title to the land or any interest therein, when the trustee demanded possession of him and his son. How, in the face of this finding, can he now ask to have it entered of record that he had complied with the order of the Court ? As he was not able to malee the requisite title, he should have paid the money into Court according to the terms of the orders of Judge Shaw and Judge McNeill. This is what they clearly meant should be done, unless he had otherwise complied with the order by securing a good title to the one-fourth interest, and conveying that interest to the trustee. Not having done so and not proposing to do so, he was manifestly if not flagrantly disobeying the order, and was therefore acting in contempt of the authority of the Court, for which conduct he was properly adjudged to be committed. Pain v. Pain, 80 N. C., 325.

We find no error in the ruling of the Court.

No Error.

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