143 Vt.
Volume 143 — Vermont Reports
120 opinions
- 143 Vt. 1In re J. J. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 6In re M. W. R. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 11State v. Clark (1983)
- 143 Vt. 15In Re Hough (1983)
- 143 Vt. 20State v. Kingsbury (1983)
- 143 Vt. 23In Re Mecier (1983)
- 143 Vt. 33State v. Partlow (1983)
- 143 Vt. 40State v. Quintin (1983)
- 143 Vt. 45Stockwell v. DISTRICT COURT OF VERMONT (1983)
- 143 Vt. 52Morissette v. Morissette (1983)
- 143 Vt. 62Guardianship of H. L. (1983)
<bold>1. Guardian and Ward — Guardian Ad Litem — Appointment</bold> There is no statutory requirement that the probate court appoint a guardian ad litem for an incompetent parent in a proceeding for appointment of a guardian for the minor child of such parent. <cross_reference>14 V.S.A. § 2645</cross_reference>(2).<page_number>Page 63</page_number> <bold>2. Courts — Probate Courts — Procedure</bold> The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the probate courts. V.R.C.P. 1. <bold>3. Guardian and Ward — Guardian Ad Litem — Appointment</bold> The appointment of a guardian ad litem is a power inherent in courts in dealing with those appearing before them who are under disability. <bold>4. Judges — Powers and Duties — Generally</bold> It is the duty of the court at all stages of a trial to see that the interests of an incompetent person are fully protected and preserved. <bold>5. Guardian and Ward — Guardian Ad Litem — Appointment</bold> A guardian ad litem must be appointed for an incompetent litigant when fundamental rights are involved, even if the incompetent objects to such an appointment. <bold>6. Constitutional Law — Due Process — Family Matters</bold> Both the right of a parent to custody and the liberty interest of parents and children to relate to one another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference, are rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. <bold>7. Guardian and Ward — Guardian Ad Litem — Appointment</bold> Where at the time grandparents filed a petition seeking to be appointed guardians of a minor child the child's mother was a patient at the Vermont State Hospital, and the trial court, upon being informed by the mother's counsel that he was unable to communicate with his client because of a deterioration in her mental condition, denied counsel's request that a guardian ad litem be appointed for her, rather than requiring a showing sufficient to enable it to make a judicial determination as to whether the mother was competent to proceed without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, its judgment granting guardianship of the child to the grandparents would be reversed.
- 143 Vt. 66Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 80In Re Burlington Housing Authority Declaratory Ruling 124 (1983)
- 143 Vt. 84Argast v. State Environmental Board (1983)
- 143 Vt. 87Heisse v. State (1983)
- 143 Vt. 91Hill v. Conway (1983)
- 143 Vt. 95Buttura v. Buttura (1983)
- 143 Vt. 100Davis v. Davis (1983)
- 143 Vt. 102Kaplan v. Kaplan (1983)
- 143 Vt. 107Ragosta v. Ragosta (1983)
- 143 Vt. 113Wood v. Wood (1983)
- 143 Vt. 120In re Central Vermont Public Service Corp. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 123Burkhart v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 128Solomon v. Design Development, Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 132Merchants Bank v. Thibodeau (1983)
- 143 Vt. 135Hall v. Miller (1983)
- 143 Vt. 147Quinlan v. Hamel (1983)
- 143 Vt. 150Sullivan v. Lochearn, Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 154Desjarlais v. Gilman (1983)
- 143 Vt. 159Myers v. Brown (1983)
- 143 Vt. 167Birkenhead v. Coombs (1983)
- 143 Vt. 175Smith v. Drummond (1983)
- 143 Vt. 178Thibault v. Vartuli (1983)
- 143 Vt. 182Beaudry v. Town of Chester (1983)
- 143 Vt. 187In re Angelucci (1983)
- 143 Vt. 191State v. Jarrett (1983)
- 143 Vt. 197State v. Mosher (1983)
- 143 Vt. 210State v. Murray-Miller (1983)
- 143 Vt. 213State v. Tenney (1983)
- 143 Vt. 217Goss Dodge, Inc. v. Acciavatti (1983)
- 143 Vt. 219LaFlamme v. Church (1983)
- 143 Vt. 220Northern Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Conway (1983)
- 143 Vt. 224State v. Shores (1983)
- 143 Vt. 228In Re Judy Ann's Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 235Mancini v. Mancini (1983)
- 143 Vt. 241Norse v. Melsur Corp. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 245State v. Bristol (1983)
- 143 Vt. 252Bevins v. King (1983)
- 143 Vt. 257Vermont National Bank v. Chittenden Trust Co. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 268Board of Medical Practice v. Perry-Hooker (1983)
