B.C. v. A.A’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““‘A juvenile court is required to apply a two-pronged test in determining whether to terminate parental rights: (1) clear and convincing evidence must support a finding that the child is dependent; and (2) the court must properly consider and reject all viable alternatives to a termination of parental rights. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d 950, 954 (Ala.1990).’ “B.M. v. State, 895 So.2d 319, 331 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). A juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Bowman v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 534 So.2d 304, 305 (Ala.Civ.App.1988), ‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is ‘ “[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.”’ L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So.2d 171, 179 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (quoting Ala. Code 1975, § 6-ll~20(b)(4)); see also Ex parte McInish, 47 So.3d 767 (Ala.2008) (explaining standard of review of factual determinations required to be based on clear and convincing evidence). A juvenile court’s factual findings in a judgment terminating parental rights based on evidence presented ore tenus are presumed correct. R.B. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 669 So.2d 187 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. T.T. v. C.E. · J.W. v. Houston County Department of Human Resources

2. ““Once a juvenile court has placed a dependent child into the ‘permanent’ custody of a proper caregiver, the dependency of the child ends and any further change of custody is governed by the standards set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984). See Ex parte J.P., 641 So.2d 276, 278 (Ala.1994) (applying the McLendon standard in a custody dispute between two sets of relatives when one set of relatives had been awarded custody under a prior judicial order). Thus, the noncustodial relatives were required to meet the McLendon standard in order to be entitled to a modification of the custody of the children. As our supreme court reaffirmed in Ex parte Cleghorn, 993 So.2d 462, 466-67 (Ala.2008): “ ‘In Ex parte McLendon, we held that the trial court cannot order a change of custody “ ‘unless [the party seeking the change of custody] can show that a change of the custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare.’” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155,157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)). We noted in Ex parte McLendon that “[i]t is important that [the party seeking the change in custody] show that the child’s interests are promoted by the change, i.e., that [the party seeking the change in custody] produce evidence to overcome the ‘inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” 455 So.2d at 866 .’ “Our supreme court has also stressed that ‘[t]he McLendon standard is a “rule of repose,” meant to minimize disruptive changes of custody beca”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. T.D.I. v. A.P.