In re Mertens’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““By the present act, the title of the trustee is vested in the estate of the bankrupt ‘as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt.’ We are of opinion that until the date of the adjudication a lienor or pledgee is at liberty to perfect any title which the nature of the lien permits. Under the act of 1867, no lien could be acquired after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, because the title of the assignee vested as of the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy. Now the trustee takes the property of the bankrupt in the condition in which he finds it at the date of the adjudication, unless it has been incumbered fraudulently or in contravention of some of the provisions of the act. Under the former act- there were many decisions that a lien previously acquired could not be enforced subsequent to the commencement of the proceeding, except with the permission of the bankruptcy court. The Supreme Court, however, refused to sanction these decisions, and held that the lienor was entitled to perfect his title and enforce his rights as though no proceeding had been commenced. Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521 [ 23 L. Ed. 403 ]; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 [ 24 L. Ed. 136 ]. The change in the present act, by which the trustee’s title is that only which exists at the date of the adjudication, removes any uncertainty which arose under the act of 1867. It was intended, we think, to permit all legitimate business transactions between a debtor and those dealing with him to be carr”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Zotti · Hersh v. United States

2. ““The decision of the court below proceeded not only upon the ground that the sale was unwarranted by the terms of the pledge, but also upon the ground that, having been after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, it was inoperative and subject to the supervision and control of the court, because the act suspends the exercise of the pledgee’s remedy pending the adjudication of bankruptcy. * * * That Congress did not intend that lienors or pledgees should be prejudiced in enforcing their rights by the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy is indicated by the change made in the present act with respect to the proof of claims by secured creditors. * * * The present act provides that the value of his (the pledgee's) security may be deter-. mined, among other methods, by converting it into money pursuant to his contract rights, and thus, if he has enforced it as the contract with the debtor allowed, he is permitted to prove the unsatisfied balance of his claim. Section 57, subd. ‘h,’ prescribed several modes of valuation, and the one referred to is exclusive of the others, and is superfluous and useless, unless it is intended to authorize the creditor, without interference by the trustee or the court, to value his own security, provided he turns it into money according to the terms of the agreement pursuant to which it was delivered to him.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Mayer · In re Peacock

3. ““The provisions of the present bankrupt act requiring secured creditors to surrender preferences, and when the security Is not preferential to have its value determined, as a condition precedent, to the allowance of the claim, have no application to cases in which the security was not the property of the bankrupt. * * * ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Graves