144 Ill.

Volume 144 — Illinois Reports

70 opinions

144 Ill. 9Chicago v. Wedel (1892)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 14Kohlsaat v. Crate (1892)
1. Injunctions — dissolution — amount of damages. Section 12 of chapter 69, relating to injunctions, does not, either expressly or by implication, limit the amount of damages to be assessed against the complainant on the dissolution of an injunction, to the penalty of the bond given. On the contrary, ic implies the assessment of such damages as will compensate the injured party for such losses as are directly occasioned to him, and such expenditures as are necessarily occasioned, by the wrongful suing out of the injunction, whether any bond is given or not. 2. The office of an injunction bond is not to create or measure the liability of the complainant for damages, but to secure the payment of such damages up to the amount of the penalty of the bond. 3. Same — of the bond. The statute (sec. 9, chap. 69) authorizes the granting of an injunction without bond in cases for good cause shown, when the judge or master is of the opinion that the injunction ought to be granted without any bond. The statute fixes the amount of the bond only in cases where the collection of judgments is sought to be enjoined. In all other cases the penalty of the bond is discretionary with the judge or master awarding the writ. 4. Chancery — recitals in a decree — how far conclusive. One of the usual modes of preserving the evidence of a fact in a chancery suit, is by the finding of such fact in the decree. In such case, the evidence must be preserved in the record by a certificate, if its sufficiency to establish the fact is questioned. When the evidence is not preserved by certificate, the findings of fact in the decree will be conclusive on this court.
144 Ill. 21Jackson v. Glos (1892)
Writ of Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 23Kozel v. Dearlove (1892)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. L. C. Collins, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 26Schultz v. Meiselbar (1892)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Geo. R. Driggs, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 29Wilson v. Trustees of Schools (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Calhoun county; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 32Guertin v. Mombleau (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. N. J. Pillsbury, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 40Wunderle v. Wunderle (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jersey county; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 68Plummer v. Yost (1893)
Appeal from the County Court of Jefferson county; the Hon. John C. Edwards, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 77Wisconsin Granite Co. v. Gerrity (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. H. M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 83Neufeld v. Rodeminski (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. George Driggs, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 90Waterman v. Alden (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee county; the Hon. John D. Crabtree, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 108Vose v. Strong (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 115Herbert v. Herbert (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 125Stodalka v. Novotny (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward P. Vail, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 132Arnold v. Bournique (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 140Coughlin v. People (1893)
Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. P. McConnell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 197Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. P. McConnell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 203Stafford v. Woods (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Knox county;—the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 213Lancaster v. Roberts (1893)
Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. H. M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 227Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Co. v. Rice (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. Lyman Lacey, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 238McNeil v. Shober & Carqueville Lithographing Co. (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. P. McConnell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 241Cornell v. Newkirk (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. L. C. Collins, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 248Monson v. Kill (1898)
1. Agent’s authority—must be strictly pursued. The owner of land gave a real estate broker written authority to sell the same within six months for $13,000, one-half to paid be in cash, and the balance in' one, two and three years with six per cent interest, payable annually, secured by notes and mortgage on the property. The agent made a contract of sale which recited that the purchaser had paid $500 purchase money to be applied on the purchase when consummated, and had agreed to pay within ninety days after the title had been examined and found good, the further sum of $5500, and to pay the balance in three equal installments of $3000, due separately on or before one, two and three years after the date of the contract, and stipulating that the notes should provide that payments might be made on or before the time named in the notes, with six per cent interest, etc. Held, that the authority to sell for one-half cash in hand was in no sense complied with by a sale on ninety days’’ time, and that the authority to sell and make the balance over and above the cash payment payable in one, two and three years, did not authorize the making of a contract that such payments might be made on or before such times, at the option of the purchaser. 3. A written authority to an agent to sell land of his principal within six months for a fixed net price, one-half to be paid in cash and the balance in one, two and three years, with six per cent interest, payable annually, secured by notes and mortgage on the property, is not complied with by a sale on ninety days’ time. In such case the authority to sell is special and limited, and the purchaser will be required to know that the authority must be strictly pursued. 3. Cloud on title — contract for sale of land — by an agent — in excess of Ids authority. The record of a contract for the sale of land made by an agent not in pursuance of his authority, or in excess thereof, being such as to interfere with the sale by the principal, will be treated in equity as a cloud upon the title of the latter and set aside. 4. Same—bill to remove —must allege possession or that the land is unoccupied. A bill seeking to remove a cloud upon the title to land is defective if it fails to allege that the complainant is in the possession of the land, or that he claims to be the owner thereof, and that it is unimproved and unoccupied, and is subject to a special demurrer. 5. Same — waiver of defects in bill to remove. If the complainant in a bill to remove a cloud on title is in the possession of the land at the time of filing the bill, that fact should be alleged. But if the defendant fails to demur specially for that cause, and answers and proceeds to hearing without objection, he will waive the defect in the bill. 6. Chancery— decree nunc pro tunc. There is no error in entering a decree nunc pro tunc, thereby restricting the time in which to perfect an appeal, when the party is not thereby prevented from perfecting his appeal.
