Perkins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[t]o prove a Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), violation [or a Napue v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264 (1959), violation], the petitioner must show that: (1) the State used the testimony; (2) the testimony was false; (3) the State knew the testimony was false; and (4) the testimony was material to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Williams v. Griswald , 743 F.2d [1533] at 1542 [ (11th Cir. 1984) ]. '[T]he defendant must show that the statement in question was "indisputably false," rather than merely misleading.' Byrd v. Collins , 209 F.3d 486 , 517 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Lochmondy , 890 F.2d 817 , 823 (6th Cir. 1989) ). 'The burden is on the defendants to show that the testimony was actually perjured, and mere inconsistencies in testimony by government witnesses do not establish knowing use of false testimony.' Lochmondy , 890 F.2d at 822 . '[I]t is not enough that the testimony is challenged by another witness or is inconsistent with prior statements, and not every contradiction in fact or argument is material.' United States v. Payne , 940 F.2d 286 , 291 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Bigeleisen , 625 F.2d 203 , 208 (8th Cir. 1980) ). '[T]he fact that a witness contradicts himself or herself or changes his or her story does not establish perjury.' Malcum v. Burt , 276 F.Supp.2d 664 , 684 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Monroe v. Smith , 197 F.Supp.2d 753 , 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001) )."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. LOVE v. the STATE. · McMillan v. State

2. “Under Strickland , to demonstrate prejudice a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability-one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome-that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In the context of the denial of challenges for cause, such prejudice can be shown only where one who was actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tramarus Deonte Dixon v. State of Iowa

3. “Because a defendant must demonstrate prejudice in a [post-conviction] proceeding, post-conviction relief based on a lawyer's incompetence with regard to the composition of the jury is reserved for a narrow class of cases where prejudice is apparent from the record, where a biased juror actually served on the jury.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tramarus Deonte Dixon v. State of Iowa