- 143 Vt. 271Chittenden Trust Co. v. King (1983)
- 143 Vt. 275State v. Martell (1983)
- 143 Vt. 280Page v. Smith-Gates Corp. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 283State v. Pike (1983)
- 143 Vt. 290Capen v. Department of Employment & Training (1983)
- 143 Vt. 291City of Montpelier v. Town of Berlin (1983)
- 143 Vt. 294Ski-Lan Gymnastics & Performing Arts Educational Foundation, Inc. v. City of Rutland (1983)
- 143 Vt. 298Atwood v. Atwood (1983)
- 143 Vt. 301Cliche v. Cliche (1983)
- 143 Vt. 308Adams v. B.P.C., Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 311Davis v. Manning (1983)
- 143 Vt. 316Furgueson v. Dunstan (1983)
- 143 Vt. 319Ronay's Famous Shoes, Inc. v. St. Peter (1983)
- 143 Vt. 325In Re John L. Norris Trust (1983)
- 143 Vt. 329Carpenter v. Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (1983)
- 143 Vt. 335Arjay Properties, Inc. v. Hicks (1983)
- 143 Vt. 339Northeast Petroleum Corp. of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State (1983)
- 143 Vt. 344In re Y. B. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 348State v. Amarantes (1983)
- 143 Vt. 353State v. Hull (1983)
- 143 Vt. 355State v. Johnson (1983)
- 143 Vt. 360State v. Kilborn (1983)
- 143 Vt. 369State v. Kirby (1983)
- 143 Vt. 372State v. Loehmann (1983)
- 143 Vt. 378State v. Lupien (1983)
- 143 Vt. 383State v. Normandy (1983)
- 143 Vt. 388State v. Orvis (1983)
- 143 Vt. 392State v. Ruud (1983)
- 143 Vt. 396State v. Williams (1983)
- 143 Vt. 408State v. Wood (1983)
- 143 Vt. 413State v. Young (1983)
- 143 Vt. 416Vermont Union School District No. 21 v. H. P. Cummings Construction Co. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 432In re A. D. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 437In Re Village of Hardwick Electric Department (1983)
- 143 Vt. 445Boisvert v. Boisvert (1983)
- 143 Vt. 449Prouty v. Manchester Motors, Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 458Lyon v. Lyon (1983)
- 143 Vt. 468State v. Piper (1983)
<bold>1. Constitutional Law — Miranda Warning — When Necessary</bold> A defendant about to undergo a custodial interrogation must first be told that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. <bold>2. Courts — Decisions — Applicability</bold> Judicial decisions announcing a new rule of law will be given effect to cases pending on direct review. <bold>3. Constitutional Law — Waiver of Rights — Juveniles</bold> Under the Vermont Constitution a juvenile may waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel only if the following conditions have been met: (1) he must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult; (2) the adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile; and (3) the independent interested adult must be informed and be aware of the rights guaranteed to the juvenile. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10. <bold>4. Constitutional Law — Waiver of Rights — Juveniles</bold> The purpose of the interested adult rule is to guard against improvident waivers of constitutional rights resulting from the minor's lack of sophistication or experience and to guarantee that his decision is as well considered as that of an adult under similar circumstances. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10. <bold>5. Constitutional Law — Waiver of Rights — Juveniles</bold> The right to consult with an interested, informed and independent adult before deciding whether to waive or assert the right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination accrues to a person under the age of eighteen at the commencement of a custodial interrogation simultaneously with the right to be given <italic>Miranda</italic> warnings. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10. <bold>6. Constitutional Law — Waiver of Rights — Juveniles</bold> In the case of a juvenile who was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in a careless and negligent manner, incriminating statements made by the juvenile to the investigating officer when no interested, informed and independent adult was present were not erroneously admitted into evidence, since the juvenile<page_number>Page 469</page_number> went to the police station where he made the statements voluntarily, was not under arrest or detention, was at all times during the investigation free to leave, and, therefore, was not "in custody" at the time the incriminating statements were made. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10; <cross_reference>23 V.S.A. § 1091</cross_reference>(a).
