State v. Mack’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To preserve the role of the fact finder, i.e., to accord the deference demanded by Jackson , this Court has further subscribed to the general principle in cases involving circumstantial evidence that when the fact finder at trial reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence advanced by the defendant, "that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt." State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 , 680 (La.1984). A reasonable alternative hypothesis is not one "which could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion," but one that "is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not 'have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (quoting Jackson ). Thus, in all cases, the Jackson standard does not provide a reviewing court with a vehicle for substituting its appreciation of what the evidence has or has not proved for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517 , 521 ; State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165 , 1166. A reviewing court may impinge on the "fact finder's discretion ... only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law." State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 , 1310 (La.1988).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Baumberger · State v. Mayeux

2. “11sIn Jackson, we emphasized repeatedly the deference owed to the trier of fact and, correspondingly, the sharply limited nature of constitutional sufficiency review. We said that ‘all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution,’ 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (emphasis in the original); that the prosecution need not affirmatively ‘rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt,’ id., at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 ; and that a reviewing court ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution,’ ibid.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 161 So. 3d 64 - State v. Ellis

3. “to facilitate appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 , 1201 (La. 1984). All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard. State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 , 820 (La. 1987).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 238 So. 3d 1076 - State v. Raine