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145 Mass. 20

Hamilton v. McLaughlin

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1887-07-01

<p>If the keeper of a livery stable, who, upon learning that a horse in his stable belongs to another person, notifies the owner that the horse is there, and states the amount due for its board, refuses, upon the demand of the owner a few weeks later, to deliver the horse to him unless the whole bill for its board is paid, he waives whatever lien he may have for the board of the horse after the notice to the owner.</p> <p>In an action for the conversion of personal property, a mortgage of the property to the plaintiff, purporting to be executed in the name of a corporation by its president and under its corporate seal, is sufficient prima facie evidence of the incorporation, and of the authority of the president to execute the mortgage.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“assertion of a right other than that given by the lien”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 159 F. Supp. 30 - In Re the Snow Maiden

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1887-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently December 1972 · most notably Earnshaw v. Whittemore (1907), Folsom v. Barrett (1902)

4 district · 24 state decisions — followed in 10 states

801887189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

W. Alleít, J.

¶1The only lien which the defendant claims is for keeping the horse after notice to the plaintiffs, and a request to take it away. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that he had such a lien, and whether the instructions asked in regard to it were sound, we do not find it necessary to consider. It is immaterial that the defendant had a lien, if he waived it at the time of the demand. A claim to hold the possession of the property, and a refusal to deliver it on demand under and in assertion of a right other than that given by the lien, would be evidence of a conversion. There is no dispute about the facts. When the defendant notified the plaintiffs that the horse was at livery with him, he stated the amount of board due. When the demand was made by the plaintiffs’ agent a few weeks later, the defendant refused to deliver the horse unless the whole bill for its board, amounting to about $40, was paid. He made no distinction between what occurred before and what occurred after the notice to the plaintiffs, but demanded the whole in one sum and as one debt. Had he claimed distinct liens for distinct debts, for what occurred before and what occurred after the notice to the plaintiffs, it may be that he would not thereby have waived a valid lien for one of the debts only, without the refusal of a tender of that alone; but the demand for the whole as one debt, and the refusal to deliver the property unless the whole was paid, was a refusal to deliver the *23property upon the payment of the amount which had accrued after the notice, or to accept a tender of that, and rendered a tender of it unnecessary. Jones v. Tarleton, 9 M. & W. 675. The Norway, Br. & Lush. 404. Kerford v. Mondel, 5 H. & N. 931. Dirks v. Richards, 4 Man. & Gr. 574. Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270.

¶2The evidence of the plaintiffs’ title was sufficient, and there was no error in the instructions in regard to it.

¶3 Exceptions overruled.

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