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145 F.2d 228

Docket No. 11148.

Fitzgerald v. Sanford

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Oct. 20, 1944.

Writ of Certiorari Dismissed Dec. 18, 1944.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1944-10-20

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“cannot be affected retroactively by a sentence subsequently imposed.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Abrahams v. Rodgers

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 710

Relies on Fitzgerald v. Sanford

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1944-10-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently October 1982

4 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

5019441950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1See 65 S.Ct. 311.

¶2See, also, 142 F.2d 445.

¶3Thomas Fitzgerald, in pro. per.

¶4M. Neil Andrews, U. S. Atty., and Harvef H. Tisinger, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

¶5Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

¶6PER CURIAM.

¶7The applicant for habeas corpus was sentenced in Pennsylvania to six years’ imprisonment on Oct. 17, 1937. He served this sentence, less good time allowance under 18 U.S.C.A. § 710, and was conditionally released on Dec. 23, 1941, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 716b. Not giving bond, he was taken to New Jersey, where an indictment for another offense was pending. On it he was sentenced on July 22, 1942, to a term of four years and returned to the penitentiary. If both sentences had been in effect dufing the first period of imprisonment, the more liberal good time allowance on the aggregate sentences of ten years would have shortened the total time of imprisonment to a period less than he has now served. The claim is that the prisoner’s plight should not be worsened by the United States having delayed the second trial till the first sentence was served, custody having in fact been continuous. The District Court held that good time allowances depend on the aggregate of sentences in existence at the time the good time is earned, and cannot be affected retroactively by a sentence subsequently imposed. This we think is a correct interpretation of the statute allowing them. When the appellant was conditionally released from imprisonment under his first sentence the good time allowance due him thereon was fixed. A subsequent imprisonment under a later sentence, although there was continuous custody, has its own separate basis for good time computation.

¶8Judgment affirmed.

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