144 Ill. App. 3d 239 - Fisher v. Crippen’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
16 federal appellate · 20 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 85 Ill. 2d 161 - Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos · 85 Ill. 2d 146 - Witherell v. Weimer · 62 Ill. 2d 456 - Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. · 76 Ill. 2d 154 - Kerns v. Engelke · 33 Ill. 2d 316 - Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) the plaintiff was engaged in or was passing under or by a structural activity; (2) when the activity was being performed with reference to a structure; (3) a scaffold or other mechanical devise was being used; (4) a defect existed in the construction or use of the devise; (5) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries; (6) the defendant had charge of the work being performed; and (7) the defendant willfully violated the Act's safety standard.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““ ‘Proximate cause’ is a term of art which encompasses the distinct concepts of cause in fact and legal cause. Determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a cause of plaintiff’s injury involves nothing more than an analysis of the facts. Once it is established that the defendant’s conduct has in fact been a cause of the injury, however, there remains the question whether the defendant should be legally responsible for what he has caused. As otherwise stated, the question is whether the policy of the law will extend defendant’s responsibility to the consequences which have in fact occurred.” ( 54 Ill. App. 3d at 333 , 369 N.E.2d at 1292 .)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.