145 F3d 1339 Murphy v. Wilson
145 F.3d 1339
Stephen P. MURPHY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Pete WILSON, Governor, As the Governor and Chief Executive
of the State of California in his individual and official
capacity; Individuals, Serving in the position of Chairman,
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of the California Board
of Prison Terms, in their individual and official
capacities; J. Nielson; J. Gillis; M. Guaderrama; D.
McCuen, C. Bentley; J. Lander; J. Aceto; R. Jauregui; R.
Castro; E. Tong; R. Koenig, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-55463.
D.C. No. CV-95-04691-JDG-BQR.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 20, 1998.**
Decided April 27, 1998.
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John G. Davies, District Judge, Presiding.
Before BRUNETTI, RYMER, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
Stephen P. Murphy, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as the denial of his motion for preliminary injunctive relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). We affirm.
Murphy contends that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint because: (1) the district court held him to standards which were too high for a pro se litigant; (2) he has a liberty interest in being considered for parole due to the mandatory language of the statutes and regulations; (3) the Board of Prison Terms is biased; and (4) the district court erred when denying his request for a preliminary injunction ordering defendants not to retaliate against him for pursuing this litigation.
Insofar as Murphy contends that (2) he has a liberty interest in being considered for parole due to the mandatory language of the statutes and regulations, and (3) the Board of Prison Terms is biased, because a challenge to the procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the validity of the denial of parole and, therefore, the prisoner's continued confinement, Murphy failed to state a cognizable claim under § 1983, and these two claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir.1997).
However, issue (1) and issue (4) do not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or continuing confinement, and although they are properly brought under section 1983, see Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir.1997), we affirm for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation as adopted by the district judge in the order filed on February 27, 1997.
AFFIRMED.