Holtum v. Grief’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

103 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 103 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The question, then, is as to the power of the trial court to vacate an order granting or denying a new trial after it has once been regularly made and entered. The decisions of this court are numerous and uniform to the effect that a judgment or order once regularly entered can foe reviewed and set aside only in tfoe modes prescribed by statute. If they have been entered prematurely, or by inadvertence, they may be set aside on the proper showing (Odd Fellows’ Sav. Bank v. Deuprey, 66 Cal. 170 [ 4 Pac. 1173 ], and cases cited), and, if the order as entered is not the order as made, the minutes may be corrected so as to make them speak the truth (Garoutte v. Haley, 104 Cal. 497 [ 38 Pac. 194 ], and cases cited); but subject to these exceptions the order is reviewable only on appeal, and, the decision of the trial court having been once made after regular submission of the motion, its power is exhausted — it is functus officio.”'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 36 Cal. 2d 483 - City of San Diego v. Superior Court · Luke v. Coleman

2. ““ . . . Here it is suggested there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appeal from the order overruling the motion for execution, but this remedy although plain is neither speedy nor adequate. The appeal, in the ordinary course, would not be decided for a long time, and pending the appeal there would be no security for the payment of the judgment. And, besides, nothing would necessarily result from an appeal beyond a reversal of the order, and this would merely confirm the right of the petitioner to execution—a right already complete. So that unless the judgment of reversal was accompanied by a mandatory direction to order the issuance of execution, the petitioner would find himself at the end of his appeal precisely where he is now—with a right to demand the issuance of the writ, but with no power to compel it. Considerations such as these must have been the ground of decision in Garoutte v. Haley, 104 Cal. 497 [ 38 Pac. 194 ], ...””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 88 Cal. App. 260 - Edwards v. Superior Court