144 Ill. 256Day v. Wallace (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 261Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Arnol (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Owen T. Reeves, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 274Jackson v. Jackson (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Stark county; the Hon. N. E. Worthington, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 284Bardonski v. Bardonski (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 290Schultze v. Schultze (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lorin C. Collins, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 299Smith v. Smith (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. O. H. Horton, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 308People v. Miner (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Mercer county; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 313Lambert v. Alcorn (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 332Rayfield v. People ex rel. McElvain (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Jersey county; the Hon. George W. Herdman Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 336Stevens v. St. Mary's Training School (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. O. H. Horton, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 355Alexander v. Parker (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams county; the Hon. William Marsh, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 370Stock Quotation Telegraph Co. v. Board of Trade (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. George Driggs, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 373Cheney v. Patton (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 378Thompson v. People (1893)
Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 382Sharpe v. W. J. Morgan & Co. (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Elliott Anthony, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 391Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. City of Chicago (1893)
Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. G. W. Brown, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 392Illinois Central Railroad v. City of Chicago (1893)
144 Ill. 393Heuer v. North Western National Insurance Co. of Milwaukee (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. George H. Kettelle, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 403City of Joliet v. Shufeldt (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 413Holden v. Dunn (1893)
Writ of Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Kirk Hawes, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 422Goodrich v. Tenney (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county, the Hon. Lorin C. Collins, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 436Taylor v. Taylor (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 446City of Chicago v. Cummings (1893)
Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. George W. Brown, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 450Gage v. Gentzel (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. B. R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 458Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Co. v. People ex rel. Jaeger (1893)
Appeal from the County Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Samuel D. Wead, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 471Batcheller v. Batcheller (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 482Payne v. Irvin (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 490Niagara Fire Insurance v. Scammon (1891)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 507Svanoe v. Jurgens (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 517Lambert v. Wiltshire (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Coot county; the Hon. L. C. Collins, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 520Shaw v. Chicago Sash, Door & Blind Manufacturing Co. (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. John D. Crabtree, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 532Hall v. Cox (1893)
1. Appeals and writs of error—reviewing questions of fact — amount of damages. The judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming that of the Circuit Court, is conclusive, as to all the questions of fact involved in the case, upon this court. The amount of damages is a question of fact, and the judgment of the Appellate Court in relation thereto can not be reviewed by this court. 2. Same —preserving questions of law. Where no exception is taken as to the admission of evidence in the trial of a cause before the court alone, and no propositions of law are submitted to the court to be passed upon before or at the time of rendering judgment, no questions of law will be presented and the judgment will be affirmed.