- 143 Vt. 474State v. Dustin (1983)
- 143 Vt. 477State v. Hamlin (1983)
- 143 Vt. 483Petition of Town of Springfield to Condemn (1983)
- 143 Vt. 495Littlefield v. Department of Employment & Training (1983)
- 143 Vt. 497Cook v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING (1983)
- 143 Vt. 504Petition of Telesystems, Corp. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 512In Re Local 1201, Afscme, Rutland Dept. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 518Forte v. Forte (1983)
- 143 Vt. 521Benya v. Stevens and Thompson Paper Co. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 527Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling (1983)
- 143 Vt. 537Crosby v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1983)
<bold>1. Negligence — Liability — Generally</bold> Ordinarily a person who is not the owner and is not in control of property is not liable for negligence with respect to such property. <bold>2. Judgments — Summary Judgment — Burden of Proof</bold> A party who moves for summary judgment satisfies his legal burden when he presents at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar plaintiff's claim. V.R.C.P. 56. <bold>3. Negligence — Liability — Defenses</bold> In an action for negligence which arose when plaintiffs fell over a wall onto defendants' parking lot, in which plaintiffs alleged that the wall was "a dangerous and hazardous condition," trial court correctly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, since the object which caused plaintiffs' fall was located on an adjoining parking lot which defendant neither owned nor controlled. V.R.C.P. 56. <bold>4. Judgments — Summary Judgment — Findings of Fact</bold> Although the term "findings of fact" normally implies a resolution of disputed facts by the trial court after hearing the evidence presented, in a summary judgment context findings would merely include precise statements delineating the facts that exist without substantial controversy. V.R.C.P. 56. <bold>5. Judgments — Summary Judgment — Findings of Fact</bold> Trial courts are urged to include findings with an order granting summary judgment to facilitate appellate review. V.R.C.P. 56.
- 143 Vt. 539Lent v. Huntoon (1983)
- 143 Vt. 554In re C. L. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 560In re L. R. R. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 565In re R. S. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 573State v. Doucette (1983)
- 143 Vt. 590In Re Hall (1983)
- 143 Vt. 597State v. Kerr (1983)
- 143 Vt. 610State v. Dapo (1983)
- 143 Vt. 615Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 625Stowell v. Simpson (1983)
- 143 Vt. 631State v. Coulombe (1983)
- 143 Vt. 636Petition of VSEA, Inc. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 647In re Stoddard (1983)
- 143 Vt. 647In re Cain (1983)
- 143 Vt. 647Jacobs v. Carroll (1983)
- 143 Vt. 647Haldeman v. Metropolitan Petroleum Co. (1983)
- 143 Vt. 648In re Morrissey (1983)
- 143 Vt. 648Houston v. Town of Ferrisburg (1983)
- 143 Vt. 648Town of Burke v. Leach (1983)
- 143 Vt. 649Town of Burke v. Hackett (1983)
- 143 Vt. 649Goulette v. Goulette (1983)