Hardy v. Gray’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 8 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “‘■We have shown that an element expressly contained therein is that the creditor shall have liad reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference. Naturally and justly it would be said that no one could be charged with a reasonable cause to believe something, unless that something existed to which the belief was supposed to rebate. It is true that the ordinary rule that a person who does an act is supposed lo contemplate wliat results therefrom applies to cases of tills class, but only as an element; and it cannot apply, even as an element, unless the party who does the act has a knowledge of the essential fads which tend to produce the resulting consequences, or at least has a reasonable cause to believe them or purposely shuts his eyes.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stevens v. Oscar Holway Co. · Kimmerle v. Farr

2. ““The bankrupt act, in section 60a, provides: ‘A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has within four months before the filing of the petition, or after the filing of the petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the adjudication, procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class.’ A ‘creditor’ is defined to include any one who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy. Section 1, subd. 9, Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419). It is essential therefore, in order to set aside the alleged preference, that Shaw & Co. at the time of the transfer should have stood in the relation of creditor to the bankrupt.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re McLoon

3. ““It appears to us that by this the learned 'judge eliminated the element of actual intention on the part of the debtor to give a preference. In other words, the rule laid down is apparently that, so long as the debtor is insolvent, and knows that he is insolvent, and makes a payment of a pre-existing debt, the intent to prefer is a presumption of law. Whatever may tare been the meaning of the learned judge, we understand that on the whole he held the view of the law which the trustees squarely took before us; tliat is to say, ‘that all that It is necessary for them to prove is that Towers and Mayer and Hardy had reasonable cause to believe that Andrews was insolvent on the dates in question.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Debus v. Yates