Stanley v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Alabama courts have recognized that photographs depicting the crime scene and the wounds of the victims are relevant and admissible. See Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d at 1151 (quoting Land v. State, 678 So.2d 201, 207 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)) (“‘The courts of this state have repeatedly held that photographs that accurately depict the crime scene and the nature of the victim’s wounds are admissible despite the fact that they may be gruesome or cumulative.” ’). See also Miller v. State, 63 So.3d 676, 704 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (applying law on autopsy photographs to crime-scene photographs); Vanpelt [v. State ], 74 So.3d [32,] 80 [ (Ala.Crim.App.2009) ] (same); Hyde [v. State ], 13 So.3d [997,] 1016 [ (Ala.Crim.App.2007) ] (same). “ ‘ ‘‘Generally photographs are admissible into evidence in a criminal prosecution ‘if they tend to prove or disprove some disputed or material issue, to illustrate or elucidate some other relevant fact or evidence, or to corroborate or disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered, and their admission is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.’ ” Bankhead v. State, 585 So.2d 97, 109 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), remanded on other grounds, 585 So.2d 112 (Ala.1991), aff'd on return to remand, 625 So.2d 1141 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), rev’d, 625 So.2d 1146 (Ala.1993), quoting Magwood v. State, 494 So.2d 124, 141 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 599 , 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986). “Photographic exhibits ar”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Petric v. State

2. ““The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky’s method of execution, Baze [v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 ,] 128 S.Ct. [1520,] 1538 [ (2008) ], and noted that ‘[a] State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this standard.’ Baze, [ 553 U.S. at 61 ,] 128 S.Ct. at 1537 . Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter dissented from the main opinion, arguing that ‘Kentucky’s protocol lacks basic safeguards used by other States to confirm that an inmate is unconscious before injection of the second and third drugs.’ Baze, [ 553 U.S. at 114 ,] 128 S.Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices recognized, however, that Alabama’s procedures, along with procedures used in Missouri, California, and Indiana ‘provide a degree of assurance — missing from Kentucky’s protocol — that the first drug had been properly administered.’ Baze, [ 553 U.S. at 121 ,] 128 S.Ct. at 1571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “The State argues, and we agree, that Belisle, like the inmates in Baze, cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that Alabama’s lethal-injection protocol poses a substantial risk of harm by asserting the mere possibility that something may go wrong. ‘Simply because an execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish the sort of “objectively intolerable risk of harm” that qualifies as cruel and unusual.’ Baze, [ 553 U.S. at 50”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Scheuing v. State