144 Ill. 535Ingalls v. Allen (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 537Corrigan v. City of Chicago (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 551Glennon v. Burton (1893)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. P. McConnell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 554Wolfer v. Hemmer (1893)
Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Kirk Hawes, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 563Cummings v. City of Chicago (1893)
1. Statutes — whether special legislation—lato depending on the population of a city. Section 55 of the act of April 29, 1887, to amend article 9 of the Cities and Villages act, in force July 1, 1873, after providing that the amount of any special assessment for any local improvement in any city, incorporated town or village, may be divided into installments when so provided by the ordinance for the making of such improvement, and fixing the manner of payment of the same, etc., has this proviso: “ Provided, that in cities containing a population of fifty thousand or more, this and the following sections shall not apply, except in cases where any such special assessment exceeds, in the aggregate, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars”: Held, that the effect of the proviso is not such as to render the act special legislation within the meaning of section 33, article 4 of the constitution, and, therefore, void. The proviso can not, therefore, be rejected. 3. It has become the settled rule of construction in this State, that an act, general in its terms and uniform in its operation upon all persons and subject-matter in like situation, is a general law, and not obnoxious to the objection that it is local or special legislation. This case distinguished from Devine v. Commissioners of Cook County, 84 Ill. 590. In that case the power given by the act necessarily, not only by the limitation of population but by the wording of the statute and the purposes and objects declared, related to a single county.
144 Ill. 569City of Chicago v. Law (1893)
1. Special assessments —power of city to raise money thereby. The power of taxation by special assessment can not be exercised by a city or any other corporate authority unless the power has been expressly and clearly conferred by the legislature. In no case can a city resort to the taxation of property by special assessment unless the power has been clearly conferred. 3. The first section of article 5 of the act relating to cities and villages contains ninety-six distinct paragraphs specifying the different powers of the city council, but there is nothing in that article or any of its sections or clauses which confers authority to make a special assessment to raise money to enable the city to carry out any of these different powers. 3. Same — widening navigable river. Under section 1 of article 9 of the same act, a city has the right to levy special assessments to pay for the opening, grading and paving streets and alleys, and to pay for the making of sidewalks, sewers and other like improvements; but it has not the right under that section to make a special assessment to pay for the, widening of a navigable river of the United States which is under the control of the general government. Such an improvement has none of the elements of a local improvement, such as incorporated cities and villages have been in the habit of making by special assessment, but is one in which the general public have an interest. 4. The grant of power to cities and villages to deepen, widen, dock, cover, wall, alter or change the channel of water-courses, does not authorize them to resort to special assessment to raise money to put such power in execution. 5. When Congress has taken no action on the subject, the city, under the grant of legislative power, will have the right to make such improvement in a navigable river within its limits in aid of navigation as in its judgment may be required; but after Congress has passed an act on the subject, and has thus assumed jurisdiction over the subject, the city can only act in conformity to the act of Congress. 6. So when the act of Congress has declared it unlawful for the city of Chicago to make any improvement of the Chicago river until the plan of its work is submitted to and approved by the secretary of war, the city will have no power to improve that river, except by procuring the approval of the secretary of war. 7. Same — by whom may be challenged. Where an improvement is ordered which is manifestly one not pertaining to the locality, but one designed to be a great benefit to the country at large, an assessment therefor may be challenged by the property owner whose property may be assessed, and the court may refuse to confirm such assessment and dismiss the proceeding. 8. Commerce —power of Congress to regulate. Under the constitution of the United States Congress is clothed with power to regulate commerce, and, as commerce includes navigation, the improvement of harbors and navigable waters is included within the power.
144 Ill. 580Rhoads v. City of Metropolis (1891)
Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Massac county; the Hon. R. W. McCartney, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 588Harding v. Harding (1892)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F Tuley, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 604O'Sullivan v. People (1892)
Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. P. McConnell, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 611Telford v. Patton (1892)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson county; the Hon. C. S. Conger, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 628Rock Island & Peoria Railway Co. v. Dimick (1892)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 641Speyer v. Desjardins (1892)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county.; the Hon. L. C. Collins, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 651Monson v. Jacques (1893)
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.
144 Ill. 652Rogers v. Tyley (1892)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. L. C. Collins, Judge, presiding.