145 F. 3d 1340 - William Rupert v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

MEMORANDUM*

William Rupert appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC/R") on Rupert's claim for restitution under the Federal Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A)(ii). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the grant of summary judgment and question of standing, see ACF Indus. Inc. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 42 F.3d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1994), and we affirm.

The district court did not err by determining that Rupert lacked standing to bring his first cause of action for restitution. See Smith v. Block, 784 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1986) (listing requirements for standing). The district court did not err by granting summary judgment because defendant's motion gave Rupert adequate notice that defendant was moving for summary judgment on his first cause of action. In addition, Rupert presented evidence and adequately briefed the issue in his opposition to the summary judgment motion and at oral argument. See Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 311-12 (9th Cir.1982).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rupert's motions to alter or amend the judgment, brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), or for relief from judgment, brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, because none of the grounds advanced by Rupert entitle him to relief. See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (listing grounds). The district court did not err by construing Rupert's Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 motion as a reply brief, and refusing to allow him to file a reply. See In re Ointex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1498 (9th Cir.1991) (Central District's local rules do not require court to allow party to file a reply brief).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rupert's motions to disqualify the magistrate judge to whom Rupert consented.1 See 28 §§ U.S.C. 455(a) and 455(b)(1) (disqualification where impartiality might reasonably be questioned, for personal bias or prejudice, or for personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (judge's bias or personal knowledge of facts must arise from extrajudicial source); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (waiver of ground under subsection (a) may be accepted if there is full disclosure of the basis for disqualification).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rupert's requests to proceed in forma pauperis, both in the district court and on appeal. See O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616-17 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that this court may review denial of in forma pauperis status despite district court's failure to state bases for denial). Because the magistrate judge had the authority to deny Rupert's request for in forma pauperis status, he did not err by entering the denial nunc pro tunc.2

AFFIRMED.