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145 Mass. 239

Taylor v. Taylor

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided November 22, 1887

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1887-11-22

Appeal, by the executors of the will of William Taylor, from a decree of the Probate Court, disallowing certain items in the executors’ account, charging interest to the legatees named in the will on debts due from them to the testator at the time of his death.

Relies on Cummings v. Bramhall

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1887-11-22

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently April 1941

5 state decisions

201887189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Morton, C. J.

¶1The question whether the executors have the right to charge interest, after the death of the testator, upon the debts due by his brothers and sisters, depends upon the intention of the testator, to be gathered from his will. Bacon v. Gassett, 13 Allen, 334. Cummings v. Bramhall, 120 Mass. 552.

¶2The will gives legacies to several persons; directs that the executors “ shall lay aside a fund of twenty-five thousand dollars,” of which his widow is to have the income during her life ; and devises and bequeaths the rest and residue of the estate to his brothers and sisters who may be living at the decease of the testator, to be divided equally between them.

¶3It then provides that, “ in case any of the legatees are indebted to me at the time of my decease, such indebtedness shall be deducted from the legacy given him or her, and the balance only paid over to such legatee, and if such indebtedness exceeds the legacy given them, I hereby discharge and release the surplus of such indebtedness.”

¶4The amounts due by the brothers and sisters at his death cannpt, in strictness, be regarded as advancements; but it is clear that the testator did not intend that they should be treated as debts capable of being collected. At his death they ceased to be debts to be collected, and became amounts which were to be included in making up the residue to be divided, and then to be deducted from the separate shares of the legatees. The language first used implies that the debts to be deducted are to be taken as they exist at the death of the testator: “ In case any of the legatees are indebted to me at the time of my decease, such indebtedness shall be deducted.” “ Such indebtedness” means the amount due at the decease of the testator. We think that the intention of the testator was that these debts should cease to be debts, and become at his decease in the nature of advancements. They therefore become substantially advancements,- not by force of the statute nor by reason of the original character of the debts, but because they are made so by the will of the testator.

¶5It follows that the executors are not entitled, in making up the residue, to charge, against the brothers and sisters of the testator who were indebted to him at the time of his decease, interest after his decease. Decree affirmed.

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